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Introduction 
Religion and Nationalism in Sri Lanka: 
Introducing Context, Questions and Framework 
Since the island nation of Sri Lanka attained independence in 1948, it has 
experienced periods of civil unrest marked by riots and governrnent implemented 
curfews. In the mid-1980s this agitation erupted into civil war between two 
parties: the Liberation Tigers ofTarnil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan 
government. Each is associated with a different ethnic group and a very 
particular nationalist rhetoric. 1 The L TTE, a group of militant separatists, claims 
to represent the Tamil population of the north and east, while the Sri Lankan 
governrnent is mostly comprised of politicians belonging to the island's ethnic 
majority - the Sinhalese. 2 
The island ' s politics have been examined by historians, political scientists 
and anthropologists. These scholars cover a range of issues and advance a variety 
of arguments. When I first began to engage with this scholarly literature, I 
became aware of some common themes and conclusions. In particular, I noted 
that scholars commonly label the government's nationalism as Sinhalese-
Buddhist. 3 Tamil nationalism, on the other hand, appears to be secular. Tamil 
nationalists have always proclaimed themselves secularists,4 disavowing religion 
and denying the kinds of connections that Sinhalese nationalists make between 
religion and politics. This religious difference between the two nationalisms 
seems remarkable, when we consider that the religious divide complements the 
1 Kristian Stokke and Anne Kirsti Ryntveit, "The Struggle For Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka," 
Growth and Change 31 (2000): 285 . 
2 Serena Tennekoon, "Newspaper Nationalism: Sinhala Identity as Historical Discourse," in Sri 
Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathon Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 205 . 
3 Ibid. When I call the Sri Lankan government 's nationalism 'Sinhalese,' I do not mean to suggest 
that minority groups are not included in the Sri Lankan government. In fact, the government 
comprises members of several minority communities (e.g. Tamils, the Muslims and the 
Burghers). Instead, I am suggesting that we can associate the Sri Lankan government with 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, because, since independence, successive governments have 
adopted rhetoric and policies which are Sinhalese-Buddhist in tone. The Sri Lankan government 
thus implies that being Sri Lankan means being Sinhalese-Buddhist. Many nation-states connect 
national identity to the identity of one group; the Sri Lankan government is not unusual in this 
regard. The Sri Lankan government, however, is perhaps more explicit than other governments in 
how it delineates this relationship. 
4 Partha S. Ghosh, Ethnicity versus Nationalism: The Devolution Discourse in Sri Lanka (New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), 76. 
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ethnic divide; the majority of Sinhalese are Buddhists and the majority of Tamils, 
Hindus. Given this parallel, one would expect Tamil nationalists to counter 
Sinhalese-Buddhist claims with an overtly Tamil-Hindu discourse, rather than a 
secular one. 
As I researched further, however, I encountered the work of a small band 
of scholars who complicated the religious difference that I had identified. These 
scholars engage in a lively debate over LTTE practices and terminology. Some 
identifY evidence ofreligion in the LTTE's practices, symbols and terminology, 
while others defend the LTTE's secularity. This scholarly literature clearly has 
important consequences: if the L TTE' s nationalism is rei igious, then is the L TTE 
insincere when it claims to be secular? Or is it unaware that its nationalism is 
religious? Or perhaps all nationalisms are religious,5 in which case: is the 
LTTE's nationalism any more religious than nationalisms elsewhere? And finally 
- ifthe LTTE's nationalism is religious, then is it religious in the same way as 
Sinhalese nationalism? 
My project has been shaped by these issues arising out of the scholarly 
literature. In particular, the scholarly literature has prompted me to ask the 
following questions, all of which structure my study: Is there a religious 
difference between Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism? And if so, what is it, and 
how did it develop? Also, ifthere is a difference, how have Tamil nationalists 
(and more particularly, the LTTE) mobilised a group identity without using 
religion in the same way as Sinhalese nationalists? 
In this thesis, I argue that scholars miss the point when they argue over 
whether the LTTE is a truly secular organisation. This is because 'religion' and 
'secular' have no fixed meanings. In this sense, there is no religious difference. 
Sinhalese nationalism is not somehow innately religious, and Tamil nationalism, 
secular. But in another important sense, there is a difference that pertains not to 
the absence or presence of religion, but to how the categories of religion and the 
secular are represented and mediated. While Tamil nationalists distance national 
identity from religious identity, Sinhalese nationalists depict the two as almost 
synonymous. I argue that these representations of national identity (and their 
5 
"There is certainly a long and interesting tradition that suggests nationalism is a religion." Tala! 
Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (California: Stanford University 
Press, 2003 ), 187. 
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relationship to the categories of religion and the secular) developed through a 
particular set ofhistorical circumstances in the late 19th, early 201h century. 
In this study, I also argue that the LTTE mobilises a group identity 
through two discourses: history, and violence and death. I draw four conclusions 
about these discourses which, in tum, inform us about how the LTTE mobilises a 
group identity. First, these discourses are structured by the claim to be secular. 
The LTTE thus mobilises a group identity through claims, traditions and 
practices that are represented as being secular. Second, these discourses 
propagate shared experiences of suffering (in the recent post -co Ionia I past) and 
liberation (in the present and future). I thus argue that the LTTE mobilises a 
group identity through these shared experiences. Third, these discourses refer to 
Tamil traditions which the LTTE explicitly claims to mould or even supersede. 
Consequently, I argue that the L TTE mobilises a group identity through 
reshaped, Tamil traditions. The fourth conclusion arises out ofthe last two. 
L TTE discourses emphasise an individual, societal and cultural transformation. I 
thus conclude that the LTTE mobilises a group identity through notions of 
becoming and transformation. Those who study the L TTE often miss these 
features when they apply the category of 'religion ' in self-evident ways. In 
particular, I argue that scholars miss the theme ofbecoming which pervades 
LTTE rhetoric and imagery. 
My thesis thus focuses on two issues: the religious difference between 
Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms, and the LTTE's efforts to mobilise a group 
identity. I tackle the first issue, here in the Introduction and in Chapter Two. 
Chapters Three and Four are devoted to the second issue. 
Here, in the Introduction, I establish Talal Asad's ideas about religion and 
the secular. Informed by his insights, I assert that we are correct when we 
intuitively perceive some kind of religious difference between the two 
nationalisms. I suggest that this difference pertains not to a religious or secular 
essence but to how Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists represent the categories of 
religion and the secular. In Chapter Two I substantiate this assertion, arguing that 
one identity, Sinhalese identity, is implicitly associated with religious concerns 
and symbols (i.e. concerns and symbols that are represented as religious), while 
the other, Tamil identity, is explicitly distanced from religious concerns and 
symbols. I also show how these representations of group identity developed 
4 
during the Buddhist and Hindu (Saivite) revivals of the late 19th Century. 6 
Sinhalese identity came to be connected to Buddhist ideals and symbols while 
Tamil identity was aligned to the caste ideals ofthe Vellalars. While these 
V ell alar ideals were originally represented as religious traits, they eventually 
came to be represented as cultural characteristics. Influenced by different factors 
and conditions, the two group identities thus came to develop quite different 
relationships to the category of religion. I then discuss how this Vellalar-based 
identity presented problems for early Tamil nationalists who wanted to mobilise 
a group identity. 
Chapter Two thus leads neatly to the second issue: the L TTE' s efforts to 
mobilise a group identity. From the material covered in Chapter Two we can 
appreciate that the L TTE has had to overcome significant challenges in order to 
successfully mobilise a group identity. It has had to counter the Buddhist rhetoric 
of its Sinhalese counterparts (without employing an overtly religious rhetoric) 
and also transcend the elitist representation ofTarnil identity advanced by earlier 
nationalists. While the material related in Chapter Two lays the groundwork for 
the rest of this thesis, it also provides part of the answer to the question that I ask 
in the following chapters: How has the L TTE mobilised a group identity? In the 
final section of Chapter Two, I argue that the L TTE mo bilises a group identity 
through reshaped Vellalar values. This is the first instance where we see the 
LTTE mobilise a group identity through a reformulated Tamil tradition. 
In the following chapters, I discuss how the LTTE mobilises a group 
identity through two discourses: the LTTE's historical discourse in Chapter 
Three, and its discourse pertaining to violence and death in Chapter Four. In 
Chapter Three I explore three ' pasts' that the LTTE promulgates: the militant 
past, the Jaffna Kingdom and the post-colonial narrative. I argue that while all 
three pasts are involved in the LTTE's project, it is the post-colonial narrative 
that is most important to how the LTTE mobilises a group identity. The post-
colonial narrative is structured by the claim to be secular. Furthermore, it 
emphasises recent experiences of suffering. We thus see how the LTTE 
mobilises a group identity through a secular narrative (i.e. a narrative that is 
represented as being secular) which emphasises a shared experience. 
6 Saivism is a branch of Hinduism, focussing on the deity Siva. 
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While the post-colonial narrative is crucial to how the LTTE mobilises a 
group identity, the militant past is also involved in the LTTE's efforts to evoke 
national sentiment. Through this past, the L TTE depicts an ancient martial 
tradition. Here, as with the Vellalar values, we can see how the L TTE explicitly 
admits to and even celebrates its reformulation oftradition. When scholars 
analyse how the LTTE employs tradition, they become embroiled in the 
categories of religion and the secular. Consequently, they overlook how the 
LTTE celebrates a self-consciously fashioned tradition. 
In Chapter Four, I tum to the LTTE's discourse around violence and 
death. Once again, we see how the LTTE mobilises a group identity through 
claims, arguments and practices that are represented as secular. I also explore 
how the discourse mobilises a group identity through experiences ofliberation. 
When cadres fight and die on the battlefield, they liberate themselves from 
suffering; they also bring the liberation of the nation closer. The discourse thus 
presents the answer to the post-colonial narrative of suffering. 
When cadres liberate themselves and the nation, they also conquer death. 
Consequently, L TTE rhetoric suggests that the cadres live on in a metaphorical 
sense. Some anthropological research and LTTE poems even suggest that the 
dead live on in a more literal sense, as deities who can influence the struggle 
from beyond the grave. When scholars analyse this notion (of the deification of 
the dead), they implicate the category of religion. In the final section of Chapter 
Four, I offer an alternative reading of the practice, which focuses on how the 
L TTE represents the relationship between the secular and national identity. I 
argue that the deification of the dead (if it is happening) powerfully underlines 
the trans formative power of dying for the nation. 
In the conclusion I draw together all the LTTE traditions, experiences and 
claims discussed throughout the study. In particular, I focus on the 
transformation or becoming which the LTTE promises. I show how this process 
ofbecoming is represented as a secular transformation - hence the title of this 
work. The Tamil nation is in a secular state or process of becoming, part of 
which involves attaining the mechanisms of a secular state- Eelam. I also return 
to Asad 's ideas, showing how his approach might inform future studies of 
nationalism in Sri Lanka. 
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In order to grapple with the argument advanced in this study, the reader 
must be familiar with Sri Lanka's demographics and history, issues pertaining to 
LTTE sources, and finally Talal Asad 's ideas about religion and the secular. 
These pieces of groundwork are also important because they have shaped my 
project in significant ways. I will explore each piece of groundwork, discussing 
how it is important to my study. 
1.1 Context: History and Demographics 
The island of Sri Lanka is home to a number of groups who identify 
themselves by religious affiliation, cultural practices, region and language. Here I 
will elaborate only on those groups which are important for my project. 
Perhaps the best place to begin is with the Sinhalese-Tamil distinction. As 
with all cultural and religious distinctions in Sri Lanka, this distinction is more 
complex than it first appears. Even though ethnic identity came to the forefront 
of the political scene in the early post-colonial years, Sri Lankans continued and 
still continue to articulate other competing regional and caste identities. For my 
project, it is important that we understand both how the Sinhalese-Tamil divide is 
commonly represented and explained, and the layers of complexity that underlie 
such representations. First, I will outline how the Sinhalese and Tamil identities 
are generally represented. I will then look at key events and groups during the 
colonial and postcolonial years that shaped these identities (with a particular 
emphasis on Tamil identity). Finally, I will explore other competing identities 
that complicate the Sinhalese-Tamil distinction. 
When scholars and nationalists depict who the Sinhalese and Tamils are, 
they typically begin with a selection of facts and figures: In 1981, prior to the 
outbreak ofthe war, the Sinhalese constituted seventy four percent ofthe island's 
population, and the Tamils, thirteen percent. 7 The Sinhalese speak Sinhala, an 
Indo-European language only spoken in Sri Lanka, and the majority of Sinhalese 
identify as Buddhists. The Tamils, on the other hand, speak Tamil, a Dravidian 
language that is also spoken in India (although in a slightly different dialect). 
7 Stokke and Ryntveit, "The Struggle For Tamil Eelarn in Sri Lanka," 289. This figure excludes 
the Estate Tamils, a group whom I discuss later. 
7 
Most Tamils are Hindus although there is a significant Christian minority. 8 Many 
Sri Lankans would accept this description. Clearly, then, this description is 
important; it is involved in how Sri Lankans identify themselves. But as an 
explanation of Sri Lanka and the people who live there, such accounts only relate 
halfthe story. 
The Sinhalese-Tamil distinction has not always been represented in the 
way that it is today. Nationalists project the Sinhalese-Tamil identities of today 
upon peoples who inhabited the island in pre-colonial times. While we do not 
know a lot about the Sinhalese and Tamil identities prior to colonial contact, we 
can surmise that they were flexible, malleable entities. Unlike today, they 
tolerated difference and comfortably coexisted alongside other overlapping and 
contrasting identities. "Speakers ofTamil, speakers ofSinhala, speakers ofTamil 
and Sinhala, Buddhist Tamils, non Buddhist Tamils, Buddhist Sinhalas and non 
Buddhist Sinhalas, Shaivites- Tamil speakers and possibly Sinhala speakers 
drifted with relative ease, at different times for different purposes and 
conveniences, from one sociological formation into another."9 
This changed only when the colonisers arrived. Sri Lanka was colonised 
by the Portuguese, the Dutch and then finally the British. It is the British who 
most significantly influenced how the two identities came to be articulated. With 
their penchant for categorisation, statistics and the disciplines ofhistory and 
biology, the British cemented and rigidified the Sinhalese and Tamil identities. 
These once pliable identities were then sharpened and politicised further during 
the post colonial era, when nationalists used ethnic confrontation to mobilise 
support. 10 As the Sinhalese and Tamil identities gained salience, other competing 
identities - caste, regional, and religious - were increasingly rendered irrelevant. 
Distinctions that were once fiercely marked, like those between the Kandyan and 
Low Country Sinhalese, or the Jaffua and East Coast Tamils faded into the 
background. 11 Consequently, pre-colonial allegiances that occurred across the 
Tamil-Sinhala divide were forgotten, and almost erased from the historical 
8 Robert Kearney, "Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka," Asian 
Survey 25:9 (1985): 899 
9 E. Valentine Daniel , Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropography of Violence 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 44. 
10 Elizabeth Nissan ·and R.L Stirrat, "The Generation of Communal Identities," in Sri Lanka: 
History and the Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathon Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 26-30. 
II Ibid ., 27' 30. 
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narratives of nationalist groups. 12 What follows is a description of some of the 
key events and groups that shaped the two identities into the modem, post-
colonial entities that we see today. 
During the early part of British rule, the British adopted a form of 
communal representation in the legislative and executive councils. Under this 
system, the Tamils had enjoyed equal or near equal representation with their 
Sinhalese compatriots in the councils. 13 In addition, the majority of positions 
within the public service were held by Tamils. 14 With independence looming, 
Tamil politicians became concerned that the representational system that the 
British were implementing would reduce the participation ofTamils in 
government. One Tamil politician, G.G. Ponnambalam suggested a system that 
was famously dubbed fifty- fifty. Fifty percent of all seats in parliament would be 
reserved for minorities, while the other fifty percent would represent Sinhalese 
constituents. 15 The British repudiated Ponnambalam's suggestions, saying that 
communal representation encouraged communalism. Instead they implemented a 
system of proportional representation. 16 
Going into independence, the first set of elections was won by the UNP 
(the United National Party). 17 The country's first government consisted of mainly 
elite members ofboth the Tamil and Sinhalese communities. As one scholar puts 
it, the masses had yet to be invited into history and into the parliamentary 
process.18 This was redressed at a subsequent election in 1956 when a Sinhalese 
politician, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, led a newly formed party- the SLFP (Sri 
12 Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Concept of a Tamil Homeland in Sri Lanka- its 
Meaning and Development," South Asia 13 :2 (1990): 109. For example, in pre-colonial times, 
farts of the East Coast were allied to the Kandyan Kingdom in the South . 
3 Murugar Gunasingam, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism : A Study of its Origins (Sydney: M.V. 
Publications, 1999), 73-7 6. 
14 While some have tried to construe this as evidence of a divide and rule policy, others offer 
alternative arguments: The communal representation in councils and the British differentiating 
between the different groups "should not be interpreted as the manifestation of a wish to ' divide 
and rule'; it was done out of misguided ' liberal ' sentiments which sought to protect the different 
customs of different ' races."' Nissan and Stirrat, "The Generation of Communal Identities," 29. 
15 Ghosh, Ethnicity versus Nationalism, 69. 
16 David Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 1994), 53-4. 
17 T.D.S.A Dissanayake, War or Peace in Sri Lanka (Mumbai: Popular Prakashan, 2005), 66. 
18 Jonathon Spencer, "Introduction: The Power of the Past," in Sri Lanka: History and the Roots 
of Conflict, ed. Jonathon Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 9. 
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Lanka Freedom Party)- to victory. 19 Bandaranaike won this election on the 
promise that he would institute Sinhalese as the only official language in the 
country (until this point, Sinhala, Tamil and English had all been official 
languages). With this 'Sinhala Only' policy, Bandaranaike mobilised mass 
support.Z0 After the election, Tamil politicians led satyagraha21 protests against 
the bill. 22 
The Sinhala Only act was the first of many post-colonial government 
policies that fuelled Sinhalese-Tamil animosity. Others, including the 
resettlement policies (where Sinhalese people were settled into areas where 
Tamils predominated),23 standardisation policy (in which the access of students 
from Tamil areas to university education was hampered)/ 4 and the 1972 
constitution (which revoked clauses protecting minorities)25 further entrenched 
the Sinhalese-Tamil distinction.26 In Chapter Three, I will discuss the LTTE's 
description ofthese policies. 
During this increasingly turbulent period, the FP (Federal Party) emerged 
as the most influential Tamil political party. The party was formed shortly after 
Sri Lanka became independent. Its party manifesto declared its intent to establish 
a Tamil state within a united Sri Lanka.27 In the fust few elections they 
contested, the FP received very little support from Tamil constituents, showing 
that most Tamils were not interested in a federal state.28 This soon changed. 
Government policies impelled Tamils to support the FP's demands for a separate 
19 Kenneth D. Bush, The Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Reading to 
Read between the Lines (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 84. The SLFP was the main 
~arty in a coalition of parties called the MEP (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna). 
0 William McGowan, Only Man Is Vile: The Tragedy of Sri Lanka (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 1991), 154-5. 
2 1 Neil De Votta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay and Ethnic Conflict in 
Sri Lanka (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004), 139-40. Satyagraha refers to non-violent 
protests that usually involve acts of civil disobedience. Gandhi famously led satyagraha 
campaigns against the British. In Sri Lanka, Tamil leaders used the term satyagraha to refer to 
their non-violent campaigns. They believed that if they followed Gandhi ' s tactics, they too would 
bring about political change. 
22 Ghosh, Ethnicity versus Nationalism, 78 . 
23 Robert Kearney, "Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka," 904. 
24 McGowan, Only Man Is Vile, 168. 
25 De Votta, Blowback, 134. 
26 Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffua Social System: Continuity and Change under 
Conditions ofWar," Internationales Asienforum 24 (1993): 271. 
27 Stokke and Ryntveit, "The Struggle For Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka," 291-2. 
28 Devanesan Nesiah, Tamil Nationalism, Marga Monograph Series on Ethnic Reconciliation 6 
(Colombo: Marga Institute, 2001), 13 . 
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state. The FP, like the SLFP, was thus able to use ethnic tension to mobilise mass 
support and win votes.29 
During the 1970s, the FP and other Tamil political parties were 
influenced by the Tamil youth, who felt particularly marginalised by the 
government and increasingly frustrated with the parliamentarian strategies of 
their elected representatives. Feeling this frustration, a group ofTamil parties 
(including the FP) amassed and formed a conglomerate known as TUF (Tamil 
United Front), later renamed TULF (Tamil United Liberation Front). The TULF 
issued a declaration in 1976 where it stated its decision to pursue Eelam- a 
sovereign, autonomous state for the Tamil people. 30 Around this time, Tamil 
militant groups began to emerge. When the TULF failed to win Eelam or even 
make concrete progress towards Eelam, it was sidelined by these emergent 
groups. Several of these groups still exist today in some form or other, but the 
most influential is the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam (LTTE).31 Renowned for 
its ruthlessness, the L TTE has attained this status by eliminating dissidents 
within the organisation and opponents outside it. But this is only one condition of 
its success. The L TTE has won its hegemony at least equally through its capacity 
to formulate a sense of national identity that resonates deeply with the Tamil 
public. 
Having established how Sinhalese and Tamil identities are often 
represented and the events and groups which shaped these representations, I will 
now complicate the Sinhalese-Tamil distinction and show that it is not as self-
evident as it appears. As I have already intimated, the Tamil speaking community 
is not a homogeneous group. A careful observer can apprehend old allegiances to 
caste, region and religion simmering beneath nationalist projects, goals and 
rhetoric. While most Tamil speakers classify themselves as Tamils (the Muslim 
community are an exception here), they would also identify as Estate Tamils, 
East Coast Tamils, and Peninsular Tamils, and as particular castes within these 
groups. Here, I will outline these divisions amongst the Tamil speaking 
community, and then I will elaborate on them as necessary in the chapters that 
follow. 
29 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Concept of a Tamil Homeland in Sri Lanka," 99-103. 
30 Ghosh, Ethnicity versus Nationalism, 76. 
31 Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle For Identity (Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994), I , 9-11. 
11 
Tamil speaking peoples live throughout the island but predominate in the 
Jaflha Peninsula (in the north), the Vanni proper (the area south of the Peninsula 
and north of Anuradhapura) and the East Coast (which is often regarded as an 
extension ofthe Vanni). 32 In addition, there are significant Tamil speaking 
communities in Colombo (the country's capital) and in the central highlands 
where the plantations are. 33 The region most closely associated with Sri Lankan 
Tamil consciousness and nationalism is the Jaffua Peninsula, from where the first 
Tamil nationalists came.34 The Jaflha Peninsula is considered the most 
conservative corner of the island. Caste and religious practices are upheld 
rigorously there. 35 
Tamil national identity is not only connected to the Jaffua Peninsula but 
also to a particular caste group on the peninsula, the V ellalars. While the 
Vellalars officially belong to the Sudra varna (the lowest ofthe varna, according 
to Sastric ranking)36, they enjoy a high status in Jaffna. They are a landowning 
caste, associated with the fertility of the earth and the prosperity ofthe 
comrnunity. 37 The Jaffua Vellalars traditionally owned most ofthe temples on 
the Peninsula. 38 In these Vellalar-owned temples, the Brahmans (who belong to 
the highest varna) perform daily and annual rituals, the benefits of which accrue 
to the patrons of the temple, rather than to the officiants or the attendees.39 In 
J affua, the Brahmans are thus regarded as the salaried staff of the V ellalars. This 
is quite different from the situation in South India where a small minority of 
Brahmans presided over the population. 40 
But the Jaffua situation is not anomalous. In fact , in the Brahman-Vellalar 
alliance, Jaffua preserves a hallmark of ancient Dravidian civilisation.41 In South 
India this relationship changed in medieval times when Brahmans became 
32 Dennis McGilvray, Tamil and Muslim Identities in the East, Marga Monograph Series on 
Ethnic Reconciliation 24 (Colombo: Marga Institute, 2001), 1-2. 
33 Daniel Bass, Landscapes of Malaiyaha Tamil Identity, Marga Monograph Series on Ethnic 
Reconciliation 8 (Colombo: Marga Institute , 2001), 6. 
34 Bryan Pfaffenberger, "The Cultural Dimension ofTamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," Asian 
Survey 21 :11 (1981): 1146. 
35 Ibid. , 1148. 
36 According to classical texts, the people are divided into four main varna: the Brahmans, the 
Kshatriya, Vaishyas and the Sudra. The Untouchables are placed outside this system. 
37 Bryan Pfaffenberger, Caste in Tamil Culture: The Religious Foundations of Sudra Domination 
in Tamil Sri Lanka (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1982), 5. 
38 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffua Social System," 252. 
39 Pfaffenberger, Caste in Tamil Culture, 61 , 63-4. 
40 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffua Social System," 252. 
41 Pfaffenberger, "The Cultural Dimension ofTamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," 1151. 
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increasingly powerful. 42 Because Jaffha Brahmans never attained the same kind 
of power, the area has remained untouched by the anti-Brahman movement that 
swept through South India.43 The Jaffha Vellalars thus retained their power well 
into the 20th Century. The values and symbols ofthis group shaped the contours 
ofTamil national identity in the colonial and early post-colonial years.44 In 
Chapter Two I will outline how this Vellalar based conception ofTarnil identity 
caused problems for the Federal Party when it tried to mobilise a national 
identity. 
The Karaiyar, another caste on the peninsula, stand apart from the ancient 
agrarian dominance ofthe Vellalars. While other castes sought to acquire 
Vellalar status, the Karaiyar articulated an independent identity. Originally a 
fishing caste, the Karaiyar comprises ten percent of the peninsular population.45 
They are mentioned extensively in sources about the Jaffha kingdom, a pre-
colonial kingdom centred in the northern peninsula. Their traditions cast them as 
brave warriors who were recruited in pre-colonial times to fight as mercenaries.46 
This tradition of doughtiness lived on in the colonial era, when many Karaiyar 
resisted colonial rule and became notorious as smugglers. 47 
The Karaiyar retained a degree of autonomy from the Vellalar not only 
through their martial traditions, but also by being a politically active group. 
When universal franchise was granted in 1931 , they were the only caste, other 
than the Vellalar, to vote in significant numbers. This, along with the way they 
pursued English education, annoyed conservative Vellalars who wanted to 
preserve education and politics as domains ofVellalar power and influence.48 
Their independence from the Vellalar establishment may also be attributed to 
their large scale conversion to Catholicism. Here, they differed from even 
Vellalar Christians, who were mainly Protestants.49 The majority ofLTTE cadres 
42 Pfaffenberger, Caste in Tamil Culture, 26-7. 
43 Ibid., 31-2. 
44 Pfaffenberger, "The Cultural Dimension of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," 1146. 
45 Oivind Fuglerud, Life on the Outside: The Tamil Diaspora and Long Distance Nationalism 
(London: Pluto Press, 1999), 27. 
46 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffua Social System," 265-267. 
47 Stokke and Ryntveit, "The Struggle For Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka," 297. 
48 Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, "From Differences To Ethnic Solidarity," in Sri Lankan 
Society in an Era ofGlobalisation: Struggling to Create a New Social Order, ed. S.H. Hasbullah 
and Barrie M. Morrison (New Delhi : Sage Publications, 2004), 105. 
49 Ibid. , 103 . Fifteen percent of the Jaffua Tamil population are Christians. Of this, eighty percent 
are Catholics. 
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are drawn from the Karaiyar caste. 5° Consequently there is a significant Catholic 
contingent in the LTTE. 
Like the Karaiyar and Vellalars ofthe Jaffna Peninsula, the Tamil 
population of the East Coast identify as Tamils, while retaining caste and 
regional identities. East Coast Tamils diverge from the peninsular Tamils in their 
social and religious practices. For example, while there are Vellalars on the east 
coast, the dominant caste is the Mukkuvars (a caste oflagoon fishers). 51 Also, 
familial lineages are traced differently in the two regions; the Jaffha Tamils are 
patrilineal while the east coast Tamils are matrilineal. 52 Furthermore, East Coast 
Tamils do not assiduously observe the Brahmanic rituals so important to Jaffna 
Tamils, but persist with a number of popular religious practices that have long 
been repudiated in the north. 53 
We can explain this chasm between the two groups at least partly through 
the physical and political separation of the two regions. The East Coast Tamils 
were never allied to the Jaffua Kingdom that existed in the north. In fact, when 
the Portuguese arrived, significant sections ofthe East Coast were allied to the 
Kandyan Kingdom in the South. 54 In addition, the East Coast Tamils espouse 
different immigration traditions from the northerners, tracing their origins to 
different parts oflndia. 55 The East Coast Tamils have resisted being assimilated 
or equated with Jaffna Tamils, although this has slowly changed with post-
independence politics. Since independence, successive governments have 
alienated the East Coast Tamils through their resettlement schemes. In this way, 
the government has encouraged the East Coast Tamils to ally with their Jaffna 
brethren. As a result, the two regional identities have conflated to some extent. 56 
Another Tamil speaking group that lives on the East Coast are the 
Muslims. They comprise about seven percent ofthe island ' s population. 57 
Although they speak Tamil, the Muslims have not posited a common identity 
5° Fuglerud, Life on the Outside, 35. 
51 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "From Differences To Ethnic Solidarity," 103 . 
52 McGilvray, Tamil and Muslim Identities in the East, 5. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Concept of a Tamil Homeland in Sri Lanka," 89. 
55 Ibid. , 89-93. 
56 Bryan Pfaffenberger, "The Political Construction of Defensive Nationalism: The 1968 Temple 
Entry Crisis in Sri Lanka," in The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity, ed. Chelvadurai 
Manogram and Bryan Pfaffenberger (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 162-3. 
57 Fuglerud, Life on the Outside, 20. 
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with either the East Coast Tamils or the Northerners, but maintained a distinct, 
Muslim identity. 58 While Muslim groups sometimes align themselves with the 
LTTE and other Tamil nationalist groups, this has not always the case. 59 On the 
Tamil side, the TULF and the LTTE have made various provisions for the 
Muslims within a Tamil state. 60 In 1990, however, the LTTE estranged the 
Muslim community when it ordered all Muslims living on the peninsula to 
leave. 61 
The last group which we must discuss are the Estate or Hill Country 
Tamils, a population who live primarily within the highlands of the Uva province 
(near Kandy). Today's Estate Tamils are the descendents oflndian labourers, 
brought to Sri Lanka by the British at the tum of the 20th Century.62 Most of 
today's Hill Country Tamils continue to work on the tea plantations where their 
forefathers toiled. While the Estate Tamils share common language and religious 
features with the East Coast and Northern communities, they have traditionally 
not been accorded the same status on account of their caste, their links to India, 
their place of abode and their short history in the island. 63 At independence, with 
the support of Ceylon Tamil politicians, they were disenfranchised through two 
successive acts ofparliament.64 The LTTE welcomes the Estate Tamils, inviting 
them to join the struggle and live in the future state ofEelam. The LTTE's map 
ofEelarn, however, does not include the hill country region where the Estate 
Tamils live. 65 
58 S.H. Hasbullah, "Justice for the Dispossessed: The Case of a Forgotten Minority'' in Sri 
Lanka's Ethnic Conflict," in Sri Lankan Society in an Era ofGlobalisation: Struggling to Create 
a New Social Order, ed. S.H Hasbullah and Barrie M. Morrison (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
2004), 222. 
59 Daniel , Charred Lullabies, 18-9. 
60 Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, "Religious Ideology Among the Tamils," in Sri Lanka's 
Ethnic Conflict," in Sri Lankan Society in an Era of Globalisation: Struggling to Create a New 
Social Order, ed. S.H Hasbullah and Barrie M. Morrison (New Delhi : Sage Publications, 2004), 
79-80. The FP made provisions for the Muslims in a federal state. They promised to make 
Amparai (a district with a Muslim majority on the East Coast) an autonomous unit within a 
federal scheme. In its blueprint for Eelam, the LTTE has promised the Muslim community 30% 
of all the seats in parliament and 35% of all newly developed land in the East- 5% in the North 
and 30% in Mannar. 
61 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "From Differences To Ethnic Solidarity," 109. 
62 Daniel, Charred Lullabies, 18. 
63 Stokke and Ryntveit, "The Struggle For Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka," 291. 
64 Bass, Malaiyaha Tamil Identity, 10. 
65 Hellmann Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers, 57. While the borders ofEelam do not encompass 
the areas where the Estate Tamils lived, they do include areas where Tamil speakers had 
originally lived, before becoming Sinhalised. 
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In the chapters to follow, I explore how Sri Lankan Tamils formulate and 
articulate a national identity. When I refer to the Sri Lankan Tamils, I am 
referring to the Tamil speaking people, who identify as Tamils and that either 
live in, or trace their origins back to, the North or the East. As Nesiah points out, 
when one uses the term 'Sri Lankan Tamil' in this way, one must also 
acknowledge the identity politics that underlie the category: 
The term Sri Lankan Tamils is . .. inaccurate since it implies that the other 
Tamil group resident in Sri Lanka, the Hill Country Tamils, are not Sri 
Lankan. If, in the course of time, the ethnic identities of the Sri Lankan 
Tamils and the Hill Country Tamils merge, then the term Sri Lankan 
Tamil could be used to correctly distinguish between the Tamils of Sri 
Lanka and those oflndia and elsewhere, and not to draw distinctions 
among the Tamils of Sri Lanka. I have not made any attempt to coin new 
'politically correct ' terms or to anticipate future developments but have 
used the terms Tamil Nationalism and Sri Lankan Tamils as widely 
understood in Sri Lanka. 66 
The information presented in the foregoing discussion is important to my 
project for several reasons. First, throughout the study I refer to groups (such as 
the Jaffua Vellalars) and events (such as the 1956 elections) recounted above. 
Second, the preceding discussion gives us some insight into the Tamil 
community which the L TTE addresses and claims to represent. Third, the 
discussion highlights how Sinhalese and Tamil identities are flexible entities that 
have been shaped by ideological, political and economic circumstances. 
Consequently, in my project, I assume that there is nothing essentially Tamil 
about the LTTE's representation ofnational identity. I thus approach the LTTE's 
formulation of national identity as a malleable entity that offers only one possible 
depiction ofwhat it means to be Tamil. 
1.2 Sources 
My study has been shaped not only by Sri Lanka 's demographics and 
history, but also by considerations pertaining to L TTE sources. The L TTE' s 
English sources differ in content from its Tamil sources. I cannot read or speak 
Tamil and am consequently limited to English language sources. Therefore, I 
have had to carefully consider how and why the English and Tamil sources 
66 Nesiah, Tamil Nationalism, ! . 
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differ. These differences have shaped my project in important ways. I now turn 
to this next piece of groundwork: L TTE sources. 
The LTTE has created a broad range of literature. It values literary 
accomplishments, encouraging Tamil poets, writers and composers. In addition 
to this canon of creative literature, the LTTE has produced a website as well as a 
number of official books and pamphlets that detail the movement, its cause and 
the ongoing difficulties the organisation encounters in trying to attain Eelam. 
While the material written in Tamil is directed primarily at the Sri Lankan Tamil 
community (both in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora), the English materials are 
aimed primarily at the International audience. The English materials include both 
L TTE texts written solely in English as well as those texts which the LTTE 
translates into English. 
Compared with the English language sources which are in plentiful 
supply, scholarly translations of the Tamil sources are difficult to find. In their 
articles, scholars sometimes translate excerpts from Tamil sources (e.g. Peter 
Schalk's translation of a paragraph from a Heroes' Day Address and Oivind 
Fuglerud's translation of a speech from an LTTE cassette.67 Dagmar Hellmann 
Rajanayagam and Peter Schalk have also translated two L TTE texts written in 
Tamil- a compilation ofLTTE poetry and a collection ofPrabhakaran's 
sayings. 68 From these scholarly translations and from the scholars' analyses of 
these and other Tamil texts, I have become aware ofhow the LTTE's Tamil texts 
diverge from (but also converge with) the English ones. 69 
In particular, the English language texts omit references to the LTTE's 
martial traditions, which are mentioned across a wide variety ofTamil sources. 
Even more importantly, scholars identify religious terminology in Tamil sources 
that is either omitted or toned down in the English language sources. We see 
these sorts of omissions when we compare the LTTE's official translation of 
Velupillai Prabhakaran's 1992 Heroes' Day Address with Schalk's translation of 
67Peter Schalk, "Beyond Hindu Festivals: The Celebration of Great Heroes ' Day by the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) in Europe," in Tempel und Tamilien in Zweiter 
Heimat, ed. Martin Baumann (Wuerzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2003), 402; Fuglerud, Life on the 
Outside, 155-6. 
68 Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And Heroes Die: Poetry of the Tamil Liberation Movement 
in Northern Sri Lanka," in South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 28: I (2005); L TIE, 
Reflections of the Leader, trans. by Peter Schalk and Alvappillai Veluppillai (n .p: L TIE, 2007). 
http:/ /publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed May 12, 2008). 
69 Hellmann Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers, 4. 
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an excerpt of this speech. 70 When I compare the two, I cannot even find an 
equivalent paragraph for the passage which Schalk translates. 
We can speculate as to why the LTTE's English texts differ in this way. 
Perhaps the L TTE supposes that an international readership might interpret these 
'Tamil references' (to martial history and Hindu ritual) as evidence that the 
L TTE is an organisation of religious fanatics, with visions of imperial grandeur. 
The LTTE wants to win the support ofthe international community, and so it 
either deliberately or unthinkingly omits these references from the English 
language sources, references which it believes might be misinterpreted by the 
international community. 
Alternatively, in the case of translations, the L TTE may view rigorous 
translations as too difficult or inappropriate for the context in which they are 
provided. Scholarly translations gloss Tamil words, explaining the context in 
which they are used; footnotes and parentheses are required. For the LTTE, 
translating like this may be too difficult or even inappropriate for the context in 
which such translations will be circulated (for example, posting on the internet). 
Because I cannot read Tamil, I have been mainly limited to the LTTE's 
English language sources. This 'limitation' has had important consequences for 
my project. For example, in the following chapters the reader will see that I rely 
primarily upon the secondary analysis when I discuss how the LTTE employs 
martial and Hindu traditions. I recognise that this inability to access a range of 
L TTE sources has limited my research, and I openly discuss this in this thesis. 
This 'limitation,' however, has also influenced the direction that my study has 
taken. 
Because I could not directly access the Tamil sources, I was forced to rely 
on the scholarly literature for most of my information about the LTTE's Tamil 
sources. Consequently, I became aware ofhow the scholarly literature is rife with 
contradictions. In particular, I identified how the category of religion hinders, 
70 Schalk, "Beyond Hindu Festivals", 402; Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation of 
Martyrs' Day Speech 1992," http://www.ltteps.org/?view=422&folder=9 (accessed, May 12, 
2008). Velupillai Prabhakaran is the enigmatic, much revered leader of the L TTE. According to 
the L TTE, he inaugurated the organisation under the name Tamil New Tigers. The organisation 
was renamed as The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 1976. Every year at the Mavirar Nal 
celebrations, Prabhakaran delivers a speech, summarising the events of the year and encouraging 
the people to recommit to the struggle. Mavirar Nalliterally means Great Heroes' Day, but the 
LTTE often translates it as Martyrs' Day. A.S. Balasingham, Liberation Tigers and Tamil Eelam 
Freedom Struggle (n .p: LITE, 1983), 25. 
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rather than helps, scholarly analysis. Even more importantly, this 'limitation' has 
forced me to really tackle the English language sources and recognise the 
similarities (as well as the differences) between the English and Tamil sources. I 
take both sets of sources seriously. I do not consider the English language 
sources to be a fa9ade or a fabrication purely for the benefit of the international 
community. The English and Tamil sources share many common features (for 
example, both emphasise the recent post-colonial past). The references in the 
Tamil sources, invisible to us in the English equivalents, complement and 
coalesce with what is common to both the English and Tamil sources. Although 
the English and Tamil sources are directed at different audiences, they are 
nonetheless equally involved in how the L TTE shapes its cause, its nationalism 
and most importantly, Tamil identity. 
1.3 Religion and the Secular: An Asad-based Response to 
the Scholarly Debate 
The final piece of groundwork involves the scholarly discussion that I 
alluded to both in the opening paragraphs of this chapter and in the preceding 
discussion on sources. Scholars disagree over whether religion is involved in the 
L TTE 's nationalism. Some support the L TTE 's declaration that they are a secular 
organisation, while others (either explicitly or implicitly) contest it. I will 
elaborate on this debate in the following chapters, but here I will outline some of 
the assertions that scholars make. I will then delineate Talal Asad's ideas, 
showing how they have enabled me to intervene in the scholarly debate and 
formulate an approach for this study. 
Peter Schalk, Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, Cristiana Natali and 
Michael Roberts argue that the LTTE 's nationalism is religious in some way. 
Schalk employs a functionalist defmition of religion, suggesting that the LTTE's 
nationalism is a new kind of religion. 71 Hellmann Rajanayagam advances 
another claim: the LTTE employs syncretistic religious symbols and terms which 
diverge from its secular proclamations. 72 Nat ali pushes this conclusion further, 
arguing that the L TTE is aware of these religious facets, and yet, does nothing to 
71 Peter Schalk, "The Revival ofMartyr Cults Among Ilavar," Temenos 33 (1997): 154. Peter 
Schalk is being polemical when he advances his argument. In most of his articles, he emphasises 
the secular character of the LITE's nationalism. 
72 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And Heroes Die," 118. 
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eradicate them. 73 She implies that the L TTE is insincere when it asserts a secular 
status. Finally, Michael Roberts argues that the LTTE's nationalism contains 
both rational and enchanted facets. Consequently, he argues that the LTTE 
should not be understood (from a critical, analytical perspective) as a secular 
organisation. In fact, to Roberts, the L TTE is akin to overtly religious 
organisations like Al Qaeda. Both organisations possess enchanted facets and 
thus "share a shoring in cosmological realities."74 
As I have already pointed out, this debate impacts upon how we assess 
the LTTE's secularity and the religious difference also. We must thus intervene 
in this debate if we are to answer my first set of questions: Is there a religious 
difference between the two nationalisms? And if so, what is it and how did it 
develop? 
From the scholarly discussion, we can see that the categories of religion 
and the secular are implicated not only in how the LTTE mobilises a group 
identity, but also in how scholars discuss and analyse the LTTE's nationalism. 
Therefore, we can only engage with the scholarly discussion, when we establish 
a theoretical framework that enables us to discuss religion and the secular as 
rhetorical strategies. Talal Asad's work provides us with such a framework. 
In his book Formations of the Secular, Talal Asad problematises the 
categories of religion and the secular. For Asad, religion and the secular are not 
self-evident categories that can be used to describe phenomena. Although 
religion and the secular are presented in modem societies as autonomous, distinct 
arenas, when we investigate them further we find that so called religious objects 
and institutions overlap with secular objects and institutions. Furthermore the 
meanings of 'religion' and 'secular' are made and remade in different contexts. 
At different historical moments people provide very different defmitions of 
religion, consisting of quite different attributes and criteria. 75 Because 'religion' 
and 'the secular' overlap, and because their meanings are context dependent, 
73 Cristiana Natali, "Building Cemeteries, Constructing Identities. Funerary Practices and 
Nationalist Discourse Among the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka," 
http://www.basas.ac.uk/conference05/natali,%20cristiana.pdf (accessed April 26, 2008). Michael 
Roberts cites this conference paper in the following article: Michael Roberts, "Pragmatic Action 
and Enchanted Worlds: A Black Tiger Rite of Commemoration," Social Analysis 50:1 (2006). 
74 Roberts, "Pragmatic Action and Enchanted Worlds," 95-6. 
75 Talal Asad, "The Trouble With Thinking: an Interview with Tala I Asad," in Powers of the 
secular modern: Tala/ Asad and his interlocutors, ed. David Scott and Charles Hirschkind 
(California: Standford University Press, 2006), 287. 
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Asad argues that the categories have little value as analytical or descriptive 
categories. 76 When we classify an institution, experience or text as religious or 
secular, we provide little insight into the object being investigated. While Asad 
repudiates the categories as conventional, analytical categories, he does not 
entirely dismiss the categories. 
Based on these observations, Asad encourages a new mode of analysis 
which is nonetheless still concerned with religion and the secular. Rather than 
ask whether an object is religious, Asad asks: how are religion and the secular 
represented? He argues that the categories of 'religion' and ' the secular' can be 
represented in diverse ways. He provides a striking example of this, when he 
compares Britain, France and America, three societies that are generally 
considered secular. He shows how the secular is represented differently in each 
society; what is perceived as a transgression of the secular in one society is 
entirely consonant with secularism in another. The secular, like religion, can thus 
be represented in diverse ways. Furthermore, its meanings are not static, but are 
constantly revised and refashioned in different contexts to fit new challenges and 
demands. 77 These different representations ofthe secular show us not only that 
religion and the secular are invalid as analytical tools, but also that the categories 
can and do mediate national identity in diverse ways. 78 In this way, Asad 
deconstructs the categories of religion and the secular as they are conventionally 
understood, and instead, focuses upon how the categories are represented and the 
implications ofthese representations. In the process, he acknowledges that 
representations of the categories have very real implications for how modern 
people express their identity and experience their world: "In modern and 
modernising states representations ofthe ' secular' and the 'religious' mediate 
people's identities, help shape their sensibilities, and guarantee their 
experiences." 79 
While Asad deconstructs the secular (as it is conventionally used), he also 
reconstructs it as an ontological category. This reconstructed secular is an 
important component of Asad's theory. Alongside representations of religion and 
the secular, the reconstructed secular is presented as integral to modern living: "I 
76 Asad, Fmm ations of the Secular, 25-6. 
77 Ibid., 5. 
78 Ibid . 
79 Ibid., 14. 
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take the secular to be a concept that brings together certain behaviours, 
knowledges and sensibilities in modern life."80 In particular, Asad's 
reconstructed secular refers to the genealogies of concepts and sensibilities which 
arose out of a shift in early modernity; as the secular emerged as a category that 
structured people's experiences, concepts derived from Christian tradition were 
radically reformulated. Consequently, meanings and practices changed: "Words 
and practices were rearranged and new discursive grammars replaced previous 
ones. I suggest that the fuller implications of those shifts need to be explored."81 
This shift in the grammar of concepts does not merely connote a shift in 
linguistic usage. It has real ontological implications for "how the body lives pain 
and punishment, compassion and pleasure, hope and fear."82 
Asad refers to these ontological and epistemological implications as 
secular, presumably because they emerged at the time that secularism developed 
as a political doctrine. He thus characterises the secular (in this reconstructed 
sense), not by the absence of religion, but by the concepts and binaries on which 
it is predicated, and the sensibilities, practices and knowledges that it enables. 83 
While Asad acknowledges that this ontology (like representations ofthe secular) 
is constantly made and remade, he also argues that secular life is underpinned by 
a key cluster of concepts. Although their meanings shift, the web of concepts 
nonetheless remains. 84 
A sad's 'reconstructed secular' thus does not concern how an individual or 
group understand their relationship to religion (although this is important for how 
that group represents the categories of religion and the secular). Instead it 
concerns the discourse and rhetoric of such individuals and groups. More 
particularly, it concerns the genealogies of reworked Christian concepts and 
sensibilities which pervade this discourse and rhetoric. In this way, Asad is able 
to refer as secular to individuals, groups and phenomena that claim to be 
religious. For example, he discusses how the 'secular Christian' is bound to 
80 Ibid., 25. 
8 1 Ibid., 25-6. 
82 Ibid ., 99. 
83 I will later explore particular sensibilities and concepts that Asad identifies as ' secular ' (in his 
reconstructed sense). Here I only want to emphasise his overall argument about the reconstructed 
secular - secular ontology consists of sensibilities, knowledges and behaviours that grew out 
reformulated Christian concepts. 
84 Asad, F01mations of the Secular, 23. 
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modern, secular sensibilities of pain. In the secular, modem formulation, pain 
and suffering are considered reprehensible and even scandalous. The secular 
Christian thus struggles to make sense of suffering, even though suffering 
historically held an honoured position in Christian tradition. 85 Asad thus 
characterises modem Christians as secular (in this reconstructed sense). While 
they profess religious faith, they are nonetheless influenced by sensibilities 
which arise out of reworked Christian concepts. 
Similarly, Asad presents nationalism as essentially secular, even though 
some nationalists claim to be religious. He stakes this claim on the grounds that 
nationalism depends on the notion ofthe secular, a space distinct from and prior 
to religion: 86 ''Nationalism ... requires the concept of the secular to make sense. 
The loyalty that the individual nationalist owes is directly and exclusively to the 
nation. Even when the nation is said to be ''under God" it has its being only in 
'this world'- a special kind ofworld."87 
It seems that the secular sensibilities that Asad identifies have a 'this-
worldly focus' (and this is why Asad can apply the term to explicitly religious 
objects). 88 In other words, modern, secular sensibilities claim to apprehend this 
world (the real world) as it really is. As Asad points out, however, there is no 
apprehension of the real; the "secular world is not merely discovered (through 
clear-sighted knowledge of the real) but precariously assembled and lived in 
contradictory fashion." 89 The secular thus presents yet another conception of the 
world, not the true apprehension ofit.90 But the claim that the real is being 
85 Ibid., 106-107. "Christianity which was traditionally rooted in the doctrine of Christ's passion, 
consequently finds it difficult to make good sense of suffering today. Modern theologians have 
begun to concede that pain is essentially and entirely negative ... it follows that such pain should 
be eliminated from the world of human interaction- even from religious disciplines, and from the 
enactment of martyrdom, where it once had an effective and honoured place. The secular 
Christian must now abjure passion and choose action. Pain is not merely negativeness. It is, 
literally, a scandal." 
86 Ibid. , 191-2. 
87 Ibid., 193. 
88 Ibid., 64. 
89 Ibid. , 63 . 
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° For Asad the reconstructed secular is also characterised by uncertainty: "In brief, this world is 
'secular ' not because scientific knowledge has replaced religious belief (that is, because the 'real' 
has at last become apparent) but because, on the contrary, it must be lived in uncertainly, without 
fixed moorings even for the believer, a world in which the real and the imaginary mirror each 
other. In this world the politics of certainty is clearly impossible." Asad suggests that the 
"emphasis on this-wordliness is a consequence of that tension." Ibid., 64-65. 
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apprehended is an important part ofthese sensibilities that Asad describes as 
secular.91 
For Asad, modernity, like the secular, is characterised by the sense that 
the real is being apprehended: "The notion that these experiences constitute 
'disenchantment'- implying a direct access to reality, a stripping away of myth, 
magic, and the sacred- is a salient feature of the modem epoch."92 Asad thus 
construes modernity as almost synonymous with the secular: "I suggest that the 
idea of cruelty in modem discourse has distinctive characteristics, and that in 
describing them one is also identifYing aspects of the secular."93 
In my opinion, Asad is not entirely coherent when he applies the term 
'secular' in this reconstructed sense. If modem sensibilities are synonymous with 
so-called secular ones, then what do we gain by calling them secular? More 
importantly, Asad confuses his reader, first repudiating the term 'secular' (as it is 
conventionally used) and then applying it himself in a reconstructed sense. I do, 
however, think that Asad's reconstructed secular points to an important insight 
that stands, regardless of whether we agree with his appellation 'secular.' When 
Asad discusses secular sensibilities, he demonstrates how modernity presents 
another conception of the world, not the true apprehension of it. 
This study draws on both Asad's concept ofthe reconstructed secular as 
well as his insights about representation. For the bulk of my thesis, however, I 
focus on notions of representation, discussing first, how scholars apply 
(represent) the categories of religion and the secular when they analyse the 
LTTE, and second, how the LTTE represents the categories of religion and the 
secular in their discourses. When we consider Asad's observation about how 
religion and the secular overlap, it seems hardly surprising that the LTTE's 
supposedly secular nationalism has 'religious facets.' In a sense, Roberts is 
correct. The LTTE's nationalism has enchanted, religious facets like Al Qaeda's 
(or the Sri Lankan government's) rhetoric. What Asad helps us to appreciate, 
however, is that any secular organisation or nationalism has enchanted, religious 
facets. The LTTE resembles not only Al Qaeda, but also Western, secular 
91 Of course, pre-modem people also thought their narratives, practices and beliefs were 'true.' 
The difference, however, is that they did not perceive a need to verify and assert the truth of their 
narratives and practices. The claim to apprehend a verifiable reality thus characterises modem, 
secular narratives, practices and beliefs. 
92 A sad, Formations of the Secular, 13. 
93 Ibid., 100. 
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governments. Furthermore, these secular governments in the West share 
commonalities with AI Qaeda too ; both propagate rhetoric and symbols that have 
enchanted facets. 
Throughout this study, I will argue that scholars ofthe LTTE provide 
little analytical insight when they identify 'religious' facets in LTTE practices. 
Furthermore, they detract from the LTTE's claim to be secular, a claim which 
shapes how the LTTE and the Tamil public understand their identity as Tamils. 
Asad's ideas thus allow me to intervene in the scholarly debate. They also 
enable me to formulate an approach to the first of my questions: Is there a 
religious difference between Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms? When we study 
the rhetoric of Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists, we identify some kind of 
religious difference between the two: Sinhalese nationalists seem to align 
Sinhalese identity with Buddhist identity while Tamil nationalists distance Tamil 
identity from Hindu identity. We clearly cannot explain this difference through 
conventional understandings of religion and the secular. In other words, we 
provide no real explanation ofthis difference if we call one nationalism religious, 
and the other, secular. But does this mean there is no difference at all? Are we 
confused or deluded when we perceive that the two nationalisms differ in some 
way, relating to religion? Using Asad, we can suggest that there is indeed a 
difference between the two nationalisms. This difference pertains not to a 
religious or secular essence, but to how Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists 
represent the categories of religion and the secular. We are thus not deluded 
when we intuitively perceive some kind of 'religious difference.' It's just that our 
conventional understanding ofthe categories (as two mutually exclusive 
domains) hinders us from being able to really engage with this difference. In 
Chapter Two, I elaborate on this insight, showing exactly how Sinhalese and 
Tamil nationalists represent the categories of religion and the secular. 
In Chapter Two, and throughout this study, I use the phrase 'religious 
difference.' To reiterate once more, when I use this term I do not mean to suggest 
that there is some kind of essential religious difference between the two 
nationalisms. Instead, I use it to refer to our intuitive assessment that there is 
some kind of difference between the two nationalisms that pertains to religion. I 
also use it to refer to my critical assessment of this intuitively perceived 
difference: Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists differ in how they represent the 
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categories of religion and the secular. It is on this basis that I assert: the religious 
difference pertains to how Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists represent the 
categories of religion and the secular. Similarly, when I refer to religious 
symbols, concerns and identity, I do not mean to imply that these features are 
innately religious; instead they are represented as being religious. Like 'religion' 
and 'secular,' the terms 'Sinhalese' and 'Tamil' do not refer to any kind of 
essence. When I talk about 'Sinhalese concerns' or 'Tamil identity,' I am 
referring to concerns that are represented as being Sinhalese and an identity that 
is represented as being Tamil. My study thus does not assume an ethnic or 
religious essence. 
A sad's ideas also shape how I approach the material covered in Chapters 
Three and Four. In these chapters, I shift my attention from representations of 
religion and the secular to LTTE discourses. I do not, however, altogether 
abandon my interest in the categories. I show how these discourses are structured 
by the claim to be secular. Furthermore, I show how scholars obscure important 
insights when they impute religion to practices and terms within these the 
discourses. In contrast, I show how these so-called religious practices and terms 
might inform us about how the LTTE 's represents a secular, national identity. 
This study thus relies mainly upon Asad's insights around 
representation and not the reconstructed secular. For the most part, I do not try to 
assess whether the sensibilities which underpin L TTE discourses are secular in 
Asad's reconstructed sense. In my conclusion, however, I suggest how future 
studies ofthe LTTE may involve Asad's reconstructed secular. I also 
acknowledge the reconstructed secular in Chapter Three when I discuss 
Enlightenment History. Enlightenment History overlaps with several features 
that characterise Asad's reconstructed secular. Consequently, those who theorise 
about Enlightenment History, like Qadri Ismail and Valentine Daniel, bear many 
similarities to Asad. Like Asad, Ismail and Daniel identifY how aspects of 
modernity (in this case Enlightenment History) present a particular conception of 
the world. For all three scholars, this conception is disguised by modernity's 
claim to apprehend reality. Where appropriate I make the connections between 
these theorists and As ad. 94 
94 Please see footnotes 15 and 91 in Chapter Three. 
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A reader who is familiar with Asad may question my decision to apply 
Asad's theory to the Sri Lankan context. After all, as the subtitle of Formations 
of the Secular suggests, the book mainly draws from Islamic and Christian 
history when discussing the development of secularism. From this, one might 
infer that Asad ' s theory only has relevance to Western Europe. However, Asad 
does not focus on Western history because he wants to tie his theory exclusively 
to the region of Europe. Rather, he primarily discusses Europe's history because 
it is this history which has shaped how secularism is discussed and understood 
around the world: "I draw my material almost entirely from West European 
history because that history has had profound consequences for the ways that the 
doctrine of secularism has been conceived and implemented in the rest of the 
modernizing world. "95 As we can see from this extract and from the previous 
discussion, Asad clearly connects secularism to modem and modernising states 
(and not solely to European history). Given this, it is certainly relevant to apply 
Asad's theory to Sri Lanka and the LTTE. As a modernising state and as an 
organisation which wishes to establish a modem state, the Sri Lankan state and 
the LTTE are certainly involved in representing and mediating a particular 
depiction of religion and the secular. In Sri Lanka, just as in Europe, such 
depictions shape how people understand, express and experience themselves and 
the world with which they interact. 
From the foregoing discussion, one can appreciate that my thesis has been 
shaped by important considerations pertaining to Tamil and Sinhala identities, 
English and Tamil sources and religion and the secular. I hope to provide a 
nuanced discussion that honours the complexities involved in all these domains. 
95 Ibid ., 25. 
27 
Chapter Two 
Exploring the Religious Difference 
In this chapter, I substantiate the claim made in the Introduction - the 
religious difference pertains not to a religious or secular essence but to how 
Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists represent the categories of religion and the 
secular. I will argue that on the Sinhalese side, religious interests and identity are 
represented as being almost synonymous with national interests and identity. 1 
Furthermore, Sinhalese nationalists represent Buddhist practices and objects as 
symbols of Sinhalese identity. Tamil nationalists, however, distance religious 
interests from national interests, and therefore also, religious identity from 
national identity. While the LTTE does employ symbols and terms derived from 
Hindu tradition, these are not represented as being religious. Nor are they 
represented as symbols ofTamil identity. 
The argument I advance involves several tasks: first, identifying 
identities, objects, symbols, interests and concerns that are commonly perceived 
as being religious. Second, it involves examining whether these identities, 
objects, symbols, interests and concerns are distanced from or made synonymous 
with national identities, objects, symbols, concerns and interests. In order to 
understand this relationship we must delve into what Sinhalese and Tamil 
nationalists do and say, and, in some cases, even what they do not say. I thus . 
discuss the demands, rhetoric, statements, legislation and political campaigns of 
Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists, all ofwhich are involved in mediating a 
particular depiction of religion, the nation and the relationship between the two. 
Having established the religious difference, I then inquire into how these 
representations of national identity developed. I employ a historical argument, in 
which I inquire into the conditions which shaped Sinhalese and Tamil identities. 
I argue that a number of historical factors converged. On the one hand, Sinhalese 
identity was fused to values and symbols that were perceived as religious; while 
on the other, Tamil identity came to depend on elite caste values that were 
represented as being separate from religion. This second exercise yields insights 
1 As stated in the Introduction, when I refer to 'religious' identity or 'national' interests, I am 
referring to an identity that is represented as being religious, and interests that are represented as 
being of national concern. 
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into the development and thus also the character of Tamil nationalism as we 
know it today. 
2.1 Establishing the Religious Difference 
Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists posit very different relationships 
between religious concerns and national concerns, and consequently, between 
religious identity and national identity. On the Sinhalese side, Buddhist identity 
is closely aligned with national identity. This representation arises at least partly 
out of how Sinhalese nationalists represent religious interests in relationship to 
national interests. Sinhalese nationalists do not explicitly state that one must be 
Buddhist in order to be Sinhalese (or even Sri Lankan). But by representing 
Buddhist concerns as Sinhalese concerns, they imply that Buddhism has a special 
relationship to national life and identity. Tamil nationalists, like their Sinhalese 
counterparts, are not explicit about the relationship between religious identity 
and national identity. They do not openly reject or embrace Hinduism as a 
constitutive trait of Tamil identity. They do, however, explicitly distance Tamil 
concerns from Hindu concerns. In this way, they suggest that being Tamil does 
not necessarily mean being Hindu. 
In the following discussion, I will explore these differences more fully, 
examining the political campaigns, rhetoric, statements and demands of the 
government as well as the sangha, the TULF as well as the L TTE? While the 
sangha differs from the government, and the TULF from the L TTE, these 
differences are a matter of inflection only. 
In Sinhalese politics, Buddhist interests are represented as (Sinhalese) 
national interests. The government protects and promotes Buddhist interests 
through various policies, legislation and initiatives, implying that Buddhist 
interests are synonymous with national interests. For example, the government 
has two institutions to promote Buddhist interests: the Ministry of Buddhist 
Sasana and the Department of Buddhist Affairs. Amongst other things, these 
institutions are responsible for compiling and printing Buddhist encyclopaedias, 
supervising how Buddhist institutions and temples are administered (including 
2 The sangha is the Buddhist council of monks. In Sri Lanka, the sangha has influenced the 
country' s politics. 
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the Temple of the Tooth),3 sponsoring Buddhist pilgrimages to India, and the sale 
ofBuddhist publications. More generally, these government departments are 
entrusted with protecting and fostering Buddhist values, and safeguarding 
Buddhist culture from alien influence. 4 
It is important to emphasise here that the government patronises Buddhist 
interests at the expense of Muslim, Christian and Hindu interests. More 
importantly still, the government does not even try to portray (represent) its 
patronage of Buddhism as equal to that received by other religious groups. 
Instead, it explicitly claims that Buddhism and Buddhist interests deserve a 
privileged place on the island; the Sri Lankan constitution entrenches Buddhism 
as the country's foremost religion. 5 When Sinhalese nationalists explicitly 
promote Buddhist interests in this way, they represent religious concerns as 
national concerns. Implicit is the suggestion that being Sinhalese (or even Sri 
Lankan) involves being Buddhist. 
The Sri Lankan government is perhaps less direct than governments 
elsewhere in how it depicts the relationship between religious interests and 
national interests, and the parallel relationship between religious identity and 
national identity. In fact, Sinhalese politicians have artfully avoided presenting 
Sri Lanka as either a secular or a Buddhist state. In the Sri Lankan constitution, 
the term 'secular' is quite deliberately omitted. At the same time, the constitution 
does not require its citizens to be Buddhists. 6 This deliberate ambiguity is an 
important part ofhow Sinhalese nationalists represent the relationship between 
religious interests and national interests. We might speculate that the government 
is necessarily ambiguous. After all, the government does claim to represent the 
entire population, including a significant non-Buddhist minority. 
The sangha, however, is not constrained by such considerations. It is 
therefore less ambiguous and more emphatic in how it delineates the relationship 
3 The Temple of the Tooth is a temple in Kandy. It houses a relic, believed to be the tooth of the 
Buddha. The relic is believed to confer powers of kingship. Consequently, it was a blow to the 
Kandyan people when the British seized control of the relic in The Great Rebellion of 1817. 
McGowan, Only Man Is Vile , 130-2. 
4 Peter Schalk, "Present Concepts of Secularism Among Ilavar and Lankans," Asian Ethnicity 3: 
1 {2002): 55-8. It is worth noting that in 1978 a Division of Hindu Religious affairs was formed 
in the Ministry of Regional development. Similarly a division of Muslim Religious affairs was 
established in 1981 . While the state does not solely patronise Buddhism, it does give Buddhism 
the foremost place. 
5 De Votta, Blowback, 134. 
6 Peter Schalk, "Present Concepts of Secularism Among Ilavar and Lankans," 37. 
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between national interests and religious interests. For example, it asserts that 
Buddhism should be the official religion of the island. The sangha, like the 
government, thus presents Buddhist interests as national interests. It too posits a 
special relationship between Buddhism and the nation. 7 The government's 
representation of this relationship is thus predicated on the same kinds of 
connections as the sangha's representation. The sangha, however, delineates 
these connections more explicitly and assertively than the government. 
Tamil nationalists do not have the mechanisms of a state, and so we 
cannot investigate how the LTTE or the TULF patronise religion. What is clear, 
however, is that while Sinhalese nationalists use official policies to protect 
Buddhist interests, Tamil nationalists assert that religious concerns will not 
influence their policy-making process. The LTTE articulates the following 
position in their proposal for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA): ''No 
religion shall be given the foremost place in the North East."8 The TULF 
espoused a similar position: "Tamil Eelam shall be a secular state giving equal 
protection and assistance to all religions to which the people of the state may 
belong."9 The former statement is less clear than the latter, because it does not 
tell us whether the ISGA will be strictly secular, and sponsor no religion, or 
whether it will be pluralistic, and patronise all religions. 10 Regardless of this 
ambiguity, we can see how both the TULF and the LTTE disavow the sorts of 
connections that Sinhalese nationalists make between religious concerns and 
national concerns. 
Because Tamil nationalists distance religious concerns from national 
concerns, they also distance religious identity from national identity. Neither the 
TULF, nor the LTTE, name Hinduism as a feature of Tamil identity. Being 
Hindu is not a criterion-ofbeing Tamil. In fact, in several LTTE documents 
which I have encountered, religion is omitted altogether as a feature of Tamil 
identity. Instead the Tamil nation is founded upon a shared economic life, 
7 Spencer, "Introduction," 3. 
8 LTTE, "The Proposal by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on Behalf of the Tamil People 
for an Agreement to Establish an Interim Self Governing Authority for the North-East of the 
Island of Sri Lanka," http://www.eelam.com/isga/proposal.pdf (accessed May 13 , 2008). The 
LTTE authored the ISGA proposal to the Government of Sri Lanka in November 2003, because it 
was dissatisfied with the government proposals for the devolution of power to Tamil regions. In 
this, the LTTE details the financial , judicial and legal authority of a proposed Interim Authority. 
9 Dissanayake, War or Peace in Sri Lanka, 26. 
10 Schalk, "Present Concepts of Secularism Among Ilavar and Lankans," 46. 
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history, heritage, culture and language: "The Tamils ofthe island of Ceylon (now 
called Sri Lanka) constitute themselves as a nation of people, forming into a 
coherent social entity with their own history, tradition, culture, language and 
economic life. The nation is popularly called Tamil Eelam." 11 
This position differs somewhat from that of the LTTE's predecessors. 
The TULF declared that the religions (note the plural) of the Tamil people are 
among the constitutive elements ofTamil identity. "The Tamils of Sri Lanka, by 
virtue of their great language, their religions, their separate culture and heritage, 
their separate state over a distinct territory for several centuries ... and, above all 
their will to exist as a separate entity ruling themselves in their own territory, are 
a nation distinct and apart from the Sinhalese." 12 Here, all the religions practised 
by Tamil people are accepted as equally Tamil; Tamil-speaking Hindus are not 
considered more essentially Tamil than their Christian counterparts. While the 
TULF did not exclusively tie Hindu identity to Tamil identity, it nonetheless 
connected Tamil identity to the religious practices of Tamils. The LTTE seems to 
have severed even this tenuous connection, situating religious concerns and 
identity outside Tamil concerns and identity. For both the LTTE and TULF, 
Hinduism was not (and still is not) a defining criterion ofTamil identity. 
It may seem as though my comparison thus far has been an unfair one. I 
focussed on what Sinhalese nationalists do, when I analysed how they represent 
religious identity in relation to national identity. When I undertook the same 
analysis ofTamil nationalism, however, I focussed on what Tamil nationalists 
say . One might argue that the LTTE does not have the mechanisms of a state. 
Perhaps if it did, it too might patronise religious groups, even though it explicitly 
disavows religion. My response to this is: we should not focus on whether the 
LTTE would patronise religious groups or promote religious concerns. 
Undoubtedly it would. Every secular government in the world patronises 
religious organisations to some degree. What distinguishes the government from 
the LTTE is the claim that religion should not have any role in politics.13 We 
should thus focus on how the L TTE might represent its patronage of religious 
organisations. Because it distances religious interests from national interests, we 
11 LTTE, Towards Liberation (location unspecified: LITE, 1984), 22. 
12 Dissanayake, War or Peace in Sri Lanka, 25. 
13 Schalk, "Present Concepts of Secularism Among Ilavar and Lankans," 42-3 . 
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might expect the L TTE to claim that it equally patronises all religions. 14 This sort 
of patronage, represented through notions of pluralism, is significantly different 
from the explicitly one-sided patronage that we see from the government. 
The religious difference concerns not only national interests and identity, 
but also national symbols. On the Sinhalese side, Buddhist objects and practices 
are represented as evocative symbols of Sinhalese identity. For example, the 
Mahavamsa, a Buddhist chronicle, is frequently presented as an evocative 
symbol of Sinhalese national identity. Not only do nationalists draw from the 
text, but the text itself is represented as a symbol of national identity: The same is 
true of the Temple of the Tooth: "It is indeed true that the Kandy ritual complex 
has provided legitimization to every Sinhala party and politician since 
independence, including the Trotskyites who, on being elected to office, visited 
the temple to receive the blessings of the triple gem." 15 Stanley Tambiah helps us 
to understand this kind of symbolism. He claims that Sinhalese nationalists have 
fetishized Buddhist texts, reifying them as symbols of national identity. 
"Progressively removed from its original interpretation, both the original 
doctrinal texts and the mytho-historical chronicles have value as sacred objects 
themselves that are markers of special ethnic entitlement, self respect and 
identity." 16 
How does this type ofSinhalese-Buddhist symbolism compare with the 
symbolism that the LTTE uses? I am aware of no instances where the LTTE 
represents religious objects or practices as symbols ofTarnil identity. Several 
scholars, however, have identified LTTE terms and symbols in LTTE, which are 
derived from Saivite tradition. For example, the L TTE uses the term arppanippu, 
sacrifice, to connote the contributions made by dead cadres. In the temple 
context, the term refers to the dedication of a sacrifice, libation or any offering 
presented to a god. Similarly, the L TTE refers to its cadres as tiyaki, 
renouncers, 
17 
a term derived from the Bhagavadgita. 18 
14 Whether the LTTE would live up to such claims is another matter. What is important, however, 
is how it would represent its patronage of religious groups. 
15 Daniel, Charred Lullabies, 60-l . 
16 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?: Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka 
(Chicago: Chicago Universtiy Press, 1992), 59. 
17 Schalk, "The Revival ofMartyr Cults Among Ilavar," 163-4. 
18 Ibid ., 166. 
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Scholars contest the religious meanings of such terms and symbols. 
Some, like Margaret Trawick and Peter Schalk, argue that the L TTE has 
transposed these religious terms and symbols into a secular setting. 19 "LTTE 
terminology is rich in religious terms- in a completely secular context."20 Others, 
however, like Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam imply that these terms are 
religiously alive: "Fallen heroes are therefore honoured not in a secular manner, 
but with syncretistic religious symbols and terrns."21 Michael Roberts advances a 
similar assertion: "The argument here is that the images employed in L TTE 
commemorations have the capacity to draw on sakti and accaryam - divine 
power and marvellous potency."22 Clearly, the LTTE does employ symbolism 
that is derived from Hindu (and sometimes Christian) traditions. I argue, 
however, that these symbols and terms differ from the Sinhalese-Buddhist 
examples presented above. 
First, unlike the Sinhalese-Buddhist symbols, these terms and symbols 
are not represented as being religious. The L TTE represent these references and 
symbols as being situated in a secular context. Second, while Sinhalese 
nationalists represent religious objects and practices as symbols ofSinhalese 
identity, the LTTE do not represent the references described above (which 
scholars call religious) as objects ofTamil identity. 
We can explain these so-called religious references and symbols by the 
fact "that most Tigers happen to be Hindu."23 Hinduism (or what we 
anachronistically call Hinduism) informs the world view ofTamils; it is 
implicated both in their epistemologies and ontologies. Because of this, any 
Tamil construction of meaning (such as the LTTE's rituals) will be infused by 
concepts derived from Hindu traditions. This is quite different, however, from 
the Buddhist symbo Is, images and concepts, which are not only represented as 
19 Margaret Trawick, "Reasons for Violence: A Preliminary Ethnographic Account of the LITE," 
in Conflict And Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka: 'Pearl of the East' or the 'Island of 
Tears'?, ed. Siri Gamage and I.B Watson (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), 160. 
20 Peter Schalk, "Resistance and Martyrdom in the Process of State Formation of Tamil Eelam," 
http://www.tamilnation.org/ideology/schalkthiyagam.htm (accessed May 13, 2008). 
2 1 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And Heroes Die," 118. 
22 Michael Roberts, "Tamil Tiger 'Martyrs:' Regenerating Divine Potency?," Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism 28 (2005): 494. 
23 Trawick, "Reasons for Violence," 160. 
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religious, but which are also venerated as symbols of Sinhalese identity. 24 The 
LTTE's nationalism thus draws on "pre-existing languages and practices-
including those that we call, anachronistically 'religious.' How could it be 
otherwise?"25 Yet, it does not follow that this material is intrinsically the same as 
the religious material used by Sinhalese nationalists. 
As we have seen, Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists differ in how they 
represent the categories of religion and the secular in relation to national identity. 
In particular, this difference concerns how religious concerns, identity and 
objects are represented in relation to national concerns, identity and symbols. On 
the Sinhalese side, religious interests and identity are closely enmeshed with 
national interests and identity. Furthermore, Buddhist objects are represented as 
symbols of Sinhalese identity. In the Tamil case, however, religious interests and 
identity are distanced from national interests and identity. Moreover, religious 
objects or practices are not represented as symbols ofTamil identity. Now that 
we have established the religious difference, we can ask how and why this 
difference developed. When we undertake this examination, we also expose the 
substance of Tamil identity - the sorts of concerns, identities and symbols that 
are represented as being Tamil. 
2.2 Explaining the Religious Difference: A Historical 
Argument 
Given the scope of my project, I cannot offer an answer that attends to all 
the complex factors that fed the two developing nationalisms and the religious 
difference between them. 26 Yet, despite the enormity ofthe task, I have still 
24 This is not to say, however, that all Buddhist objects, practices and references are treated as 
objects of Sinhalese identity. For example, former President Jayewardene chose to light 84,000 
lamps at a series of meritorious lamp-lighting ceremonies, a number which recalls how Askoa 
built 84,000 monasteries to equal the divisions of the dhamma. While such symbols and 
references are used to evoke nationalist sentiment, they are not represented as objects of national 
identity. These symbols used by Jayewardene function much like the Hindu symbols used by the 
LTTE. Just as the Tamil worldview is connected to Hinduism, so too is the Sinhalese worldview 
connected to Buddhism. There is, nonetheless, one difference which remains. While the LITE's 
symbols are represented as being situated in a secular context, Jayewardene's symbols are 
situated in a political context which (as we have seen) is represented as being neither explicitly 
secular nor religious. Steven Kemper, "J.R Jayewardene, righteousness and realpolitik," in Sri 
Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathon Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 192-
193. 
25 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 194. 
26 The second task is worthy of its own investigation. A comprehensive answer would involve a 
detailed analysis of Sri Lanka's pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial past, the relationship 
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decided to tackle it. In short, I believe that the answers that emerge will provide 
invaluable insights into the contours and overall shape ofTamil nationalism as it 
exists today. 
Thus far I have focussed on both the LTTE and the parliamentarians. This 
is because I wanted to show that the LTTE is not the first Tamil nationalist group 
to distance religion from Tamil identity. In this section, I want to understand how 
this representation of Tamil identity developed. In particular, I want to explain 
the differences we identified in the preceding discussion. In other words, how did 
Sinhalese and Tamil group identities come to have such different relationships to 
religious identity? What conditions prevented Tamil nationalists from 
representing religious objects and practices as symbols of national identity? And 
what conditions triggered the reverse for Sinhalese nationalists? 
For me to answer these questions satisfactorily, so that my analysis yields 
valid insights, and yet briefly, so that it fits within the confines ofthis project, I 
have carefully limited how and what I investigate in the following ways. First, I 
have shied away from essentialist arguments that would explain the religious 
difference (and the conflict more generally) as the inescapable outcome of 
various immutable features ofHinduism and Buddhism, Sinhalese and Tamil 
cultures or languages, or even social and cultural institutions like the caste 
system.27 Explanations like these fail to take into account how religious, ethnic 
and caste identities are constantly rearticulated and reconstituted in new and 
changing contexts. In contrast, I seek to understand how Sinhalese and Tamil 
identities, and their representations of religion and the secular, developed in a 
particular historical context and so, unlike an essentialist, I predicate my entire 
between Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism and Indian Tamil nationalism, the relationship between 
the colonised (Sinhalese and Tamil elites, Sinhala and Tamil masses, Buddhist and Hindu priests 
etc) and the colonisers (British state, missionaries etc). Such a study must also address theoretical 
concerns, like the malleability of history. This sort of exhaustive analysis is beyond the scope of 
my project. 
27 An essentialist might emphasise that the Hindu caste system, unlike the Buddhist caste system, 
is legitimated by religious texts. As such, they might argue that such a religious ideology, 
supporting social stratification, is irreconcilable with the nationalist goal to create a homogenous, 
unifying identity. Tamil nationalists therefore could not mobilise a Tamil-Hindu identity; they 
had to ground their nationalist project in secular language and ideology. But this argument fails to 
acknowledge an important fact- Tamil identity in Sri Lanka was predicated on an exclusive 
(caste) identity. What needs to be explained, then, is how this caste identity came to the forefront 
of group consciousness and how it came apart from its religious foundations. An essentialist 
argument would treat Hinduism and the caste system as fixed, demarcated, static categories. 
Instead, I would ask: what political, ideological , and economic forces coalesced to hinder the 
development of a Tamil-Hindu identity? 
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approach on the flexible, dynamic and constructed character of religious and 
ethnic identity. 
Second, I have confined my investigation to a particular historical period 
-the Hindu (more particularly Saivite) and Buddhist revivals at the turn of the 
20th Century. The Hindu, Buddhist (and also Muslim) revivals occurred when the 
British established freedom of religion. Freedom of religion enabled Hindus and 
Buddhists to openly express renewed interest in their religious traditions, 
traditions which had been suppressed during Portuguese and Dutch rule. 28 I 
chose this period because it is associated not only with the articulation of 
religious identity, but also with the consolidation of Sinhalese and Tamil group 
identities.29 Because of its associations with both religion and the birth ofSinhala 
and Tamil group identities, the revivalist period promises to yield insights about 
how each group identity developed in relation to representations of religion. 
Third, in order to elicit these insights, I have chosen to compare the two 
movements. Here, the Sinhalese-Buddhist material serves merely as a 
counterpoint to the Tamil-Saivite example. For this reason, I have only 
adumbrated the character of the Buddhist revival. 
Fourth, when I compared the revivalist movements, I actively sought out 
differences between the two. While the revivalist movements shared many 
common features, it is the differences that highlight the influences and factors 
that nudged one group identity towards representations of religion and the other, 
away from it. In particular, I have attended to two especially influential 
differences - the roles played by caste identities and language in each revivalist 
movement. 
2.2.1 Caste Identities in the Revivalist Movements. 
Like ethnic and religious identities, caste structures and identities also 
develop in and respond to new and changing contexts. I now tum to these 
28 Rohan Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life: Complicity and Resistance in the Tamil Hindu 
Revival," in Sri Lanka: Collective Identities Revisited Volume I, ed. Michael Roberts (Colombo: 
Marga Institute, 1997), 389-391. The Hindu and Buddhist revivals were roughly contemporary. 
The Saivite revival precedes the Buddhist revival by roughly a decade. As such it is not 
characterised by the fin de siecle sentiments that we see in the Buddhist revival. 
29 Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, "Arumuka Navalar: Religious Reformer of National Leader 
ofEelam," Indian Economic Social History Review 26 (1989): 236. Scholars concede that these 
revival movements shaped Sinhalese and Tamil identities, even though they debate the extent of 
this influence. 
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constructed caste structures, their place in the revivalist movements and their role 
in shaping the religious difference between the two group identities. 
Both before and during the era of the revivalist movements, Sinhalese and 
Tamil caste structures were reworked, when certain economic and colonial 
influences coalesced. In the Sinhalese low country, the British opened up a 
number of mercantile opportunities. 30 In particular the Karava and Salagama 
castes eschewed their traditional occupations and seized these opportunities in 
transportation, trade, cinnamon production and arrack renting. 31 These socially 
mobile castes thus began to form an emerging bourgeoisie. 32 Through their 
newfound status, they began to resist the hegemony of the dominant Goyigama 
caste.33 
In the Tamil north, we observe quite a different set of interactions. 
Traditionally, the Vellalars, the dominant caste, were at the centre of a social 
system in which they procured the "salubrious grace" and the "coveted benefit of 
increase" from Brahman rituals. 34 These rituals established "the Vellalars in the 
eyes of the village community as persons saturated with good fortune, the 
capacity to manage agrarian reproduction, and the right to command the services 
ofnon-Vellalar castes."35 Like the Brahmans, the untouchable, adimai castes also 
participated in this social system that hinged upon securing the prosperity of the 
Vellalar.36 They were expected to labour on Vellalar lands and were also 
responsible for imbibing or removing disordering substances from Vellalar 
rituals that threatened to disrupt "the very foundation of social order and 
dignified life."37 In return, the adimai possessed rights to Vellalar care and 
protection. 38 
30 LA Wickremeratne, Religion, Nationalism, and Social Change in Ceylon 1865-1885, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History (Colombo: Studies in Society and Culture, 1993), 13 . 
31 Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 392. 
32 Richard Gombrich and Ganath Obeysekere, Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri 
Lanka (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 211 . 
33 Wickremeratne, Religion, Nationalism, and Social Change in Ceylon 1865-1885, 13. 
34 Pfaffenberger, Caste in Tamil Culture, 149, 227. 
35 Pfaffenberger, "The Cultural Dimension ofTamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," 1151. 
36 Pfaffenberger, Caste in Tamil Culture, 148. 
37 Ibid., 148, 96-7, 198-200 
38 Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 401. 
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The Dutch, and the Portuguese before them, codified V ell alar dominance 
to aid their own collection of monies and for agricultural reasons too.39 In the 
process, they rigidified caste relations and amplified Vellalar power. "Elements 
of Jaffna's caste system probably predate the colonial incursion. However, it 
would be a serious error to ascribe the system's rigidity to the traditional system 
ofintercaste relations ... the Dutch strengthened the dominance ofVellalars for 
their own revenue-collection purposes."40 
These reconstituted caste relations greatly influenced the revivalist 
movements, where group identities were forged. 41 In the Buddhist case, the 
revival was tied to the voice and interests of the socially mobile, bourgeois 
castes.42 The revivalists propagated a new Buddhist morality and doctrinal values 
that fitted their bourgeois lifestyle and aspirations. For example, Angarika 
Dharmapala, a key figure in the Buddhist revival, authored in 1898 a daily code 
for the Buddhist laity that openly encouraged bourgeois habits and practices. "In 
some instances Western norms are directly advocated as, for example, eating 
with fork and spoon and using toilet paper before water during ablutions."43 
Dharmapala's social reform provided a value system to a new class, an emerging 
bourgeoise. 44 This newly formulated Buddhism, with its unique ideals and 
values, responded to Goyigama hegemony in a context of economic change and 
social mobility: "The Buddhist movement was, at least in part, the religious 
expression of the improved economic and social status of the major non-
39 Two agricultural methods exist on the Jaffua Peninsula. The first, rice agriculture, is only 
marginally economic. The Dutch encouraged the second method, of tottam (garden) agriculture, 
to grow and export cash crops. Tottam agriculture is productive but also very labour intensive. In 
order to secure labour, the Dutch defined the Untouchable, adimai castes as slaves. As such, they 
denied the adimai castes their traditional patron-cl ient rights to Vellalar care and protection. "By 
defining the adimai Untouchables as slaves in the sense of Roman Dutch law, and in particular, 
as enslaved persons attached to a specific master irrespective of rights to land, the Dutch 
unleashed forces which were to insulate Vellalar domination from later administrative efforts ... 
to destroy it." Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 400-1 ; Pfaffenberger, Caste in Tamil Culture, 
42. 
40 Pfaffenberger, "The Political Construction of Defensive Nationalism," 146. 
41 Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 393. 
42 Sarath Amunugama, "Ideology and Class Interest in One ofPiyadasa Sirisena's Novels: The 
New Image of the 'Sinhala Buddhist ' Nationalist," in Sri Lanka: Collective Identities Revisited-
Volume I, ed. Michael Roberts (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1997), 341. In fact, the epicentre of 
the revival is the maritime districts where these very castes predominate. Wickremeratne, 
Religion, Nationalism, and Social Change in Ceylon 1865-1885, 1. 
43 Gombrich and Obeysekere, Buddhism Transformed, 215. 
44 Ibid ., 212. In later times these bourgeois ideals were extended to the peasant communities 
through the Sinhala medium schools. This has led scholars to argue that Sinhalese nationalism 
and the Buddhist reviva l are characterised by the embourgeoisement ofSinhala society, the 
spreading of bourgeois ideals. 
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Goigama castes in the maritime districts .. .Implicit was a clear challenge to the 
traditionally prestigious status of the Goigama caste."45 Sinhalese identity, which 
was shaped during the revival, thus came to be tied to this bourgeois Buddhism, a 
Buddhism which had enabled the revivalists to challenge the hegemony of the 
Goyigama caste. 
In contrast to the Buddhist revival, where traditional caste relations were 
undermined and the interests of an emerging bourgeoisie were supported, the 
Saivite revival explicitly celebrated the Vellalar order. As such, it was centred in 
the Jaffna Peninsula, the preserve oftraditional Vellalar domination, and its key 
instigators were Vellalars. Like their Buddhist counterparts, the Saivite 
revivalists addressed their peers, who in this case were "the local intelligentsia 
engaged in the professions and the self employed who were of respectable stock 
and generally landowners. "46 
These Vellalar revivalists extolled Vellalar ideals and values, primarily 
associated with the ancient Brahman-Vellalar alliance, a feature ofDravidian 
culture.47 As such, Brahmanic rituals, and their prescriptions in the agama texts, 
were an important facet ofthe revival. 48 As Rohan Bastin reminds us, however, 
this Brahmanical focus should not be misconstrued as a glorification of Brahman 
status: "In short, agamism is heavily ritualistic, a feature it shares with much 
Brahmanic Hinduism. It is not, however, pro-Brahmin or more exactly pro-
Advaita Brahmin in the sense ofholding up the person of the Brahmin as an 
object ofveneration, or holding up the Vedas as the most important text.',49 
Instead, revivalists such as Arumuka Navalar (1822-79) celebrated 
Vellalar identity and openly qualified the pride of place accorded to Brahmans. 5° 
While Navalar thought that Brahmanic ritual was important, he also believed that 
it was the Vellalars who had to ensure that it was performed correctly. In order 
45 Wickremeratne, Religion, Nationalism, and Social Change in Ceylon 1865-1885, 13. We can 
see this even during the early 19th Century when members of the Karava, Salagama and Durava 
castes introduced a number of Buddhist ordination lines from Burma; up until then , only 
Goyigamas could be ordained. Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 393. 
46 Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 409. 
47 Pfaffenberger, "The Cultural Dimension ofTamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," 1151. 
48 Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 394-5. Pfaffenberger argues that the Saivite revival , unlike 
the Buddhist revival, had a strong textual focus: "It is in this respect that Navalar 's campaign 
differs radically from that of other Hindu reformers (and that ofDharmapala): Navalar was 
simply not interested in reforming Hindu society." Pfaffenberger, "The Political Construction of 
Defensive Nationalism," 156. 
49 Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 395 
50 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "Arumuka Navalar," 241. 
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for them to oversee rituals in this way, they must be well versed in the ritual 
prescriptions. This is one ofthe main reasons why Navalar pushed for (Vellalar) 
children to receive a Tamil-Saivite education- as adults, conversant with the 
ritual prescriptions of the agamas, they could ensure that Brahmans properly 
executed rituals. "A knowledge of these written rules was also important. .. to 
check on whether the Brahmin priests were performing the ritual in the proper 
way."51 Reformers like Navalar were solely intent on preserving the social order, 
safeguarding V ellalar pre-eminence and keeping Brahmans in their proper 
place. 52 Therefore, although the revival is labelled Brahmanic, it was still 
undoubtedly pro-Vellalar. 
In this way, the revival brought Vellalarhood to the forefront of Jaffua 
Tamil, and then later, a more general Tamil, consciousness. Well into the 20th 
Century, the term 'Tamil' was used only to refer to Vellalars. 53 Vellalar ideals, 
concerns and identity were thus represented as Tamil symbols, concerns and 
identity. Vellalar-Tamil ideals comprised a number of different values, privileges 
and practices that were traditionally considered the prerogative of the Vellalars. 
Some were associated with Saivite tradition (for example the deference given to 
Brahmans, practices around protecting women's chastity and proficiency in 
Tamil, the language ofSaivite thought). Others, however, had emerged relatively 
recently as markers ofVellalar- Tamil identity (western education and the 
cultivation of Tamil dance and music). 54 
Later in this chapter, I will discuss these values and practices in greater 
detail. Here it is sufficient to say that Tamil national identity eventually came to 
comprise Vellalar ideals and traditions as its constitutive traits. 55 This is similar 
to the way that the bourgeois values (such as the laicisation of Buddhism and the 
celebration ofbourgeois life) of the Buddhist reformers are active in how 
Sinhalese nationalists understand and articulate their identity. 
The material presented thus far might seem to answer our questions about 
how the religious difference developed. We might argue that, while the Saivite 
51 Ibid ., 246. 
52 Ibid ., 243 ; Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 395. 
5
" Pfaffenberger, "The Political Construction of Defensive Nationalism," 149. 
54 K Kaliasapathy, "Cultural and Linguistic Consciousness of the Tamil Community," in 
Ethnicity and Social Change in Sri Lanka: papers presented at a seminar organised by the Social 
Scientists Association, December 1979 (Colombo: Social Scientists ' Association, 1984), 117. 
55 Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 405-7. 
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revival exalted values that were explicitly associated with an elite caste, the 
Buddhist revival implicitly challenged traditional caste relations, focussing 
instead on religious ideals and values. Consequently, one group identity was 
founded on ideals that were represented as being caste-based, while the other was 
predicated on values that were represented as religious. This then influenced the 
national identities which later developed. Sinhalese national identity was tied to 
representations of religion, while Tamil identity was distanced from similar 
representations. 
However, this does not satisfactorily answer our questions. In the Saivite 
revival, Vellalar ideals were firmly anchored to their religious foundations (the 
Brahmanic rituals). Surely, then, Tamil concerns and identity should have been 
tied to Saivite-Vellalar concerns and identity. Similarly, we might ask why 
Saivite-Vellalar practices and objects did not come to be represented as symbols 
ofTamil identity. What we still need to explain is how these Vellalar ideals came 
to be distanced from religion, how they came to be represented as cultural, rather 
than religious traits. 
The answer to this question lies in the linguistic dimensions of the Saivite 
revival. Once again, a comparison with the Buddhist movement is helpful. 
Amongst the Tamils, language was distanced from Saivite tradition while still 
privileging Vellalar identity. In the Sinhalese case, however, the linguistic facets 
of the religious revival supported the primacy of Buddhism as a marker of 
Sinhalese identity. 
2.2.2 The Impact of Language Missions on the Revivalist 
Movements. 
We discovered that we cannot understand representations of national 
identity and their relationship to religion through innate or essential features of 
Hinduism, Buddhism or caste practices amongst the Sinhalese and Tamils. The 
same is true of the language elements of the religious revivals. While it would be 
tempting to explain the religious difference through features of the Sinhalese and 
Tamil language traditions, we must remember that such arguments can only 
constitute partial explanations. 
For example, we could argue that the Saivite tradition glorifies the Tamil 
language (in its own right) as a Vellalar accomplishment, and therefore enables a 
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Tamil-Vellalar identity founded on language rather than religion. 56 Similarly, we 
could argue that the Sinhala Buddhist tradition is dependent on a Pali, rather than 
a Sinhalese canon. 57 Consequently, the Sinhalese language developed as a 
secondary component of Sinhalese identity. While these arguments undoubtedly 
highlight important truths about each tradition, they cannot solely explain the 
religious difference. Without looking hard, we can fmd other factors or features 
of Sinhalese and Tamil culture and society that contravene the arguments 
presented above. 
For example, while language occupies a place of great importance in the 
Tarnil-Saivite tradition, religious ritual and practice are also valued. In fact, 
scholars have long designated the Jaffua Tamil peninsula as the most pious and 
religious corner of the island. 58 Given this, surely an ethnic identity based on 
religion was just as likely as one founded on language. In other words, language 
is in no way intrinsically more important than religion. On the Sinhalese side, I 
would conversely argue that language is not innately secondary to religion as a 
marker of group identity. After all, Sinhalese language movements gained a 
significant following. 59 
In both cases, then, we must seek to understand how language came to 
function as it did in relation to both group identities. As we did with caste 
relations, we must look to the ideological, political and economic forces that 
accentuated particular strands of Sinhalese and Tamil, Buddhist and Saivite 
traditions while rendering others irrelevant. Here, the role played by the 
missionaries is important. 
While the missionaries had a monopoly on educational facilities both in 
the north and south, they interacted quite differently with each community and its 
56 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "Arurnuka Navalar," 243 
57 Gombrich and Obeysekere, Buddhism Transj01med, 207-8, 210-11. 
58 Pfaffenberger, "The Cultural Dimension ofTamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," 1148. 
59 K.N.O Dharmadasa, Language, Religion and Ethnic Assertiveness: the Growth of Sinhalese 
Nationalism in Sri Lanka (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 261-289. In the late 
1930s there was a Sinhalese language movement known as the He/a Movement. This movement 
placed language rather than religion at the heart of ethnic identity. Curnaratunge, the founder of 
this movement, wanted to cleanse the Sinhalese language of its Pali and Sanskrit influences. In 
this way he was quite different from the religious revivalists before him who had happily 
accommodated Pali and Sanskrit alongside Sinhalese as the languages of the Sinhala-Buddhist 
tradition . The movement could not di slodge religion as the most highly mobilised aspect of 
Sinhalese identity. It did, however, impact upon the form that Sinhalese nationalism took when it 
erupted into the political arena in 1956 with a linguistic demand- that Sinhalese be made the only 
official language of the country. 
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language. The missionaries in the south failed to attend to the nuances of the 
Sinhalese language. Consequently, they alienated themselves from the Sinhalese 
elite. Furthermore, because Sinhalese literature was Buddhist, these works were 
not read in missionary schools, a policy also adopted in government schools. 60 
Instead the missionary and the governmental educational authorities adopted an 
impoverished Church and Textbook Sinhalese. Even Sinhalese Christian scholars 
rejected it, arguing that it followed colloquial usage rather than literary 
conventions.6 1 While the Sinhalese Christian scholars were alienated on this one 
grievance, their Buddhist counterparts, who formed the majority, were angered 
on two counts - not only were Buddhist texts not being taught in schools, but the 
Sinhalese texts that were being taught relied upon a colloquial vocabulary and 
idiom. The development of the Sinhalese language thus became the 
responsibility of the Buddhist revivalists. In order to stake out a place for the 
Sinhalese language, the revivalists had to modernise the language so that it could 
cope with the new forms of media in the modem world.62 They invented a new 
style of Sinhalese that was a compromise between colloquial usage and literary 
convention. 63 They then disseminated this new style of Sinhalese through 
Sinhalese Buddhist newspapers and journals. 64 
Where the fate of the Sinhalese language had been left almost entirely in 
the hands of the Buddhist revivalists, in the north, Tamil Christians and even the 
missionaries were involved in studying and teaching the Tamil language. 65 
Unlike the Sinhalese, the Tamils had a non-religious literature that the 
missionaries regarded highly. 66 Consequently the missionaries promoted 
Classical Tamil and taught Tamil composition in their schools. 67 The 
missionaries in the north also had an advantage over their colleagues in the south. 
They could communicate with the missionaries in Tamil-speaking regions in 
India, who were also grappling with how to read, speak and generally 
60 Ibid., 161. 
61 Ibid., 159-60. 
62 Ibid., 182. 
63 Ibid., 184-5. 
64 Ibid ., 115. 
65 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "Arwnuka Navalar," 245. 
66 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "Ethnicity and Nationalism -The Sri Lanka Tamils in the Late 
Nineteenth Century: Some Theoretical Questions," in Nationalism, Ethnicity and Political 
Development: South Asian Perspectives, ed. D. Weidemann (New Delhi: Manohar, 1991 ), 31. 
67 Lakshmanan Sabaratnam, Ethnic Attachments in Sri Lanka: Social Change and Cultural 
Continuity (New York: Palgrave, 2001 ), 105. 
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communicate in Tamil. 68 Because of this, the missionaries working in Jaffua had 
access to more language resources, and consequently developed a deep 
understanding and appreciation of Tamil. For example, Reverend Peter Perceival, 
a missionary based in Jaffua, rendered, with Navalar, a translation of the Bible 
that was noted for its literary quality. 69 This is quite different from the reception 
which the Sinhalese translation of the Bible received. 70 
In the Saivite revival, language was originally represented as a feature of 
a Saivite-V ellalar concern. 71 The V ellalars were the preservers and protectors of 
not only Saivite practices, but also of the Tamil language, which was the vehicle 
of Saivite thought and practice. But because missionaries and Christians 
participated in the linguistic facets of the revival, language was distanced from 
its connections to Saivite tradition, while still retaining a strong connection to 
Vellalar identity. While Christian Tamil poetry was admitted into the canon of 
Tamil literature, that same canon ofTamilliterature remained a symbol of 
Vellalar accomplishments. 72 
The missionary involvement in the revival thus enabled Tamil identity to 
remain firmly tied to Vellalar concerns (ofwhich language was the most 
important), concerns which were no longer represented as being religious. In 
particular, Tamil concerns and identity were fused to one particular Vellalar 
concern - language. 73 The missionary involvement in the revival thus explains 
why Tamil national identity came to be aligned with linguistic concerns and 
identity, and not religious concerns and identity. 
68 Ibid., 109. 
69 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "Arumuka Navalar," 237. 
70 Dharmadasa, Language, Religion and Ethnic Assertiveness, 67. 
7 1 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffua Social System," 256. Hellmann Rajanayagam discusses 
how Tamil identity was connected from early on to Vellalar identity. Language was important 
then as a status symbol of a Vellalar-Tamil identity. "Thus, from quite early on, an ethnic 
moment crept into the concept of caste (cati) among the Tamils, and a concept of caste into 
'ethnic' differentiations. This had astonishingly little or nothing to do with whether one spoke 
Tamil or not, a feature that is nowadays so important, and in spite of the fact that even then, 
Tamil held a high place in the esteem of the Jaffuese, but that was the ' pure' Tamil spoken by 
high castes." 
72 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "Ethnicity and Nationalism," 31. 
73 Hellmann Rajnayagam notes how language functions as the most potent marker of Tamil 
identity. Conflict occurs when the Tamil language (and not religion) is threatened. This proves 
my point that language concerns are aligned with Tamil concerns. Being a Tamil-speaker 
epitomises what it means to be Tamil. We find further proof in the interactions between the 
Muslim community and Tamil nationalists. Tamil nationalists have (fairly unsuccessfully) sought 
to include the Tamil-speaking Muslims. Once again, this shows that Tamil national identity is 
tied to linguistic, and not religious identity. Ibid., 43 ; Hellmann Rajanayagam, "From Differences 
To Ethnic Solidarity," 109-10. 
45 
The missionaries' participation in the revival also explains why Hindu 
practices, temples and texts did not come to be represented as symbols ofTamil 
identity. When the missionaries participated in the revivial, they enabled not 
only language, but also other Saivite-Vellalar practices, concerns, and ideals to 
be distanced from Saivite tradition. The most potent symbols ofTamil identity 
were thus V ell alar practices and values that were represented as cultural, and not 
religious, traits. 
In the Buddhist case, however, we see a different relationship develop 
between representations of religion and representations of language. Because the 
missionaries did not join in the linguistic dimensions ofthe revival, nurturing and 
developing the Sinhalese language fell into the hands ofthe Buddhist revivalists. 
Those who were promoting the Sinhalese language were also promoting 
Buddhist interests. This, along with the fact that the Sinhalese language had 
never been revered in its own right as the sole vehicle of Buddhist thought (Pali 
and Sanskrit had actually filled this role), meant that language became a 
secondary marker, which merely reinforced the place ofBuddhism as the 
primary marker of Sinhalese identity. Sinhalese concerns and identity were 
firmly tied to Buddhist concerns and identity. Consequently, Buddhist objects 
and practices came to be represented as symbols of Sinhalese identity. Status and 
ethnic symbols for the Sinhalese were represented as being religious, whereas for 
the Tamils they were represented as being linguistic and also cultural- hence the 
religious difference between the two nationalisms. 
From this process of identity formation, we can see that the answer to the 
religious difference does not primarily lie in the raw material that Hinduism and 
Buddhism or Sinhalese and Tamil cultures (as they were understood and 
experienced) provided, but in how this raw material interacted with and was 
reconstituted by historical, social, political, cultural, economic and ideological 
forces. Religion came to be represented differently in relation to representations 
of national identity. This is because ofhow the revivalist movements (which 
shaped these identities) influenced and were influenced by caste relations and 
language traditions, which were in tum moulded by colonial ideology, policy and 
economics. 
Perhaps if, historically, a different set of factors had coincided to produce 
a Saivite revival that pitted Hindus against Christians, rather than lower castes 
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against higher castes, then a Tamil religious identity might have emerged. Or if 
the British had provided entrepreneurial opportunities for the lower Tamil-
speaking castes, then a revivalist movement may have been engendered by 
socially mobile members of these castes, and Tamil nationalism may have 
become allied to a form ofSaivism rather than Vellalarhood. Similarly, if the 
missionaries had not partaken in the linguistic dimensions of the revival, then 
perhaps Christians would not have been admitted into the Vellalar, Tamil fold, 
and V ell alar ideals would have remained firmly embedded within a religious 
context. But this did not happen, and caste values, divorced from religion, 
formed the basis of a national identity, where V ell alar Christians were considered 
as equally Tamil as their Hindu counterparts. 
2.3 Tamil Nationalists: Representing a Vellalar, Tamil 
Identity 
During the revival, Tamil identity was thus aligned with language, as well 
as other Vellalar concerns, all ofwhich were distanced from religion. In later 
years this formulation of Tamil identity lent itselfto a policy of secularism. The 
revival also had other consequences for how Tamil identity came to be 
represented. I will show how the revival compromised Vellalar identity, while 
also celebrating it. These compromises enabled Vellalar identity to be extended 
not only to Christians, but also to Tamil speakers from other castes and regions. 
Finally, I will discuss how this Vellalar-based formulation ofTamil identity has 
impacted upon the rhetoric and projects ofTamil nationalists, particularly the 
LTTE. 
While revivalists, such as Navalar, celebrated Vellalar status, they also 
inadvertently compromised it when they unflinchingly advocated textual 
prescriptions over popular religious practices. 74 One example that had lasting 
consequences was Navalar's opposition to lower-caste, ritual services. On the 
grounds that they were textually unfounded, Navalar condemned these practices 
where lower adimai castes removed disordering substances from Vellalar homes 
and temples. However, in doing so, he unknowingly provided the lower castes 
with a rationale for temple entry. No longer polluted by these impure tasks, 
74 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "Arwnuka Nava lar," 239-40. 
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Untouchable Tamils began to agitate for temple entry and other rights normally 
denied to them because oftheir impure status. "In short, ifthe scriptural language 
of purity and pollution is privileged above all other forms of status reckoning, 
then the low rank of Minority Tamils appears to be nothing more than an artifice 
forced on these castes by Vellalar power."75 
While some Vellalars resisted Navalar's position, on the whole, these 
ritual services (and what they implied for the castes that performed them) were 
increasingly done away with. Consequently, Vellalar status was compromised. 
These services had traditionally stigmatised the lower castes and so had 
demarcated Vellalars from non-Vellalars. But now, with the repudiation of these 
services, lower castes could behave like V ellalars and even claim V ellalar 
status.76 
Contemporaneous to these developments, economic forces had also 
eroded other markers ofVellalar status.77 Consequently, the proportion ofthe 
Jaffna population professing Vellalar identity swelled from one-third to roughly 
one-half during the 19th Century. 78 Even the Madapallis, a caste that claimed 
higher status than the Vellalars, and had traditionally been rivals of the Vellalars, 
were amalgamated and integrated into the Vellalar fold as the 'proud' Vellalars 
ofMannippay. 79 The Jafflla Peninsula thus faced a situation where "Slowly, 
slowly they all become Vellalar."80 The revivalist movement had made it 
possible for more people to acquire Vellalar status, while simultaneously 
championing Vellalar ideals. The elite were helpless in the face of such change, 
75 Pfaffenberger, "The Political Construction of Defensive Nationalism," 157. 
76 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffna Social System," 263 . 
77 Bastin, Pfaffenberger and Hellmann Rajanayagam all discuss the erosion ofVellalar status. In 
contradistinction to the Dutch era when Vellalar status was reinforced and reiterated through 
colonial policy, the British colonial period coincided with a number of factors that coalesced to 
erode the basis ofVellalar status. Foremost amongst these was the instability of the market. 
Vellalars found it increasingly difficult to secure reliable income from the cultivation of cash 
crops. Consequently, Vellalars no longer required a contingent of adimai workers. Instead it was 
far more beneficial to hire labourers for cash. But this disturbed the basis ofVellalar hegemony-
their ownership and cultivation of the land, and their provision for those who laboured on it. 
Vellalars, deprived of such traditional status markers, fought hard to ensure that they were the 
sole beneficiaries of English education. They were trying to establish a new domain within which 
they could continue to predominate and prosper. Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 405-6; 
Pfaffenberger, "The Political Construction of Defensive Nationalism,"l50; Hellmann 
Rajanayagam, "The Jaffna Social System," 259. 
78 Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 410. 
79 Ibid. This suggests that the situation "was not one of simple upward mobility, but of 
identification with a numerically, politically and socially dominant caste." 
80 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffna Social System," 254. An old Tamil proverb- "mella mella 
ell am Vellalarkal akinrana." 
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and so, "Revivalism lost its specifically elite membership, gaining instead more 
of an elitist orientation."81 In this way Vellalar (and therefore Tamil) identity 
were extended to members of other Tamil-speaking castes and East Coast Tamils 
also. 
This situation caused significant problems. 82 On the one hand, Vellalar 
ideals were celebrated and extended, swelling the Vellalar ranks. But on the 
other, Vellalar status relies on the existence of other subordinate castes. "Thus 
Jaffua is caught in the dilemma of trying to hold on to high caste status for its 
elite members, but at the same time defming caste in such a way as to make it 
impossible for these distinctions to be upheld, constantly extending the range of 
groups coming under the term 'elite. "'83 As more people adopted V ell alar 
deportment, the traditional markers ofVellalar identity eroded, and Vellalars 
increasingly insisted upon extra-legal measures and outward markers of 
identity. 84 Such demands often resulted in brutal and violent caste disputes. 85 
Social stratification is thus firmly entrenched in Sri Lankan Tamil 
nationalism. 86 While Vellalar-Tamil ideals have been assumed by more and more 
Tamil-speaking groups, other loyalties and identities have not been completely 
obliterated. Pfaffenberger informs us that the Vellalar basis ofTamil identity 
holds some ambivalence for both East Coast as well as Minority Tamils. 87 While 
most East Coast and Minority Tamils would willingly defend and preserve 
Vellalar-Tamil values as the acme ofTamil achievement, they also fear (although 
less so after the rise of militant groups) that they would be marginalised in a 
Vellalar-led state that professed to protect the very values to which they are so 
deeply attached. 88 
This ambivalence remains unresolved despite the best efforts ofboth the 
militants and the parliamentarian nationalists who preceded them. 89 The 1968 
Temple Crisis is an excellent example of how these competing caste agendas and 
8 1 Bastin, "The Authentic Inner Life," 409. 
82 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffua Social System," 261. 
83 Ibid., 254. 
84 Pfaffenberger, "The Political Construction of Defensive Nationalism," 148. 
85 Fuglerud, Life on the Outside, 30. 
86 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffua Social System," 258-261. 
87 Pfaffenberger, "The Cultural Dimension ofTamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," 1146. 
88 Ibid ., 1153-4. 
89 Recently a faction of East Coast Tamils (led by the former LTTE commander Karuna) broke 
away from the L TIE. This provides another example of how old regional divisions still exist. 
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identities sat uncomfortably alongside Tamil national unity. Over a week long 
temple entry campaign, Minority Tamils and Vellalars clashed in violent 
demonstrations outside the gates of the orthodox, Saivite Nallur temple. Once 
again, V ellalars sought to safeguard their caste stature by enforcing a status 
marker, their exclusive right to temple entry. 
At the time ofthe Temple Crisis, the FP was tom between the Vellalars 
and the Minority Tamils. On the one hand, the FP comprised a mainly Vellalar 
membership and constituency. On the other, the FP officially supported the 
abolition of caste. Because it did not wish to alienate itself from either minority 
Tamil or Vellalar constituents, the FP chose not to form a coherent policy, and 
instead redirected attention toward ethnic confrontation with the Sinhalese 
government. 90 
In this case, the FP's stance paid off politically and it was able to present 
a mostly united Tamil front to the Sinhalese government. However, ruptures and 
frictions simmered beneath the surface of nationalist politics. These tensions and 
rivalries have provided the Sinhalese government with grounds for denying a 
federal option. Prior to the rise of Tamil militancy, the government argued 
alongside Minority Tamil associations that a Tamil state would merely give 
Vellalars the opportunity to exploit Minority Tamils. 91 
Eventually, the FP and the TULF failed to effect change both against the 
government and within Tamil society, and so the L TTE became the successor of 
their undertaking- to unifY and represent the Tamils. The LTTE faced the same 
predicament - it had to promote an inclusive Tamil identity, when Tamil identity 
was already tied to an exclusive caste consciousness. Of all the militant groups, 
the LTTE was perhaps best placed to do this; of all the militant groups it is the 
most representative ofTamil society. 92 
This brings us to the question which structures the next two chapters of 
this thesis: how has the LTTE mobilised a group identity that transcends elitist 
formulations ofTamil identity, without representing religion in the same way as 
their Sinhalese counterparts? While the following chapters delve into this 
90 Pfaffenberger, "The Political Construction of Defensive Nationalism," 158, 160. 
9 1 Ibid ., 159. An association of Minority Tamils had "asked the Prime Minister to stay the 
implementation of the District councils." The association feared for the human rights and safety 
of Minority Tamils under a District Council led by Vellalars. 
92 Hellmann Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers, II . 
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question more thoroughly, the material covered in this chapter offers one piece of 
the puzzle. 
In order to unify its cadres and also the Tamil public, the LTTE 
challenges Vellalar hegemony. As many scholars have pointed out, the LTTE's 
battle has been a unique one; it has had to fight a two pronged war.93 On one side 
it has had to oppose the Sinhalese government, but on the other it has struggled 
against Vellalar dominance. Unlike the FP who only made token attempts to 
incorporate marginal Tamil groups, 94 the LTTE has genuinely and consistently 
tried to reform Tamil caste relations. For example, in 1994 it instituted a penal 
code that outlawed caste practices. 95 
While the L TTE has challenged V ellalar hegemony, it has not entirely 
rejected Vellalar values. It has recognised that Vellalar symbols and traditions 
are evocative; they have long been associated with Tamil identity. While the 
LTTE does promulgate symbols drawn from other traditions, its formulation of 
national identity has retained a strong connection to Vellalar symbols. I 
mentioned these values earlier: honouring the Tamil language, protecting 
women's chastity (two values originally connected to the Saivite tradition), 
education, dance and music (traditions that had emerged more recently as 
markers ofVellalar identity). I will examine each ofthese values in tum, 
exploring first, how they were originally tied to Vellalar identity, and second, 
how they are used by the LTTE to mobilise a group identity. I will begin, first 
with language, showing both how the LTTE represents it as a symbol ofTamil 
identity and how it ties linguistic concerns to national concerns. 
As already established, during the revival, the Tamil language was 
distanced from its connections to Saivite tradition while retaining its connection 
to Vellalar identity. In this way, language concerns came to be represented as 
Vellalar-Tamil concerns. Language also emerged as a symbol of a non-religious, 
Vellalar-Tamil identity. 96 
93 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffua Social System," 280. 
94 Pfaffenberger, "The Political Construction of Defensive Nationalism," 162. 
95 Fuglerud, Life on the Outside, 163 . 
96 Kaliasapathy, "Cultural and Linguistic Consciousness of the Tamil Community," 117. In 
particular, Classical Tamil, or Sen Tamil , spoken by the Vellalars was valued as a symbol of 
Vellalar-Tamil identity. Because of this emphasis of classical literature, revivalists disregarded 
folk literature and increasingly objectified classical literature. Like the revivalists, the L TIE also 
promotes a pure Tamil , devoid of influences from other languages. Consequently, it has revived a 
number of archaisms. Fuglerud, Life on the Outside, 156. 
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Like the revivalists, the LTTE connects linguistic concerns and identity to 
Tamil concerns and identity. Writing about Prabhakaran, Adele Balasingham 
claims that the Tamil language motivates Prabhakaran to fight for Eelam. "His 
deep love for his people, their culture and - more specifically - their language, 
fuels his dedication and determination to secure their survival.',n When the 
Tamil language is threatened, so too is Tamil identity. 
Like the revivalists, the LTTE also represents the Tamil language as a 
symbol ofTarnil identity. For the LTTE, however, language does not signifY an 
exclusive Vellalar-Tamil identity, but a pan-Tamil identity that includes all 
Tamils living in the island. Furthermore, the LTTE associates language (as a 
symbol ofTamil identity) with the liberation struggle: "Artists and literary 
authors should create novel and revolutionary creations to suit the needs of 
modern [sic] age and historical evolution. These creations should serve to 
strengthen our sacred liberation struggle; they should sow the seeds of social 
revolution. "98 The L TTE promotes Tamil poetry, songs and prose about the 
liberation struggle. Where Tamil literature was once celebrated as a Vellalar 
achievement, it is now associated with the liberation struggle and celebrated as 
an inclusive symbo I. When the L TTE presents language in this way, it mobilises 
a group identity that both depends upon and also challenges former conceptions 
ofTamil identity. 
Protecting the chastity of women, like revering the Tamil language, is 
another value that came to signifY Vellalar-Saivite identity. Protecting women's 
karpu or chastity traditionally, entailed a number of practices: absolute 
premarital chastity, chaperoning, female initiation rituals, and the construction of 
a house to serve as a fortress against the intrusion of strangers. Through these 
practices, the virgin cultivated a supernatural power, upholding the status ofher 
family and caste.99 "She will bring to her family an ambience of fertility, power, 
good fortune, and joy." 100 Traditionally this value was associated with the near 
supremacy of the Vellalar caste; only Vellalars could afford to uphold the 
97 Adele Balasingham, The Will to Freedom: An Inside View of Tamil Resistance (Mitcham: 
Fairfax Publishing Ltd, 2003), 335. Adele Balasingham is the wife of the recently deceased 
LTTE theoretician, Anton Balasingham. 
98 LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http ://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 263 . 
99 Pfaffenberger, "The Cultural Dimension ofTamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," 1149. 
100 Ibid. , 1149. 
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practices associated with protecting women' s karpu: ''Vellalars advertise the 
virtue oftheir women with stout, fenced houses and a remarkable variety of 
rites ... But to claim a high rank on these grounds requires no small wealth, not 
only to build the houses and sponsor the rites, but also to dispense with the 
earning power of women outside the house." 10 1 
The LTTE has appropriated and reinterpreted this set ofvalues around 
karpu. It insists that both male and female cadres abstain from pre-marital 
relations. 102 In the context of the struggle, a woman' s karpu is no longer believed 
to maintain the status and prosperity ofher family. Instead, women cadres' karpu 
is now believed to endow them with a power, which enables them to fight 
fearlessly on the battlefield.103 Whereas in the 19th century, the practice 
symbolised a Vellalar-Tamil identity (that embraced both Saivites and 
Christians), today it is represented as a symbol of an inclusive Tamil identity. 
Like language, it is closely associated with the liberation struggle. 
The practices ofhonouring the Tamil language and protecting the chastity 
ofwomen were symbols ofVellalar status originally connected to Saivite 
tradition. We have seen how the L TTE has appropriated these cultural practices 
and reshaped them. The L TTE also appeals to Vellalar values and practices of 
recently relative origin: the pursuit of education and the cultivation of art forms. 
The LTTE represents both as symbols ofTamil identity. 
During the 19th and even 201h Centuries, western education emerged as 
key feature and symbol ofVellalar identity. Consequently, Vellalar parents 
fought to prevent children of other castes from obtaining a missionary 
education. 104 The LTTE also represents the pursuit of education as a key trait and 
symbol of Tamil identity: "Education is basic to the life and development of our 
ethnic community; it is the foundation to the progress of our society." 105 Where 
education was once associated with Vellalars, the L TTE now associates it with 
the liberation struggle: "As the struggle ofliberation is the armour for education, 
101 Ibid. , 1150. 
102 Balasingham, The Will to Freedom, 79. 
103 Peter Schalk, "Women Fighters of the Liberation Tigers in Tamil Ilam. The Martial Feminism 
of Ate! Palacinkam," South Asia 14:2 (1994) : 177-8. 
104 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffua Social System," 258-9. 
105LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 287. 
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education should also stand the [sic] fortress of our struggle." 106 Yet again, a 
once elitist value is associated with the liberation struggle and represented as a 
symbol of an inclusive Tamil identity. 
Finally, during the revival, two art forms, dance (Bharata Natyam) and 
music (carnatic music), emerged as symbols of a Vellalar-Tarnil identity. Only 
affluent Vellalars could afford to acquire these art forms. 107 The LTTE also 
encourages the cultivation of these Tamilian arts. Even though the LTTE 
employs a Marxist rhetoric, it does not represent these art forms as being in the 
least bourgeois. 108 Instead it values and promotes them, Bharata Natyam in 
particular. Bharata Natyam performances are an integral part ofLTTE 
ceremonies and rituals. I witnessed one of these performances at the Mavirar Nal 
ceremony which I attended in Melbourne in 2006. I was told that the dance 
depicted the struggle for Eel am. Yet again, the L TTE has appropriated a V ell alar 
value as a symbo 1 of national identity. It is associated with the liberation 
struggle, and not an elite status. 
While the LTTE has eschewed Vellalar domination, 109 it has also 
continued the process begun in the 19th Century where Vellalar ideals were 
appropriated, reshaped, and, most importantly, extended to non-Vellalar, Tamil-
speaking peoples. These reshaped Vellalar values are an important part ofhow 
the LTTE depicts and mobilises a Tamil identity: "The pillars that bear the 
superstructure of our ethnic community are education, language, culture and 
land. The enemy is trying to demolish these pillars. His aim is to destroy the 
individuality of the ethnic community." 11 0 According to Hellmann Rajanayagarn, 
106 Ibid., 265 . 
107 Kaliasapathy, "Cultural and Linguistic Consciousness ofthe Tamil Community," 116. 
108 Daniel, Charred Lullabies, 27. Several scholars have noted that the L TIE ' s Marxist rhetoric 
is not as potent as its references to Tamil culture. Hellmann Rajanayagam suggests that the 
Marxist references are merely a veneer for an ultra-nationalist rhetoric: "This ideology creates 
great doubts about LITE's alleged Marxist and socialist allegations." Adele Balasingham 
discusses why the L TTE has turned away from Marxism: "Although many of the cadres had an 
inherent sympathy with socialist views, none of them ever articulated Marxist positions; neither 
did any of them ' look ' like Marxist revolutionaries in the classical sense ... But more deeply than 
that, over the years we were to learn that Marxism had no real mass appeal in the Tamil social 
formation where religion, particularly Hinduism, has become a deeply entrenched ideology 
steeped in the socio-cultural life of the Tamil people." Hellmann Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers, 
68 ; Balasingharn, The Will to Freedom, 45 . 
109 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jatfua Social System," 265-269. 
11 0 LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 294. 
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the L TTE 's success lies in its capacity to usurp Vellalar values and meld them 
with social reforms. 
At times, the L TTE claims to have stripped V ell alar practices and ideals 
of all that is not true Tamil culture - dowry practices, caste practices and so on. 
The LTTE thus claims to uphold some kind of cultural essence: "We should 
identify and get rid of reactionary qualities, customs and ideologies which have 
penetrated our social life in the guise of culture." 111 At other times, however, the 
L TTE seems remarkably self-aware of how it is formulating a new conception of 
Tamil identity. It explicitly admits to combining old values with new ones: "Arts, 
fme arts and culture which flourish by shedding the old and by incorporating the 
new bring honour to our ethnic community; it will produce a revolutionary 
awakening in the mentality of our people." 11 2 This reveals an important insight 
about how the LTTE mobilises a group identity: while the LTTE draws on Tamil 
traditions, it is also explicit about how it transforms these traditions. This notion 
oftransformation and becoming is important to how the LTTE mobilises a group 
identity, and we will see it appear in the following chapters. 
In this chapter I have shown that Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists differ 
in how they represent the categories of religion and secular. In particular, I have 
looked at how religious concerns, identity and objects are represented in relation 
to national identity. I have also inquired into how these representations 
developed. I employed a historical argument, structured by a comparison ofthe 
Saivite and Buddhist revival movements. I argued that during the revivals 
Sinhalese identity was fused to Buddhist concerns, identity and symbols. Tamil 
identity, on the other hand, became enmeshed with Vellalar concerns, identity 
and symbols, which were eventually represented as separate from religion. This 
argument thus explains how Sinhalese nationalist identity came to be represented 
as a religious identity when Tamil identity came to be distanced from religion. 
In the rest ofthis study, I discuss how the LTTE mobilises a group 
identity. From the material covered in this chapter, we can appreciate what a 
difficult task this is for the L TTE. On the one hand, the L TTE has had to 
mobilise a group identity without representing religion as their Sinhalese 
Ill Ibid., 285. 
112 Ibid ., 280. 
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counterparts do. On the other, the LTTE has had to diverge from the traditional 
Vellalar-based conception ofTarnil identity. 
In the following chapters, I move from the comparative framework and 
historical arguments employed here. Instead, I analyse L TTE discourses and 
show how they are involved in the LTTE's efforts to mobilise a group identity. 
While my approach changes between this chapter and the ones which follow, I 
continue to pursue the two interests discussed here. Chapters Three and Four, 




The Construction of History 
The authentic story of immense suffering and heroic struggle of our people. 1 
In the previous chapter, we established that Tamil identity has long been 
represented, first , as a non-religious identity and, second, as an elite, Vellalar-
based identity. This elitist formulation ofTamil identity presented difficulties for 
the parliamentarian nationalists who sought to mobilise a unifying identity. Caste 
disputes ensued in which Vellalars would fight to protect their status markers 
from being appropriated by members of other castes. As the 1968 Temple Crisis 
demonstrates, these symbols proved to be too divisive. Using Vellalar symbols, 
the parliamentarians could not sustain the nationalist illusion that the nation 
consists of a homogenous body of individuals. Consequently, they failed to 
mobilise a convincing group identity and thus laid the foundations for the 
militant groups that were soon to erupt on the Sri Lankan political scene. 
Because they promised results, the militants generated much enthusiasm 
amongst the Tamil public. But this enthusiasm did not make them immune from 
the challenges that confronted their parliamentarian predecessors. They too had 
to mobilise nationalist sentiment through values, ideals and symbols that were 
evocative, but also inclusive. Furthermore, this formulation ofTamil identity 
needed to be robust enough to contend with the Buddhist claims to pre-eminence. 
As we saw in the last chapter, the LTTE has usurped and reshaped 
Vellalar values, extending them to all Tamils. This is one way in which it has 
mobilised a group identity. There are others also. In the following two chapters, I 
move from the religious difference to the discourses through which the L TTE 
mobilises a group identity. When I examine these discourses, I seek out the 
values, experiences, ideals, claims and traditions which the L TTE promotes. 
From my analysis I conclude that the L TTE mobilises a group identity through 
shared experiences of suffering and liberation, reworked Tamil traditions and 
practices, and claims and arguments which are represented as secular. I also 
discuss how scholars assess these LTTE discourses (or aspects within them). I 
argue that when scholars apply the category of religion in self evident ways, they 
1 L TTE, Towards Liberation, 22. 
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obscure or neglect important aspects ofthe discourses. In this chapter I focus on 
the LTTE's historical discourse, and in the following, on their discourse 
pertaining to violence and death. 
I have identified three strands to the historical narrative promulgated by 
the LTTE: the militant past (comprising a further three strands: the Maravars, 
Cholas and the Sangam era), the Jaffua Kingdom and finally the LTTE's post-
colonial history. The LTTE shares the latter two (the Jaffna Kingdom and post-
colonial narrative) with its parliamentarian predecessors, while the former (the 
militant past) is unique to the LTTE's formulation ofnational identity. 
I argue that while all three are important to the LTTE's project, it is the 
third strand, the post-colonial narrative, which fulfils all the functions and criteria 
of a nationalist history. As such, it provides the most evocative basis of Tamil 
identity. 
I begin the chapter with an overview ofthe characteristics of nationalist 
histories in general. I also provide some background about the introduction of 
this sort ofhistory to Sri Lanka. This task enables me to establish the key 
characteristics of nationalist histories, and thereby frames my analysis. I then 
discuss the militant strands and the Jaffua Kingdom, showing how they do not 
possess the characteristics of national histories. I follow this with an examination 
of the post-colonial narrative. I argue that it functions as a true nationalist history 
which enables the L TTE to mobilise a group identity. Finally, I turn to the 
scholarly discussion ofthe LTTE's historical discourse. 
3.1 Enlightenment History in the Sri Lankan Context 
Nationalist histories are a key ingredient ofhow any nationalist group 
mobilises an evocative and convincing sense of national identity. Not any kind of 
past, however, will suffice; nationalist histories are characterised by the 
assumptions and traits of Enlightenment History. I thus begin this chapter with 
an outline of the Enlightenment History. From this discussion, I will establish the 
criteria of nationalist histories. I use these criteria to substantiate my argument 
that it is the recent past that provides the L TTE with its most potent mobilisation 
tool. 
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Enlightenment History arose during the Western Enlightenment. It is a 
modem phenomenon, originally propounded by German scholars. Closely 
associated with nations, territories and states,2 Enlightenment History is seen 
both in the academic discipline ofhistory and also in nationalist histories. 
National histories, which are crucial to national identity, are thus one kind of 
Enlightenment History. 
We can characterise Enlightenment History through a number of features. 
First, and most important, Enlightenment History is always narrated. Its narration 
is predicated on the logic of cause and effect. 3 Consequently, Enlightenment 
History is very future-orientated. It seeks potentialities in actualities,4 creating a 
chronological chain of events that explain a series of transformations or changes. 
Enlightenment History is thus predicated on a linear conception of time; the past 
is distinct from the present and the future.5 The past is thus represented as an 
object that is recovered by the historian, who is a subject.6 
History, in its Enlightenment form, is also a theoretical discourse 
structured around the dichotomy of true and false. 7 The historian aims to not just 
uncover the past, but to reveal or elicit the 'true' past (and there can be only one 
true past). Some historians define this inquiry and project in terms of attaining a 
strict correspondence between what is written and what is being written about. 
Others nurture a less ambitious project- to paint a picture to the truth of which a 
community of inquirers can concur. 8 Whatever the scope of the project, 
Enlightenment History is concerned with truth and creating a verifiable version 
of the past. Because of this concern with truth, Enlightenment History claims 
authority, a feature which has important political consequences. 9 As Qadri Ismail 
points out, if all that Enlightenment History offered was a powerfully structured 
story about the past, then its implications for nationalist claims would be less 
2 Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, "Tamils and the Meaning of History," In The Sri Lankan 
Tamils , ed. Chelvadurai Manogram and Bryan Pfaffenberger (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 
58 . 
3 Oivind Fuglerud, "Time and Space in the Sri Lanka-Tamil Diaspora," Nations and Nationalism 
7:2 (200 1 ): 201. 
4 Daniel , Charred Lullabies, 52. 
5 Qadri Ismail, Abiding by Sri Lanka: On Peace, Place and Postcoloniality (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 38. 
6 Daniel, Charred Lullabies, 28. 
7 Fuglerud, "Time and Space in the Sri Lanka-Tamil Diaspora," 201. 
8 Daniel , Charred Lullabies, 52. 
9 Ismail, Abiding by Sri Lanka , 109. 
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potent. If all history did was to produce stories of the past, then "one could call 
the stories empiricist and proceed to ignore them, or enjoy them if well crafted, 
use the paper to wrap fish or whatever. Unlike fiction, however, the stories of 
history don't enable such a response, because they are authoritative, taken to be 
true, as bearing some relationship to the real." 10 
Its insistence on truth has other consequences also.11 When 
Enlightenment History claims to present an unbiased, objective narration ofthe 
past, it erases its own epistemological production. 12 And so, as Fuglerud puts it, 
the nation and its uniqueness appear as an accident of fact. 13 In reality, however, 
Enlightenment History is a literary activity. It is reliant on ellipsis, repetition and 
elision. Events that are not believed to enter the chain of relevant transformations 
are excluded from the telling ofhistory. 14 
This sort of history was brought to Sri Lanka by the British. This is not to 
suggest, however, that the pre-colonial inhabitants of the island had no awareness 
or interest in the past. Prior to the advent and hegemony of Enlightenment 
History, other ways of approaching the past existed, all of which were grounded 
in a particular ontology, a way ofbeing. In contrast, Enlightenment History is an 
epistemological enterprise that approaches the past as a way of seeing, rather 
than a way ofbeing. 15 
Valentine Daniel refers to the ontic-based orientation to the past as 
heritage and the epistemic consciousness ofthe past (Enlightenment History) as 
history. 16 Heritage, unlike history, tolerates multiple and often contradictory 
versions ofthe past. Heritage emphasises participation, whereas history is 
characterised by its aboutness. As such, heritage is a holistic discourse, whose 
verity is affirmed in the experience of intersubjective being; heritage collapses 
10 Ismail, Abiding by Sri Lanka , 165. 
11 Fuglerud, "Time and Space in the Sri Lanka-Tamil Diaspora," 209. 
12 Ismail, Abiding by Sri Lanka , xxxvii . 
13 Fuglerud, "Time and Space in the Sri Lanka-Tamil Diaspora," 209. 
14 Ismail, Abiding by Sri Lanka, 70, 111. 
15 Daniel , Charred Lullabies, 55, 53 . This is not to say that enlightenment histories do not have 
ontological implications: "a narrative, even an imported one, that begins as theory, providing a 
people with a way of seeing the world, can, however, in time, become embodied in practice." 
History, as a way of seeing, impacts on people ' s ways of being in the world. For example, Daniel 
argues that epistemic history (enlightenment history) lends itself to particular kinds of violence: 
"In history's very thinning out of the multiplex in the record of the past, in the reduction of its 
manifold forms to a single strand, communal violence finds its raison d'etre." Daniel ' s epistemic 
history, like Asad's reconstructed secular, claims to apprehend (or see) the world as it is. Both, 
however, offer another conception of the world, another way of being in the world. 
16 Ibid., 23-5. 
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what was then and now. The past thus becomes present enactment. 17 In pre-
colonial cultures, the emphasis shifted from being to seeing in different contexts, 
but ultimately traditional historic consciousness was always grounded in 
ontology. 18 
When the British came to Sri Lanka, they found a Sinhalese-Buddhist 
text, the Mahavamsa, which had an affmity to modem, disciplinary history; it 
displayed a traditional historic consciousness. Despite this affmity, the 
Mahavamsa nonetheless entertained a way ofbeing. 19 For example, the 
colonisers regarded the Mahavamsa as an authentic history because it recorded 
dates. Recent scholarly work, however, shows that the dates in the Mahvamsa are 
connected to astrological calculations, not to a concern to establish a true, 
verifiable chronology: "The presentation of the chronicles as authentic history is 
not the result of some irreducible facet ofthe text itself. The chronicles are 
transformed from a poetic basis for multiple versions ofthe past into a 
chronological narration where all motions of incalculable time were excluded."20 
On the Tamil side, the British struggled to find any sources comparable to 
the Mahavamsa. Because of this, the Tamils were perceived as a people without 
a history- an unfavourable assessment.2 1 The Sinhalese, a people with history, 
were regarded as the descendents of the original settlers, whereas the Tamils 
were cast as the progeny of invaders (from South Indian empires) and pirates.22 
Initially the Tamils did not seem perturbed by the British claims that they 
had no history. Even Arumuka Navalar, the great proponent ofTamil-Saivite 
tradition, never once alluded to Tamil history.23 This began to change slowly in 
the late 19th and early 201h centuries. Leaders from the Tamil community realised 
that they required a history to justify the Tamils ' right to be in the island. And so, 
they began to show an interest in the history of the Jaffna Kingdom, a pre-
colonial kingdom that was conquered by the Portuguese. 24 
17 Ibid. , 50-3 . 
18 Ibid ., 43 . 
19 Ibid. , 47. 
2° Fuglerud, "Time and Space in the Sri Lanka-Tamil Diaspora," 209. 
21 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "Tamils and the Meaning of History," 58. 
22 Ibid., 78. 
23 Ibid. , 60. 
24 Ibid ., 70. 
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Hellmann Rajanayagam and Daniel discuss this development of a 
historical consciousness amongst the Tamils. Both argue that whilst the first 
Tamil historians employed an enlightenment (or epistemic) history to legitimate 
political arguments, they did not require this sort of history for their identity as 
Tamils. Instead, Tamil identity depended upon Tamil art, sculpture, dance and 
literature. 25 A third scholar, Oivind Fugelrud, argues that while Enlightenment 
History might have once been marginal to Tamil identity, it now plays an 
important role in the rhetoric ofthe militants. Given that the militants are trying 
to mobilise a national identity, and given that national identities depend on 
enlightenment histories, it seems likely that Fuglerud is correct.26 The question, 
then, is: which of the LTTE's three pasts is the history most important to the 
organisation's depiction ofTamil identity? 
As I have argued, nationalist identities are predicated on nationalist 
histories. And nationalist histories are one kind of Enlightenment History. As 
such, the L TTE 's formulation and mobilisation of national identity will depend 
most on the history which possesses the criteria of Enlightenment History. In this 
chapter I argue that it is the LTTE's post-colonial history that fulfils all the 
criteria ofEnlightenment History. In other words, the post-colonial narrative is a 
narrated history predicated on a linear conception of time. It is a history which 
attends to chronology and which also presents a causal chain of events. Finally, 
in the post-colonial narrative all these elements coalesce, revealing a past that is 
presented as true. Because the post-colonial narrative is an Enlightenment 
History, it is the 'past' which is most important to how the LTTE depicts and 
mobilises a group identity. 
I will begin my discussion with the other strands ofthe LTTE's historical 
discourse: the militant past (the Maravars, the Cholas and the Sangam era) and 
the Jaffua Kingdom. I will demonstrate how the LTTE uses these pasts for its 
nationalist project, while also highlighting how these pasts are not enlightenment 
histories. Against this analysis, I will then delineate the post-colonial narrative. 
25 Daniel, Charred Lullabies, 27. 
26 When Fuglerud substantiates his claim that history is now important to the militants, he 
discusses both the post-colonial narrative as well as the militant past. I argue, however, that it is 
the post-colonial narrative that is most important to how the LTTE depicts and mobilises a group 
identity. This is because it is the post-colonial narrative which possesses the traits of 
Enlightenment History. 
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3.2 A Militant Presentation of the Past: 
The Maravars, Cholas and the Sangam Era 
According to the LTTE, the Tamil people possess a long history of 
martial valour. The L TTE claims to embody and revive the martial tradition of 
this period, a tradition which has been largely forgotten by the Tamil people: "A 
hidden heroic tradition in the long glorious history ofthe Tamil ethnic 
community has been revived again. "27 
As far as I have seen, no accounts exist (whether from the LTTE or other 
militant groups) which chronologically narrate this militant past. I have, 
however, found an account which details the process by which the martial 
tradition (associated with this past) was lost and then found. Detailed in a series 
of articles, this account was written by D.S. Sivaram and published in the Lanka 
Guardian, a Colombo magazine. While I have not read these articles in their 
entirety, I have read significant excerpts which are included in Fuglerud's book. 
These articles are not an L TTE source. In fact , Sivaram was a member of a rival 
militant group in conflict with the LTTE during the 1980s. 28 I have nonetheless 
chosen to discuss Sivaram's articles here. They present a view of the past which 
the LTTE implicitly holds. 
Sivaram begins his account in the colonial era. He claims that the British 
felt threatened by the martial values of the Maravar, a caste that embodied the 
martial tradition of the Tamils. Consequently, to consolidate their rule, the 
British suppressed the Maravar and instead favoured non-military castes, 
particularly the "peace loving" Vellalars, a caste ' 'who had 'no other calling than 
the cultivation of the soil. '"29 During the colonial encounter the Tamil militant 
tradition (embodied by the Maravars) was thus suppressed, and the Vellalar-
based conception ofTamil identity was celebrated.30 
27 L TTE, Reflections of the Leader, http: //publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 268. 
28 Fuglerud, Life on the Outside, 157-160. Sivararn used to write military analysis in Ango-
Sinhala newspapers under the alias Taraki. If you want to know more about Sivararn/Taraki , you 
can read Whitakers' article. Mark P. Whitaker, "Learning Politics From Taraki: A Biographical 
Fragment," in Sri Lanku: Collective Identities Revisited- Volume II, ed. Michael Roberts 
(Colombo: Marga Institute, 1997). 
29 Fuglerud, Life on the Outside, 158. 
30 Ibid ., 159. Sivaram argues that the colonial intervention brought two distinct depictions of 
Tamil identity to the fore . While the Vellalars claimed that the ' pure Tamils' were Vellalars, the 
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From the examples presented by Fuglerud, it seems that Sivaram is 
primarily concerned with South India. There is, however, an underlying 
assumption that his analysis ofTamil society in India applies equally to Sri 
Lankan Tamil society. Sivaram ends (or at least in Fuglerud's excerpts) by 
making a more explicit connection. He claims that the village ofValvettithurai, 
on the Jaffua peninsula, was given to a Maravar chieftain by the founder of the 
Jaffua Kingdom. 
This village, where the Karaiyar caste predominates, has long been 
associated with militant activity. Several militant leaders, including Prabhakaran, 
are from this village. 31 As such, Sivaram's history connects the coastal Maravar 
ofTamil Nadu to the Karaiyar and the Tamil militant groups of Sri Lanka. The 
Karaiyar and the militant groups are quite literally presented as the offspring and 
heirs of the Maravar. 32 Like the Maravar, they too embody the militant Tamil 
tradition which has been suppressed by the colonial powers and which is now 
being revived by the militant groups. 
The L TTE does not narrate this history (of a militant tradition which has 
been lost and found) as explicitly as Sivaram does. But a presentation like 
Sivaram's, is nonetheless implicit in how the LTTE presents its militant past: 
"Heroic tradition which died among the Tamils long ago has taken rebirth 
again." 33 
The L TTE evokes this militant past, when it invokes the Maravars, 
Cholas and the Sangam era. These three strands are presented as evidence ofthe 
Tamils' militant past and ofthe militant tradition which flourished there. While 
the militant past is undoubtedly important to the LTTE's project, it is not an 
enlightenment history. As we will see, the L TTE does not narrate events 
Maravar asserted that all Tamils were Maravar and that the Tamil nation was distinguished by its 
ancient martial heritage. Where these depictions had once been equal and contending, under 
British rule, the militant Maravar conception of Tamil identity was suppressed and the Vellalar 
conception, promoted. 
31 Ibid., 160; Hellmann Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers, 34. 
32 Fuglerud, Life on the Outside, 160. Some scholars have postulated a historical link between the 
Maravars and the Karaiyar, but for the most part this is fairly uncertain. What is interesting, 
however, are the resemblances between the Maravar and Karaiyar traditions. For example, the 
Karaiyar, like the Maravar (but independent of any connections with the Maravar), possess a 
claim to Kshatriya status through their myths of origin. Peter Schalk, "Historisation of the Martial 
Ideology of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE)," South Asia 20:2 (1997): 51-3 ; 
Hellmann Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers, 29. Oivind Fuglerud, "Time and Space in the Sri 
Lanka-Tami1 Diaspora," 203 . 
33 LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 292. 
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pertaining to the Maravars, Cholas and the Sangam era. Consequently the 
militant past is not the history on which Tamil identity depends. In the following 
discussion, I show how the LTTE invokes (rather than narrates) each strand of 
the militant past. I will begin with the Maravars, proceed to the Cho las and then 
fmish with the Sangam era. 
Maravar literally means one who has maram (valour).34 In 1911 the 
government oflndia declared the Maravar a criminal caste. As part of their 
efforts to dispel this reputation, the Maravar have developed a tradition about a 
glorious past where they were free warriors.35 
The LTTE taps into this presentation of a Maravar past, suggesting that it 
is reviving the glory of the former Maravar. Prabhakaran frequently refers to his 
cadres as 'Maravar. ' 36 When Schalk translates an excerpt from one of 
Prabhakaran's speeches, he retains the reference to the Maravar: "These great 
heroes do not die in [normal] time; (they are) artisans of independence 
( cutantiram ), heroic maravar who have sown the seeds for the rise of a very great 
liberation (struggle) on our soil."37 Another reference to the Maravar, once again 
rich in allusions, comes from a poem translated by Hellmann Rajanayagam: "The 
bodies of the cruel ones speaking I courage I Turns into dust defeated [by] the I 
glorious Maravar."38 When the LTTE refers to its cadres as 'Maravar,' it 
connects them to a long militant past, suggesting that its cadres embody the 
ancient martial tradition of this past. 
The LTTE invokes the Cholas in a similar way. The Chola kingdom was 
one of three major South Indian kingdoms that existed during the Sangam period 
(300BCE to 300CE). 39 Its rise to imperial glory, however, came much later in 
the middle ofthe ninth century CE.40 It is interesting that the LTTE has chosen to 
allude to the Cholas (and not another Dravidian kingdom) first, because the 
Cholas invaded Sri Lanka, and second, because they are connected through 
34 Schalk, "Historisation of the Martial Ideology of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam 
(L TIE)," 45. 
35 Ibid., 45-6. 
36 Schalk, "The Revival ofMartyr Cults Among Ilavar," 165. 
37 Peter Schalk, " Beyond Hindu Festivals," 402. 
38 Pantitar Vi. Parantaman, "A King born from Humanity," trans. by Hellmann Rajanayagam, 
"And Heroes Die," 140. 
39 Fuglerud, Life on the Outside, 155. 
4° K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, A History of South India: From Prehistoric Times to the Fall of 
Vijayanagar (Delhi : Oxford University Press, 197 5), 5, 124. Hellmann Rajanayagam also 
provides an overview of the Cholas. Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffua Social System," 274. 
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tradition to the East Coast and not the Jaffua kingdom.41 The LTTE refers to the 
Cholas in several ways. First, the Tiger symbol, used by the LTTE and from 
which their name comes, is the royal insignia of the Chola dynasty. 42 Also, 
Prabhakaran's nom de guerre, 'Karakalan,' is the name of the first Chola king. 
We see this reference in LTTE poetry: "All of this will go on the path I shown by 
Karikalan I Before the Tigers it will be crippled. "43 
The LTTE also connects its naval unit (the Sea Tigers) to the military 
exploits and seamanship of the Cholas. We see this in the following speech 
translated by the Fuglerud: 
In those days all the deep seas were ruled by Chola kings. The ships 
flying the Tiger flags spread the news ofTamil heroism to the world. All 
these things were washed away by the flood oftime, and the Tamils 
became slaves and refugees [akathi]. Now the Sangam period has come 
back. The Liberation Tigers make the world focus on Tamil Eelam. The 
boats of Sea Tigers flying Tiger flags are anew roaming in the seas.44 
The Sea Tigers thus continue the seafaring, military victories of the Cholas.45 As 
with the Maravars, the LTTE does not narrate events pertaining to Chola history. 
Instead it invokes the Cholas, and thus evokes an ancient militant past where the 
martial tradition of the Tamils flourished. 
The excerpt above also introduces the third and final militant strand of the 
LTTE's militant past: the Sangam period. Alongside other Tamil nationalist 
groups, the L TTE presents the Sangam era as a period in Tamil history when 
martial values were upheld, a period when mothers willingly sent their sons to 
41 The Cholas had fiefs in the East whereas the Kings of the Jaffna Peninsula were drawn from 
the rival Pandyan dynasty. In her book, Hellmann Rajanayagam discusses possible reasons why 
the LTTE has chosen to allude to the Cholas. Hellmann Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers, 56-7. 
42 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffua Social System," 274. According to Hellmann 
Rajanayagam, rival militant groups have vied for the title 'Tigers,' showing the huge symbolic 
significance of the name. I have not been able to find any LTTE source where the LITE 
explicitly connect the Tiger symbol to the Cholas. Several Tamil nationalist websites, however, 
make this connection and I assume that the LITE do so also in their Tamil sources. Hellmann 
Rajanayagm, The Tamil Tigers, p.43 ; TamilNet, "Rules guide on use ofTamileelam National flag 
published," http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid= 13&artid= 16423 (accessed May 16, 2008) 
43 M Icaialakan, "Time Collects in Our Hand (The Opportunity is in our Hands)," trans. by 
Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And Heroes Die," 133. 
44 Fuglerud, Life on the Outside, 155-6. 
45 R. Cheran, The Six th Genre: Memory, History and the Tamil Diaspora Imagination (Colombo: 
Marga Institute, 2001), 20-21. The speech connects the Cholas with the earlier Sangam period, 
and not with the 9th Century, when they achieved the height of their power. The later Cholas of the 
9th Century were associated with Brahmanical reforms and reputed to have persecuted non-
Saivite religions. This may explain why the LITE, pursuing a policy of secularism, connect 
themselves to the earlier Cholas of the supposedly pre-religious Sangam era. 
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battle. 46 In particular, the LTTE draws on the Purananuru, an anthology of 
poems, written during the Sangam era, which celebrates this militant depiction of 
life. 47 "Almost all the material available on Great warriors' day has references to 
one of the Sangam anthologies, puranaanooru that celebrated maram (valour).',48 
As with the Maravars and Cholas, the LTTE invokes the Sangam era, thus 
alluding to a Tamil militant past.49 
While the LTTE claims to embody the Tamil militant tradition ofthe 
ancient past, it also celebrates its divergence from this tradition. We see this in a 
statement written by Adele Balasingham. She first depicts the role traditionally 
played by women during the militant past: "Early Tamil literature is full of 
episodes which glorify the self-less, sacrificing mothers and wives encouraging 
bravery and heroism in their sons and husbands." 50 Balasingham then claims 
that the LTTE's female fighters have diverged from this traditional role. By 
choosing to fight, the women cadres "Have altered the trajectory ofTamil 
women.''
51 This statement intimates an important feature ofhow the LTTE 
presents the militant past. The LTTE does not present itself as simply embodying 
the militant tradition ofthe past. Instead, it explicitly celebrates its reformulation 
of tradition. 
In the last chapter, we saw how the L TTE celebrates its reformulation of 
another Tamil tradition- Vellalar values. We also saw how these reformulated 
Vellalar values are sometimes presented as upholding a cultural or traditional 
essence. In the case of the militant tradition, however, no cultural essence is 
postulated. Instead, the L TTE represents the militant tradition as a precedent 
which it embodies but also betters: "In the history of Tamils one thousand years 
ago, mothers from home- women- bid farewell to men who went for war, 'Son, 
go forward! Come back with victory! In today's history of the Tamils one 
thousand years later, I, on behalf of all mothers, bid farewell to you, women, who 
46 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And Heroes Die," 126. 
47 Ibid., 117. According to Hellmann Rajanayagam, the L TIE claims that secularism was an 
ideology constituent of Purananuru society. 
48 Cheran, The Sixth Genre, 18. 
49 Thus far, all the references to the Maravars, Cholas and the Sangam era are drawn from 
scholarly translations of L TTE sources. In the English language sources, we see no references to 
the fighting prowess of the Tamil people. The only exception is in Adele Balasingham 's 
statement above. She alludes to a Tamil martial society when she discusses how women in early 
Tamil literature (i.e. Sangam literature) used to support their war-bound sons and husbands. 
50 Adele Ann Balasingham, Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers (Jaffna: LITE, 1993), 17. 
51 Ibid. 
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go for war, 'Daughter, go forward! Come back with victory!"52 The LTTE thus 
celebrates a tradition which it explicitly claims to transform. Once again, we see 
how notions of becoming are important to how the L TTE mobilises a group 
identity. 
Clearly the Maravar, Chola and Sangam pasts are important to the LTTE. 
The LTTE present these pasts as constitutive of a long martial history and 
tradition, forgotten by the Tamil people. This militant past presents a depiction of 
Tamil identity that diverges from former elitist conceptions. The militant past 
emphasises a horizontal depiction ofTamil identity; all Tamils throughout the 
ages have possessed a martial spirit. In this way, the LTTE celebrates and 
mobilises a Tamil identity which is not connected to any one caste. 
Although the militant past is important, it is not the history on which 
Tamil identity depends. This is because it does not bear the hallmarks of 
Enlightenment History. It is not a narrated history. As we saw, the L TTE does 
not chronologically recount events pertaining to the Maravars, the Cholas or the 
Sangam era. Unlike Sivararn, the LTTE does not even narrate the history ofhow 
the militant tradition (embodied in the militant past) was lost and then found. 
Instead it evokes a long forgotten militant past when it invokes (rather than 
narrates) the pasts ofthe Cholas, Maravars and the Sangam era. 
The Jaffna kingdom, like the militant past, is another strand of the 
LTTE's history that is invoked but not narrated. Unlike the militant past, 
however, the Jaffna Kingdom is a source that the LTTE has borrowed from the 
parliamentarians. I will now turn to the Jaffna Kingdom and its place in L TTE 
rhetoric and claims. 
3.3 The Jaffna Kingdom: Legitimating the Claim to Eelam 
The tradition of the Jaffna Kingdom is drawn from a text, the Yalppana 
Vaipava Malai (YVM), written by a Jaffna local during the early eighteenth 
century at the request of a Dutch governor.53 Early Tamil politicians and 
52 LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 294. 
53 Dagmar Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Politics of the Tamil Past," in Sri Lanka: History and 
the Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathon Spencer, (London: Routledge, 1990), 110. According to 
Pfaffenberger, the Jaffua Kingdom is strongly connected to Vellalar hegemony. Pfaffenberger, 
"The Cultural Dimension of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," 1152. 
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nationalists deployed the kingdom to advance political arguments. Before 
independence, G. G. Ponnambalam deployed the Jaffua Kingdom in his fifty-fifty 
proposal, 54 arguing that the Tamils had historically had a political influence in 
the island's affairs and were therefore entitled to political rights equalling those 
given to the Sinhalese majority. 55 After independence, the TULF argued that the 
Jaffua kingdom proved that the Tamils were a politically autonomous nation in 
pre-colonial times. On this basis, the TULF claimed that the Tamils were entitled 
to first, a federal, and then a sovereign state. 56 
While the kingdom was invoked to legitimate political arguments, it did 
not function as an enlightenment history, animating the national life and heritage. 
Early Tamil nationalists did not narrate the history ofthe Jaffua kingdom; no 
attention is paid to the events, dates and kings of the Jaffua Kingdom. For the 
parliamentarians, Tamil identity clearly did not depend on the Jaffua Kingdom. 
As we will see, the LTTE's invocations ofthe kingdom are not a great deal 
different from those of their predecessors. 
In the LTTE's English language sources, the Jaffua Kingdom is usually 
mentioned at the beginning of a historical survey. The reader is told that there 
was a stable, autonomous Tamil kingdom in the north of Sri Lanka: "From the 
13th Century onwards, until the penetration of Portuguese colonialism, Tamil 
Eelam lived as a stable national entity, ruled by its own kings."57 
At times, the LTTE seems to suggest that the boundaries ofthe Jaffua 
Kingdom correspond exactly with the boundaries of their proposed Eelam: 58 
"The proponents ofTamil Eelam argue that the northern and eastern provinces of 
Sri Lanka coincide with the historic boundaries of the kingdom of Jaffua and 
54 Please see the introduction 
55 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Politics of the Tamil Past," 115. 
56 Ibid., 117. 
57 LTTE, Towards Liberation, 4. 
58 This claim, that the boundaries ofEelam (or the areas where Tamils traditionally live) coincide 
with the Jaffua Kingdom, is a highly contestable one. In fact, areas that now fall within the 
boundaries of the Eastern province were loyal to Kandy in pre-colonial times. And Trincomalee, 
also on the East Coast, has fiercely retained a tradition of autonomy. This information is available 
in the traditions of the East Coast Tamils. It sometimes makes it way into some Tamil nationalist 
websites in interesting ways that emphasise a homogenous Tamil identity where scholars would 
postulate difference. Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Concept of a Tamil Homeland in Sri Lanka," 
89-90; Eelam Web, "Tamil Eelam History," http: //www.eelamweb.com/history/te/#2 (accessed 
May 16, 2008). 
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argue a case that seeks to establish that sovereignty over these territories ... " 59 In 
most instances, however, the concept of a Tamil homeland is introduced 
alongside the Jaffha Kingdom: 
The British divided the island into 9 provinces for their administrative 
convenience. In so doing, they recognised the Tamil ethnic character of 
the territory and population of the old Jaffha Kingdom and ensured its 
continuity by carving out 2 separate provinces out of the territory where 
the population would not be mixed but entirely Tamil speaking. They are 
the northern and eastern provinces, now recognised as the North-East 
province consequent to the Indo-Sri Lanka pact of 1987 which among 
other things, took cognizance of the historical contiguity of the Tamil 
habitat. 60 
Together the Jaffha Kingdom and the Tamil homeland legitimate the 
LTTE's claim to Eelam. While the Tamil homeland justifies the borders of 
Eelam (as the area where Tamils have always lived), 61 the Jaffha kingdom 
proves that the Tamil people have always had a political presence in the island 
and are therefore entitled to the mechanisms of a state. 
The Jaffna Kingdom is thus an important part ofhow the LTTE 
legitimates its claim to Eelam. It is not, however, crucial to how the L TTE 
mobilises a group identity. Like the militant past, the history of the Jaffha 
Kingdom is invoked and not narrated.62 The LTTE displays no interest in the 
chronology of the Jaffha kingdom. Because it is not narrated, the Jaffha 
Kingdom, as the LTTE uses it, is not predicated on the principles of cause and 
effect, nor is it dependent upon a linear conception oftirne. In other words, it 
does not function as a true nationalist history, replete with the assumptions of 
Enlightenment History. Consequently, it is not the history on which Tamil 
59 International Federation ofTamils, "Tamil Eelam- A Reversion to Sovereignty," 
http: //www.eelam.com/introduction/reversion.html (accessed May 16, 2008). According to the 
website, this paper, along with two others also cited in this study ("Tamil Eelam Demand in 
International Law" and "The Legitimacy of the Armed Struggle of the Tamil People"), was 
presented by International Federation of Tamils at a conference in 1992 which was held at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. According to my original printout 
of these webpages (2006), the papers were also published in the Official Tamil periodical of the 
L TIE International Secretariat - Kalathil. The statement, however, connecting these papers to 
the periodical, has since been removed. 
60 LTTE Peace Secretariat, "Historical Background," http://www.ltteps.org/list.ltte?folder= II 
(accessed May 16, 2008). 
61 Stokke and Ryntveit, "The Struggle For Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka," 292. 
62 The Jaffua Kingdom is invoked only once in the English translations ofPrabhakaran's Heroes ' 
Day Addresses: "The Sinhala chauvinistic gangs in the South may light crackers in jubilation 
assuming that they have captured the kingdom of Jaffua." Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English 
translation of Martyrs' Day Speech 1995," http: //www.ltteps.org/?view=419&folder=9 (accessed 
May 16, 2008). 
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identity depends. While the Jaffua Kingdom is important to how the LTTE 
legitimates Eelam, it is not the history most important to how the L TTE depicts 
and mobilises a group identity. 
3.4 The Post Colonial Narrative: Mobilising a Group 
Identity 
This history, the history on which Tamil identity depends, is the post-
colonial narrative. Amongst other things, the narrative is important, because it 
has ritual implications. All the ritual days in the LTTE's calendar mark the 
deaths of significant individuals or events within the post-colonial narrative.63 
The narrative is also important because the LTTE's representations ofviolence 
and death (which we look at in the following chapter) build upon this past. Most 
importantly, the narrative is an example ofEnlightenment History. It is presented 
as a true account ofthe past. Furthermore, it is predicated on a linear conception 
of time. The LTTE carefully narrates the post-colonial narrative, chronologically 
sequencing and linking events. The narrative is thus structured by the principles 
of cause and effect. As such, it is a true nationalist history. In the LTTE's post-
colonial narrative, we have found the L TTE' s most potent 'past,' the past which 
is most important to how the LTTE depicts and mobilises a group identity. 
Like the Jaffua Kingdom, the post-colonial narrative is a source that has 
been borrowed from the parliamentarians. For both the LTTE and the TULF, the 
post-colonial narrative demonstrates that the Tamils will never be safe in a united 
Sri Lanka. In this way, the post-colonial narrative legitimates both the TULF's 
and the LTTE's demand for a state apparatus. The LTTE has, however, 
developed the post-colonial narrative beyond simple legitimation. Now, the post-
colonial history is a unifying narrative that mobilises a Tamil identity through 
experiences of shared suffering. In the following discussion, I will delineate the 
LTTE's post-colonial narrative, showing how it functions as an enlightenment 
history. 64 In the process, we will also see how the L TTE weaves together the 
63 Schalk, "Beyond Hindu Festivals," 406-8. 
64 It is not my intention to adjudicate the veracity of the L TIE's post-colonial narrative. Instead, I 
want to understand how the L TIE presents the events within this narrative. Where the scholarly 
presentation of events adds to the discussion by bringing into relief elements of L TIE's narrative, 
then I have included it. 
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events of this history in a way that enables it to both mobilise a group identity 
and legitimate its claims to Eelam. 
The LTTE's post-colonial narrative usually begins in 1948, the year that 
Sri Lanka won independence. One of the first sets of acts passed after 
independence effectively disenfranchised the Estate Tamils, depriving them of 
citizenship rights: 
The fust victims of the Sinhala racist onslaught were the Tamil plantation 
workers. A million of this working people, who toiled for the prosperity 
of the island for more than a century, were disenfranchised by the most 
infamous citizenship legislation in Sri Lankan political history, which 
robbed these people of their basic human rights and reduced them to an 
appalling condition of statelessness. 65 
While scholars agree that this event was based on class rather than ethnic 
distinctions, the L TTE generally presents the legislation as evidence of the 
government's anti-Tamil bias. 66 
The next major event described in the narrative is the 1956 Sinhala Only 
Act, passed by the Bandaranaike led government: "The Sinhala Only Act put an 
end to the equality of status enjoyed by the Tamil language and made Sinhala the 
only state language. This infamous legislation had disastrous consequences. It 
forced the Tamil public servants to learn the Sinhala language or leave 
employment."67 The outrage which followed from the Tamil side was not solely 
about the inconvenience ofnot having Tamil recognised as an official language. 
The L TTE expresses this in quite strong terms. It argues that the act was an 
attack on the Tamil language, one of the facets ofTamil national identity. It is on 
this, and other similar claims, that the L TTE bases its accusations of genocide: 
This genocidal oppression, which spans a period of fifty years, is based 
on a calculated strategy implemented by successive Sri Lankan 
governments with a deliberate intention of destroying the essential 
foundations ofthe Tamil nation i.e. the land, the language, culture, 
economic, social and political life. The ultimate objective is to destroy the 
national or ethnic identity of the Tamil people. 68 
65 LTTE Peace Secretariat, "Historical Background," http://www.ltteps.org/list.ltte?folder= 11 
(accessed May 16, 2008). 
66 In fact, several Sri Lankan Tamil politicians supported the passing of the act. At the time, the 
greatest concern of the British-educated, English-speaking intelligentsia was that extreme leftist 
parties (for whom the Estate Tamils voted) would come into power; nationalist or ethnic 
sentiment was far from anyone's mind. Bass, Landscapes ofMalaiyaha Tamil Identity, 10; 
Nissan and Stirrat, "The Generation of Communal Identities," 34. 
67 LTTE, Towards Liberation, 24. 
68 Balasingham, The Will to Freedom, 283. 
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Other 'genocidal' events in the narrative include the annexation ofTamil 
lands and policy, and acts of parliament that discriminate against Tamil youth in 
both education and employment. Land in particular has become a fraught issue in 
Sri Lanka. The 'annexation' or 'co lonisation' of the Tamil homelands thus plays 
an important role in the narrative ofhistorical grievances. 
Prior to independence, the British opened up the Vanni region for 
settlement, an initiative continued by the Sri Lankan government after 
independence.69 Increasingly, these plans became a sore point between the 
Sinhalese and Tamils. As Sinhalese settlers were moved into areas traditionally 
dominated by Tamils, the demographics of the region began to change. The 
LTTE views this as a colonisation scheme which attacks the territorial integrity 
of Tamil Eelam. The schemes are thus construed as acts of genocide: "This 
planned occupation ofTamillands by hundreds ofthousands ofSinhala people 
aided and abetted by the state was aimed to annihilate the geographical entity of 
the Tamil nation."70 
The discrimination against the Tamils in education and employment 
includes a number of acts, policies and schemes. The most significant act, 
however, is the standardisation policy introduced by Sirimavo Bandaranaikne's 
government during the 1970s: "In the sphere of education a notorious 
discriminatory selective device called 'standardisation' was introduced in 1970, 
which demanded higher marks from the Tamil students for university admissions 
whereas the Sinhalese students were admitted with lower grades."71 With the 
introduction of standardisation, an already competitive schooling system became 
even more competitive, and many bright Tamils were turned away. According to 
the LTTE this led to increasing discontent and angst with the government, which 
boiled over into activism. 
69 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Concept of a Tamil Homeland in Sri Lanka," 79, 93-4, 99. 
Interestingly, the Tamils were given first choice to settle the area. The Jaffua Tamils, with their 
high regard for education, were reluctant to cultivate the largely uninhabited Vanni, despite the 
intense overpopulation in the Jaffua peninsula and the pressure on the arid land that this caused. 
70 LTTE, Towards Liberation, 23-4. 
7 1 LTTE Peace Secretariat, "Historical Background," http: //www.ltteps.org/list.ltte?folder= II 
(accessed May 16, 2008). According to Hellmann Rajanayagam, students studying in the Tamil 
stream had to gain higher marks than their Sinhalese counterparts if they were to obtain 
university entrance. This was then complemented with district quotas, disadvantaging Tamils 
further. Little offers a slightly different account of the standardisation policy. He says that the 
policy instituted regional (and not ethnic) quotas and therefore did not discriminate against the 
Tamils per se. Either way, many Tamils perceived the policy to be anti-Tamil. Hellmann 
Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers, 10-11 ; Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity, 72. 
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The 1972 Constitution is another seminal point in the narrative. The 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike government created a constituent assembly to establish a 
new constitution for Sri Lanka. Amongst other things, the LTTE presents the 
constitution as illegal (because it revokes an entrenched clause in the previous 
constitution which protected minorities), 72 and discriminatory (Buddhism is 
made the foremost religion and Sinhala, the only officiallanguage).73 The 
L TTE 's grievance is not only with the constitution, but also with the 
circumstances surrounding the inception and establishment ofthe Constitution. 
According to the LTTE, Tamil concerns were blatantly dismissed by the 
assembly: "Sinhala national chauvinism reigned supreme in the deliberations of 
the Assembly which resulted in most of the Tamil members of Parliament 
walking out in utter frustration and hopelessness." 74 
According to the LTTE, this series of events frustrated the Tamil 
leadership, compelling them to pursue a separate state for the Tamils. In the 
1977 elections the Tamil United Front (TUF) demanded a clear mandate from the 
Tamil people: "This election took the character of a referendum and the Tamil 
people voted overwhelmingly in favour of secession." 75 The L TTE argues that its 
national liberation project is based on this mandate given to the Tamil politicians 
at the 1977 elections: "The LTTE holds the view that the Tamil people had 
invoked the right to self determination at the 1977 general elections and opted to 
fight for political independence and statehood. The national liberation project of 
the L TTE is based on the people's mandate for self determination." 76 
In the events described thus far, we can see how the LTTE's narrative is 
predicated on the principles ofEnlightenment History. In particular, we see how 
events are narrated in a linear fashion with careful attention to chronology. 
Furthermore, each event is linked to the next and thus progressively strengthens 
the LTTE 's claim that the Tamil people can only be safe in a Tamil state. The 
72 International Federation of Tamils, "Tamil Eelam- A Reversion to Sovereignty," 
http: //www.eelam.com/introduction/reversion.html (accessed May 16, 2008). 
73 International Federation ofTamils, "Tamil Eelam Demand in International Law, 
http: //eelam.com/introduction/eelam_demand.htrni#RTFToC2 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
74 LTTE, Towards Liberation, 41. 
75 Ibid., 27-8 . 
76 LTTE, "A Struggle For Justice," 
http: / /eelam.com/freedom _ struggle/ltte _publ /strug_ for just/armed.html (accessed May 16, 2008). 
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narrative thus creates a sequence of cause and effect which enables the LTTE to 
justify its claim to Eelam. 
The events outlined thus far are consistently mentioned across a variety 
ofLTTE texts, if not in every single text. However, the episodes of most 
importance are those which involve acts of violence, particularly the violence of 
the state. We have already seen how the LTTE laces its description ofpost-
colonial events with accusations of genocide and violence. In this way, the LTTE 
presents its own violence as a necessary counter to the violence of the 
government. The events involving actual violence, however, provide the ultimate 
proofthat the LITE's violence is necessary; without it, the Tamil people would 
be destroyed, or so the L TTE claims. 
This emphasis on violence distinguishes the LITE's narrative from the 
parliamentarians' narrative. In particular, the LTTE emphasises the post-
independence riots, which, according to Ismail, are not even mentioned in the 
parliamentarians' version. 77 For the LTTE, the riots are described as the "worst 
of all" the atrocities perpetrated against the Tamil people. 78 The government is 
held responsible for inspiring and even instigating the anti-Tamil riots in 1956, 
1958, 1961 , 1974, 1977, 1979, 1981 and July 1983.79 Through these riots, the 
state forces are said to have unleashed "mass murder, looting, arson and rape, 
with abominable crimes of genocide in which the State police openly colluded 
with the vandals."80 Prabhakaran himself speaks about the riots in an interview 
with Anita Pratrap. When asked about events that had shaped his journey 
towards militant politics, he describes his childhood encounter with a widowed 
mother whose husband had been burnt alive during the 1958 riots.81 
The LTTE also discusses how the government employed violence to 
silence the non-violent campaigns of the Tamils. The Tamil leadership protested 
against discriminatory, government policies through non-violent methods-
organised satyagrahas and a civil disobedience campaign. 82 The LTTE 
77 Ismail, Abiding by Sri Lanka, 144. 
78 LTTE, Towards Liberation, 5. 
79 LTTE Peace Secretariat, "Historical Background," http://www.ltteps.org/list.ltte?folder= 11 
(accessed May 16, 2008). 
80 L TTE, Towards Liberation, 5. 
81 LTTE, Towards Liberation, 79. 
82 LTTE Peace Secretariat, "Historical Background," http://www.ltteps.org/list.ltte?folder= 11 
(accessed May 16, 2008). 
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highlights the government's response to these protests: "The Sinhala 
Government reacted with military violence and terror, brutally crushing the non-
violent peaceful campaigns of the Tamils."83 
The LTTE emphasises the violence ofthe government because it 
vindicates the LTTE 'sown violence. Once again, we see the principles of cause 
and effect at work. Based on this presentation of events, the L TTE claims that it 
is the government and not the LTTE who are the terrorists. 84 Born of the people's 
frustration, the L TTE claims to have only pursued violence as a last resort, and 
even then, only after careful consideration. 85 In this way the L TTE' s violence 
becomes reactive, rather than proactive. "The strategy of armed struggle was 
formulated by us after a careful and cautious appraisal of the specific concrete 
conditions of our struggle, with the fullest comprehension ofthe historical 
situation in which masses of our people have no choice other than to fight 
decisively to advance the cause of national freedom."86 
The LTTE cites these events involving violence not only to justify its 
violence, but also to emphasise a key theme of the narrative: shared suffering. 
While government policies and legislations have caused the people to suffer, the 
people's greatest suffering has been at the hands of government troops. This 
suffering is an experience shared by Tamils; it is constitutive of what it means to 
be a Sri Lankan Tamil today. In this way, the LITE's post-colonial narrative 
goes beyond mere legitimation. It posits a shared experience of suffering which 
the LTTE emphasises in order to mobilise a group identity: "Only when we share 
the suffering of our people, the people will unite with us. "87 This suffering exists 
not only in the past but also in the present. 88 
Thus far, we have seen how the post-colonial narrative functions as an 
enlightenment history, animating the LITE's efforts to mobilise a group identity. 
It is predicated on a linear conception oftime. It is narrated chronologically and 
83 LTTE, "A Struggle for Justice," 
http: //eelam.com/freedom_struggle/ltte_publ/strug_forjust/whydid.html (accessed May 16, 
2008). 
84 LTTE, Towards Liberation, 13. 
85 LTTE, "A Struggle for Justice," http: //www.eelamweb.com/publication/justice/whydid.shtml 
(accessed May 16, 2008). 
86 L TTE, Towards Liberation, 28. 
87 LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications. uu.se/abstract.xsql ?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 265. 
88 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation of Martyrs' Day Speech 2006," 
http://www.ltteps.org/?view= 1776&folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
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consequently, is animated by the logic of cause and effect. We still have to test 
the post-colonial narrative against one final criterion: is the post-colonial 
narrative presented as a true account? 
The LTTE depicts the post-colonial narrative as true, when it also depicts 
the narrative as secular. We see this in the following quote, where Prabhakaran 
contrasts the post-colonial narrative (the true, secular account) with the 
Mahavamsa (a mythical history). "The Sinhala nation continues to be entrapped 
in the Mahavamsa mindset, in that mythical ideology .. . It is because ofthis 
ideological blindness the Sinhalese people and their political and religious 
leaders are unable to grasp the authentic history of the island and the social 
realities prevailing here."89 The LTTE thus presents its post-colonial narrative as 
a verifiable, secular account, uncomplicated by religious or mythical details. It 
claims that if others (including the Sinhalese and the international community) 
read and understood this history, then they would understand the L TTE, and, 
more notably, its violence. 90 The LTTE thus ascribes history with an important 
function. It is transparent.9 1 The post-colonial narrative thus meets the last 
criterion of enlightenment history: it is presented as a true, verifiable account of 
the past. 
As stated earlier, nationalist identities depend on histories which fulfil the 
criteria ofEnlightenment History. The LTTE's post-colonial history clearly 
fulfils these criteria. Therefore, it is the LTTE's post-colonial narrative, and not 
the militant past or the Jaffua Kingdom that provides the LTTE with its most 
potent formulation ofTamil identity. It is the LTTE's post-colonial narrative that 
is most important to how the LTTE mobilises a group identity. 
The post-colonila narrative is strikingly modem and so too, therefore, is 
the formulation of Tamil identity which arises out of it. When the LTTE 
emphasises recent experiences of suffering, it almost suggests that Tamil identity 
was forged only in opposition to the government's violence: "Tamil nationalism 
arose as a historical consequence ofSinhala chauvinistic oppression."92 This 
89 Velupillai Prabhakaran, " English Translation of Martyrs' Day Speech 2005," 
http://www.ltteps.org/?view=996&folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
90 Balasingham, The Will to Freedom, 279-80. 
91 Asad would identify this as a secular, modem sensibility. The secular is concerned with the 
apprehension of the real. When the LTTE identifies its history as true, transparent and non 
religious, it draws on a universal modem discourse. 
92 LTTE, Towards Liberation, 33. 
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emphasis on a recent history fits well with how the L TTE sees itself as shaping 
and reformulating Tamil tradition. The recent past and the present is a period of 
great transformation where the LTTE assesses and refines Tamil tradition and 
identity. 
When scho Iars analyse the various strands of the L TTE' s historical 
discourse, they too identify what we have established here - the post-colonial 
narrative and the notion of a militant tradition and past are important to the 
LTTE's project. I turn now to these scholarly arguments, focussing particularly 
on how scholars apply the categories of religion and the secular. 
3.5 History or Myth? 
Reading Religion into the LTTE's Historical Discourse 
When scholars analyse the LTTE's historical discourse (or aspects within 
it), they do not overtly or pervasively apply the category of religion. This is 
perhaps because the discourse conforms to our ideas about what constitutes a 
secular history. While the references to religion are few, they are nonetheless 
there. 
I examine two scholars here: Fuglerud and Schalk. Fuglerud implicates 
the category of religion when he discusses the LTTE's postcolonial narrative. 
Schalk however, assesses the L TTE 's nationalism in relation to a functionalist 
definition ofreligion.93 He concludes that the LTTE's nationalism performs a 
religious function. While Schalk does not explicitly discuss the LTTE's historical 
discourse, we can surmise that his analysis applies to aspects ofthe LTTE's 
militant past. 
When Fuglerud discusses the LTTE's post-colonial narrative, he does not 
explicitly invoke the category of religion. He does, however, apply the term 
myth, a category long associated with religion: 
93 Hellmann Rajanayagam and Trawick also suggest that the LITE's nationalism is a religion. 
Hellmann Rajanayagam argues that the militants ' expression of Tamil nationalism is a new 
secular religion that has "strong integrative power precisely because it syncrestically uses 
religious symbolism and quasi-religious terms to unite Sri Lankan Tamils into a Tamil 
nationalism based on its very own concept of culture and tradition." Trawick similarly suggests 
that the LITE 's nationalism evokes a reverence that is religious in tone: "The LTTE are not 
religious fanatics or fundamentalists. Its members practice the religions of their choice. If there is 
an L TIE religion, it is devotion to Tamil Eel am, which like many other homelands is depicted 
metaphorically as a mother." Hellmann Rajanayagam, "Religious Ideology Among the Tamils," 
82; Trawick, "Reasons For Violence," 160. 
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This explanation goes beyond scientific history and represents a 
'mythico-history.' Not because it is untrue but because the Tamils as a 
people are here heroised and placed within a more encompassing moral 
ordering of the world (Malkki 1990) where relationships and processes 
are reinterpreted within a dichotomy of good and evil. It is with reference 
to this binary moral framework that the significance of different levels of 
communication must be sought. While internally there is a continuous 
ordering and reordering of events and actors, externally most people will 
project an image ofthe world in categorical terms where Tamils are 
locked in an oppositional relationship with their surroundings. Many, in 
fact, express the opinion that Tamils are a 'cursed people', abandoned by 
gods and men alike. When asked about their background, Tamil refugees 
tend to slip from the story of their own lives into the field of collective 
history. The individual and the collective fuse into one standardised 
discourse explaining 'why I am here now.'94 
Here, Fuglerud says that the LTTE's history is mythic not because it is 
untrue (a definition often given to myth), but because it departs from scientific 
history. In other words, the post-colonial narrative does not just narrate facts; it is 
also involved in how Tamils understand their identity as Tamils. Fuglerud is 
saying what we have already established- the post-colonial narrative plays an 
important role in how the LTTE mobilises a group identity. 
Of course, Fuglerud's observation is true of all nationalist histories. All 
nationalist histories are involved in the creation and maintenance of identity, 
even though they claim to be 'scientific.' So what does Fuglerud imply when he 
uses the category of myth? I think he suggests that identity formation belongs to 
the religious domain. Science, on the other hand, has no agendas; it wants 
nothing more than to provide a straightforward account of (historical) reality. 
Science, unlike religion, is not involved in how people shape their identities. 
While Fuglerud does not explicitly say that the LTTE's history is religious 
(because it is involved in the creation of identity), he nonetheless implies this. 
Fuglerud's use of the term myth shows us that the category of religion is firmly 
entrenched in modern thought and epistemology. 
While Fuglerud implicitly connects religion to the post-colonial narrative, 
Schalk explicitly applies functionalist definitions ofreligion to the LTTE's 
nationalism. Although Schalk writes polemically when he applies this definition, 
I have chosen to include his analysis here. His argument captures an important 
connection that people often make between nationalism and religion. 
94 Fuglerud, Life on the Outside, 179-80. 
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In his article "The Revival ofMartyr Cults Among Ilavar," Schalk argues 
that the L TTE is a religious organisation because it employs tradition. 95 
According to Schalk, established religions (Christianity, Hinduism etc.) possess 
tradition: "It is part of our concept of religion itself that it appeals to a long 
tradition going back to a founder or original revelation that rationalises its 
norms." Schalk argues that new political movements climb towards the status of 
a religion when they incorporate tradition (which can include language purism or 
reviving factual or mythical incidents of the past).96 In this way, Schalk presents 
tradition as being inherently religious. 
From Schalk's argument, I presume that he would accept the militant 
tradition (which we discussed in relation to the militant past) as evidence for his 
argument - the L TTE relies on tradition and is therefore a religious organisation. 
Because all nationalisms depend on tradition, we can also presume that Schalk 
would deem all nationalisms religious. 
When we deconstruct the scholarly arguments discussed above, we see 
how they point to important observations about the LTTE's nationalism. 
Fuglerud is arguing that the LTTE's post-colonial history is important to how 
Tamils understand their identity. Similarly, Schalk indicates that tradition is 
important for the LTTE: the ancient past evokes a sense of tradition. 
These insights, however, are obscured, when Fuglerud and Schalk try to 
explain them through the category of religion. In the scholars' analyses, these 
observations -that the LTTE requires tradition and that its post-colonial narrative 
is important for Tamil identity- become secondary to assertions about the role 
that religion plays in the LTTE's nationalism. When scholars become fixated on 
the categories of religion and the secular, they neglect, as well as obscure, 
important insights. For example, Schalk does not discuss how the L TTE 
celebrates its divergence from tradition, an important and fascinating facet of 
how the LTTE presents tradition. Asad's observation thus becomes clear: when 
we apply the category of religion (as it is conventionally understood), we provide 
a muddled analysis that says little about the subject being examined. 
95 Schalk also argues that the L TIE is a religious organisation because it stipulates an ultimate 
aim (for which cadres are willing to die) . Schalk, "The Revival of Martyr Cults Among Ilavar," 
153 . 
96 Schalk, "The Revival ofMartyr Cults Among Ilavar," 154. 
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In this chapter I have argued that nationalist identities depend on histories 
which exhibit the characteristics ofEnlightenment History. This includes, 
amongst other things, a concern with truth, a narration of events predicated on a 
linear conception of time and structured by the logic of cause and effect. I have 
shown that it is the LTTE's post-colonial narrative, and not the Jaffna Kingdom 
or the militant past, which exhibits these characteristics. Consequently, it is the 
post-colonial narrative which is most important to how the LTTE depicts and 
mobilises a group identity. In particular, the narrative mobilises a group identity 
through shared experiences of suffering. 
Alongside these recent experiences of suffering, the LTTE also presents a 
glorious, martial past. The L TTE quite extraordinarily celebrates its divergence 
from the martial tradition ofthis past. In this departure from tradition, we once 
again see how the LTTE emphasises a sense of constant becoming and 
transformation, a theme which reappears in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Violence and Death- Liberating the Self and the Nation 
At no time and nowhere in world history, except in our motherland, has occurred such wonderful 
abandonment (from life) and astonishing dedication (of life).' 
In the previous chapter we established that the L TTE mobilises a shared 
Tamil identity by invoking a recent past of shared suffering and an ancient past 
where martial values flourished. In this chapter, we turn our attention to another 
LTTE discourse: violence and death. I ask the same questions ofthis discourse as 
I did of the last: how does the LTTE use the discourse to mobilise a group 
identity? How is the discourse structured by the claim to be secular? And how do 
scholars implicate or apply the categories of religion and the secular when they 
analyse the discourse? In addition to the commonalities between how I approach 
the two discourses, there are several continuities between the discourses 
themselves. 
The LTTE's discourse around violence and death is intimately connected 
to the historical narrative of suffering. In fact , violence and death point to the 
working out ofthe narrative of suffering. When cadres fight and die, they 
channel and transform their experiences of suffering into battle. In the process, 
they liberate not only the self, but also the nation from experiences of suffering. 
And so, in this chapter, I argue that the L TTE mobilises a group identity through 
shared experiences of liberation, experiences which are presented as the answer 
to suffering. 
In this chapter, as in the last, we observe an LTTE discourse structured by 
the claim to be secular. We similarly observe a scholarly discussion around the 
discourse that involves the categories of religion and the secular. I focus on one 
aspect ofthe debate: the deification ofthe dead. Some scholars argue that LTTE 
rituals are commemorative only, while others claim that the rituals encourage the 
public to approach the dead as deities. For each scholar 'religion' and the 
'secular' implies something slightly different. These meanings shift between one 
study and another, and sometimes even within a single study. 
1 L TIE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 265. 
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When we engage with this lively discussion and all its flaws and 
inconsistencies, new questions and approaches emerge. The scholarly debate 
provides us with rich material that enables us to better understand how the L TTE 
represents the secular and mobilises a group identity. I begin not with the 
scholarly discussion, but with the discourse itself I show how it is structured by 
the claim to be secular. This will lead me into a discussion about how the L TTE 
constructs meaning around violence and death. In particular, I identify how the 
LTTE presents fighting and dying as creative acts through which its cadres 
transform and liberate both themselves and the nation. Finally, I will discuss the 
scholarly debate. I will offer three alternative readings of the deification of the 
dead. Unlike the scholars whom I discuss, I do not assume that the deification of 
the dead is a religious act. Instead, I inquire into what the practice might tell us 
about how the LTTE represents the secular. 
4.1 Violence and Death: The Claim to be Secular 
In the previous chapter, we saw how the LTTE presents its post-colonial 
narrative as secular. It distinguishes its own ' factual ' account from the religious 
history of its Sinhalese adversaries. We see similar assertions in the LTTE's 
discourse around violence and also death. For example, the L TTE refers to its 
cult ofmartyrs as 'secular.' The organisation ' s burial practices offer us another 
example of how it asserts its secularity. Finally and perhaps most importantly, 
the LTTE 's cause, for which it is willing to fight and die, is depicted as a secular 
one. 
Let us begin with the first example. The L TTE collectively refers to the 
dead cadres as a secular cult of martyrs. Furthermore, it claims to honour the 
dead through secular, civil ceremonies and not religious rituals. On appointed 
days, the L TTE conducts these secular ceremonies throughout the North-east. 
The ceremonies are an opportunity for living cadres and the Tamil public to 
honour the contribution made by all who have died. Most of the ceremonies mark 
the death anniversaries of notable cadres. One such ceremony is Mavirar Nal. It 
commemorates the death anniversary ofShankar, the first LTTE martyr. Other 
days in the LTTE's ritual calendar mark the 1983 riots, the fasts to death by 
Pupati and Thileepan against the Indian occupation, and the death of the first 
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Black Tiger (suicide bomber). The biggest of these ceremonies, however, is 
Mavirar Nal. These ceremonies are considered solemn, formal occasions. On the 
marked day, ritual prescriptions are carried out fastidiously. 2 
The L TTE feels that the dead are most appropriately honoured through 
these secular rituals and in a secular cult: 
It [the LTTE] feels that it would not be possible to have a specific Hindu, 
Muslim or Catholic cult of martyrs ... for the simple reason that death 
should not separate; the unity achieved in battle ... should be continued, 
and unity can be maintained only in a 'secular' cult ... in the sense of a 
cult, which does not interfere in any of the religions already practised, 
and also in the sense of a rationalistic commemorative cult. 3 
The LTTE thus asserts its secularity, when it classifies as secular both its 
commemoration ofthe dead and its cult of martyrs. 
In the LITE's burial practices we find another instance where the LTTE 
presents itself as a secular organisation. In Tamil Hindu society, the dead are 
usually cremated. Burial is a practice generally associated with Christians, 
Muslims and even lower castes. Up until the early 1990s, the L TTE returned the 
bodies of dead cadres to their families who chose to either bury or cremate their 
dead in a kin-based, religious ceremony. In the early 1990s, however, the L TTE 
established tuyilum illam (war cemeteries). When cadres die, they are now buried 
here. The L TTE effected another change also - the body of a cadre was no longer 
to be inhumed in a ceremony particular to the cadre's religious tradition. Instead, 
all dead cadres were to be buried in a secular ceremony. The practice is thus 
innovative for two reasons: first, the dead are buried (rather than cremated), and 
second, their burial is conducted as part of a 'non-religious' ceremony. 4 
Scho Iars speculate about how the L TTE has managed to convince the 
Tamil public to adopt this practice, when it diverges so drastically from Hindu 
custom. Scholars point to alternative Hindu traditions that permit burial, arguing 
that the L TTE has only been able to adopt the practice on account of these 
traditions. I will survey these arguments later, but here, I am interested in 
exploring how the L TTE itself justifies its decision to bury the dead. Does the 
LTTE explain it as a return to a Hindu practice? Or has the L TTE chosen an 
explanation that asserts its secularity? 
2 Schalk, "Beyond Hindu Festivals," 406-9. 
3 Schalk, "The Revival ofMartyr Cults Among Ilavar," 186. 
4 Ibid ., 183 . 
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According to Schalk and Natali, LTTE leaders claim that they decided to 
bury the dead when they observed the practices of countries like Britain and 
America: "They saw that they used to bury their soldiers. Then they decided to 
proceed in the same way."5 While the LTTE does not explicitly delineate the 
practice as a secular one, it nonetheless distances the practice from possible 
religious explanations. Instead, the L TTE aligns the practice with those of 
nations that are perceived as civil and secular. It too hopes to be perceived as a 
secular movement. 
Thus, we have seen how the L TTE presents its commemorative 
ceremonies as secular events. We have also explored how the LTTE associates 
its burial practices with the practices of nation-states that are generally deemed 
secular. In addition, violence and death presents us with a third instance where 
the L TTE asserts its secularity. This last instance concerns how the L TTE 
represents its reasons for fighting and dying. 
The L TTE contrasts its own reasons for fighting and dying with those of 
religious organisations. In this way, the LTTE suggests that its violence is driven 
by moral, secular motivations: "We are not mentally demented as to commit 
blind acts of violence impelled by racist and religious fanaticism. We are fighting 
and sacrificing our lives for the love of a noble cause."6 Secularists, the LTTE 
included, often regard religious violence as gratuitous. This does not mean, 
however, that secularism is incompatible with violence. Asad challenges 
theorists who designate religious origins for the violence perpetrated by secular 
governments. He argues that violence is entirely compatible with liberal, secular 
values. In fact, it is characteristic of it. Violence is disavowed on principle, but 
enlightened violence, the violence ofuniversalising reason, is legitimised for the 
liberal project ofredeeming the world. 7 When the LTTE presents its cadres' 
violence (and deaths) as just, rational and necessary, it draws on this tradition, 
distinguishing its violence from the violence of religious organisations and 
simultaneously asserting the secularity of its own. So how does the LTTE 
represent its cadres' violence and deaths as just, rational and necessary? 
5 Natali , "Building Cemeteries, Constructing Identities. Funerary Practices and Nationalist 
Discourse Among the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka," 
http: //www. basas.ac. uk/conference05/natali, %20cristiana.pdf (accessed April 26, 2008). 
6 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation ofMartyrs' Day Speech 2001 ," 
http: //www.ltteps.org/?view=414&folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
7 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 7-8. 
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The L TTE advances three interrelated claims pertaining to its cause, 
Eelam. All three demonstrate that Eelam is a rational, just, necessary cause. 
Consequently, when LTTE cadres fight and die for this cause, their violence and 
deaths are also construed as rational, just and necessary. First, the L TTE claims 
that Eelam is guaranteed to the Tamil people as a universal right. Here it draws 
on UN documents about the rights of nations, showing how Sri Lankan Tamils 
constitute a nation. Based on this position, the LTTE argues that the Tamils are 
entitled to live as a nation, determining their own political and economic life. 8 
Second, the LTTE represents its cause, Eelam, as embodying the collective 
aspirations of the Tamil people. The LTTE emphasises that it does not just 
represent the people; it is the people: "The Liberation Tigers are not separate 
from the people. The Liberation Tigers are a people's movement. The Tigers, 
indeed, are the people. The people, indeed, are the Tigers. "9 Third, the L TTE 
represents Eelam as a historical necessity. Eelam was only pursued when it 
became clear that the Tamil people would never be safe in a united Sri Lanka. 10 
These three arguments coalesce to form a strong moral claim: Eelam is a just, 
rational and necessary cause. Because cadres fight and die for such a cause (as 
opposed to a religiously motivated cause), the cadres' acts of violence and death 
are also construed as just, rational and necessary. 
Because secularists repudiate violence on principle, when they do resort 
to it, they must demonstrate that they are fighting and dying for a moral cause. 
But they must do more than this. While a cause might be just, rational and 
necessary, an onlooker might ask whether it is just, rational and necessary to kill 
and die for that cause. The moral foundation of the LTTE's cause thus only 
partly convinces a secularist that the LTTE's violence is enlightened. 
Consequently, the LTTE advances a further three arguments, all ofwhich 
demonstrate that its violence, like its cause (but independent of it), is driven by 
secular, moral motivations. These claims strongly echo the three arguments 
enumerated above. 
8 The International Federation ofTamils, "Tamil Eelam Demand in International Law," 
http://eelam.com/introduction/eelam_demand.htmi#RTFToC2 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
9 LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://pub1ications.uu.se/abstract.xsq1 ?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 258. 
10L TIE Peace Secretariat, "Historical Background," http://www.ltteps.org/li st.ltte?folder= II 
(accessed May 16, 2008). 
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First, the LTTE deploys a universalist discourse, claiming that it is a 
historical law that people must fight and die for freedom. 11 In this way, the L TTE 
claims that it is necessary (and therefore rational and just) for its cadres to fight 
and die for Eelam. Second, the LTTE claims that its violence represents the 
collective aspirations of the people. 12 Its violence is not a tyrannical, violence 
imposed upon the people, but a democratic one that emanates from the people. 
Here, the LTTE presents its violence as just. Third and finally, the LTTE 
employs a historical argument: fighting and dying for Eelam (like Eelam itself) 
were only opted for, when all other options were exhausted. It was only after 
careful consideration that the LTTE decided to attain Eelam through violent 
methods. 13 Yet again, the L TTE asserts the necessity of its violence. As with the 
previous three claims, the LTTE uses these arguments to present its violence and 
deaths as just, necessary and rational. Unlike the previous three arguments, 
however, these claims are not connected to the LITE's cause. 
When the LTTE shows that its violence and deaths are motivated by these 
moral motivations and considerations, it distinguishes its own violence and 
deaths from those of religious organisations. This moral basis is crucial to how 
the L TTE presents itself as a secular organisation. It is also important, however, 
for how the organisation constructs meaning around violence and death. We see 
this in how the LTTE distinguishes its own violence from the government's 
violence. Because it is not predicated on moral motivations, the government's 
violence is futile and meaningless. It brings unnecessary suffering to the people. 
In contrast, the LTTE 's own violence is liberating and just: "The Sinhala nation 
is engaged in a war of injustice where as we are engaged in a liberation struggle 
in which justice is on our side." 14 Because the LITE's violence is just, any 
suffering that is experienced because of it (whether by the Sinhalese, Tamil 
public or LTTE cadres) is necessary. 
11 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation ofMartyrs' Day Speech 1992, 
http: //www.ltteps.org/?view=422&folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
12 LTTE, Towards Liberation, 47-8. 
13 Ibid. , 28. Because the LITE presents its violence as necessary, it continually affirms its 
commitment to peace and peaceful modes of resolution : "We are not warmongers who love 
violence. In actually fact, spiritually, we love peace. We want a permanent, stable and honourable 
peace." Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation ofMartyrs ' Day Speech 1992," 
http: //www.ltteps.org/?view=422&folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
14 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation ofMartyrs' Day Speech 1998," 
http: / /www.ltteps.org/?view=416&folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
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The moral basis ofthe LTTE's cause similarly imbues its cadres' deaths 
with meaning: "Our heroes have sacrificed their lives for a just cause. Their 
demise does not constitute an ordinary event of death. Rather their death signifies 
a profound spiritual aspiration for national freedom." 15 Just as the moral basis of 
the cause provides a counterpoint between the LTTE's violence and the violence 
ofthe government, it also provides a contrast between the deaths ofLTTE cadres 
and the deaths of others. LTTE cadres die for the cause, and hence "They lie 
buried as seeds." 16 The deaths ofTamil civilians, however, are pointless. In one 
L TTE poem it is made clear that while cadres become seeds, innocent bystanders 
(i.e. Tamil civilians) do not: ''Not all who fell became seeds." 17 In a similar way, 
the LTTE distinguishes its own deaths from the deaths of government soldiers: 
"We, motivated by an unceasing yearning for national liberation, are forced to 
oppose you, a puppet ofthe state ... As we walk the path of national liberation, 
our deaths will acquire dignity, meaning. But yours will become meaningless and 
absurd." 18 Unlike Tamil civilians and government soldiers, LTTE cadres die for 
a just, secular cause and this is why only their deaths are presented as 
meaningful. 
The L TTE thus employs a moral argument to establish its secularity and 
to imbue violence and death with meaning. The LTTE's discourse around 
violence and death, however, concerns more than just its moral foundation: 
"Right and justice alone on our side is not enough. We need strength. We must 
have excellence for fighting. We must have determination without hesitation." 19 
How the cadres fight (and presumably die) is also important. When we address 
how cadres approach fighting and dying, we discover how the L TTE represents 
violence and deaths as transformative, liberating acts. 
15 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation of Martyrs' Day Speech 1993," 
http:/ /www.ltteps.org/?view=421 &folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
16 Katiravan, "One Foot Above the Ground," trans. by Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And Heroes 
Die," 38. 
17 Arts and Culture Association, "How You Alone . .. ," trans. by Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And 
Heroes Die," 137. 
18 LTTE, Towards Liberation, 16. 
19 LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 271. 
88 
4.2 Violence and Death: Liberating the Self 
Before cadres can fight (and die) on the battlefield, they are required to undertake 
ascetic practices. They subject themselves to an abstemious lifestyle. 
Furthermore, they undertake gruelling training where they learn to master 
themselves physically and emotionally. In the process, they transcend and 
liberate the self from physical discomfort, everyday fears and, most importantly, 
experiences of suffering. This ascetic training also enables them to fight in a 
liberated way on the battlefield. While fighting involves liberating the self in 
some degree, dying on the battlefield represents the ultimate liberation of self. 
The L TTE expects its cadres to adopt a disciplined, ascetic lifestyle, 20 
abstaining from worldly goods and pleasures, such as smoking, drinking and pre-
marital relations. 21 It thus refers to its cadres as ascetics. 22 As ascetics, cadres 
embrace this ascetic lifestyle and renounce their own personal desires, 
committing all their energies to the liberation struggle: "A liberation warrior 
should transcend the borders ofhis ego and dedicate (his life) totally to the 
struggle. "23 In this way, the L TTE suggests that its cadres liberate themselves 
when they undertake ascetic training in preparation for the battlefield. 
In other ways also, cadres undertake ascetic practices. Their training 
regime is rigorous. 
This is a period when elbow skin turns to calluses; when barbed wire 
treats the soles ofthe feet as a pin cushion; when ropes burn off the palm 
ofthe hands. It is the time when cadres bathe in their sweat; when dust 
replaces talcum powder; where clothes become rags. This is the time 
when your rifle becomes your friend; when alertness becomes a life 
saver; the moon and stars your light.24 
Through this training, cadres liberate themselves, learning to tolerate extreme 
physical deprivation and discomfort. 
Cadres are also taught to master their emotions, another aspect of their 
ascetic training. For example, they are taught to approach killing as a job that 
20 Ibid., 267. 
2 1 Balasingham, The Will to Freedom, 78-81. For some time cadres were not allowed to marry at 
all. Those who breach the code of conduct are severely punished. 
22 Schalk, "The Revival ofMartyr Cults Among Ilavar," 166. Living cadres are referred to as 
tavan (ascetics) 
23 LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu. se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 266. 
24 Balasingham, Women Fighters of Tamil Eelam, 19-20. 
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must be undertaken without emotion. 25 They also learn to individuate themselves 
so that they can overcome their fears, especially the fear of death.26 When cadres 
overcome their fear of death, they transcend, transform and liberate the self: 
"Fear of death is the cause of every human fear. Who conquers this fear of death, 
conquers over himself. This person also reaches liberation from the prison ofhis 
mind."27 
While cadres are taught to overcome certain emotions, they learn to 
harness others. For example, cadres are trained to channel their experiences of 
suffering. On the battlefield, they marginalise their fears and then focus on 
experiences of suffering, such as the loss of a comrade or the collective suffering 
of the Tamil people. They then harness this experience of suffering and cultivate 
a martial rage.28 As we noted in the previous chapter, the LTTE mobilises a 
group identity when it appropriates and emphasises shared experiences of 
suffering. In this chapter, we see how the LTTE offers a solution to the post-
colonial narrative of suffering. Cadres liberate the self from suffering when they 
channel their experiences of suffering into battle. 
Cadres thus undertake ascetic training, liberating the self from worldly 
desires, physical discomfort and emotional states. This ascetic training also 
enables cadres to fight in a liberated way on the battlefield: "In poverty you lived 
I Without pretensions your inner self I On the battlefield your courage surged."29 
Through living ascetically, cadres cultivate a power which they unleash on the 
battlefield. Men cultivate tapas (strength through abstinence) and women, karpu 
(chastity). 30 In battle they channel this power and fight ferociously. Liberated 
through ascetic practices, the self is able to fight without fear and kill without 
emotion. Most importantly, when the 'liberated self takes to the battlefield, it 
transforms experiences of suffering: "Every drop of blood ... that our people shed 
in their day to day agonies will transform into arms against your Government. 
We will raise a revolutionary army of thousands of liberation fighters from the 
25 Trawick, "Reasons for Violence," 159. 
26 E. Valentine Daniel , "The Semeiosic EconomyofFear," Social Reseach 71 :4 (2004): 1093. 
27 LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 258. 
28 Schalk, "Beyond Hindu Festivals," 400. 
29 Warrior Icaiyalakan, "Distant Star," trans. by Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And Heroes Die," 131. 
30 Schalk, "Women Fighters of the Liberation Tigers in Tamil limn," 177. 
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very ashes of those innocents who were murdered for no reason by your armed 
forces. "31 
Thus, cadres signify that they have liberated the selfwhen they adopt 
ascetic practices and fight on the battlefield. Dying on the battlefield, however, 
connotes the ultimate renunciation and liberation of the self Consequently, the 
dead are seen as the ultimate renunciators. The term tiyaki (ascetic) refers only to 
dead cadres. When a cadre dies in battle, his death is understood as an act of 
tiyakam or abandonment.32 The term tiyakam has strong connotations of 
renunciation. It generally refers to the sacrifice or devotion of someone who has 
freed the self from all earthly bonds.33 The cadre who voluntarily abandons his or 
her life for the realisation of the cause is thus similar to the renouncer who 
abandons worldly life. 34 
The dead cadre, more so than the living, has truly transcended and 
liberated the self: "To be courageous to annihilate oneself for the happy living of 
others is godly asceticism."35 Consequently death does not defeat the cadre: "The 
hawk risen into the air I Devours our bodies I As leftovers only I No power can 
contain the power inside us."36 When a cadre dies, he or she transcends and 
liberates the self, and concomitantly defeats death. Violence and death are thus 
interpreted as creative acts which are necessary for the individual to liberate the 
self As we will see in the next section, violence and death are liberating for 
another reason also: they bring the liberation of the nation one step closer. 
4.3 Violence and Death: Liberating the Nation 
When cadres fight in an empowered, agentive way, they bring the liberation of 
Eelam closer. The L TTE is clear that Eelam cannot be realised without the 
willingness of cadres to fight relentlessly and fearlessly. Only then can 
government forces be dispelled from the Tamil homeland: "We will continue to 
3 1 LITE, Towards Liberation, 18. 
32 Schalk, "The Reviva l ofMartyr Cults Among Ilavar," 166-8. 
33 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And Heroes Die," 123. 
34 Schalk, "The Revival ofMartyr Cults Among Ilavar," 166. 
35 LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 275. 
36 M lcaialakan, "Time Collects in Our Hand (The Opportunity is in our Hands)," trans. by 
Hellmann Rajanayagam, in "And Heroes Die," 132. 
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fight until your armed forces are chased out from our homeland."37 The LTTE 
thus advances its journey to Eelam, each time a cadre takes to the battlefield, 
cultivating a martial rage: "Our fighters have today become historic personages 
and are impelling history forward. "38 Because of its liberating quality, the L TTE 
celebrates its violence: "The speed of our strikes, the ability of rapid deployment, 
the unified command, the high discipline, the spectacular offensive tactics and 
the tremendous courage displayed by our fighting formations have astounded the 
world military experts. "39 
While fighting brings Eelam closer, dying signifies the ultimate way of 
liberating the nation Uust as it is signifies the ultimate means of liberating the 
self). According to the LTTE, it is necessary for cadres to die: "Only in return for 
death, destruction and grief as gifts can we see the paradise of independence."40 
Their deaths push forward the liberation struggle, bringing liberation to the land. 
Consequently their deaths are considered proof that progress is being made 
towards Eelam: "If you are afraid oflosses in war you cannot conduct (a war). 
Losses should be evaluated as support for progress."41 The LTTE claims that it 
could not advance towards Eelam unless cadres were willing to put themselves in 
situations where they can and will die. The Black Tigers exemplify this. The 
Black Tigers are the wing of the LTTE that are trained to conduct suicide 
bombing missions. They undertake missions knowing that there is no chance of 
survival. When they die fulfilling these missions, they eliminate obstacles that 
would otherwise hinder the realisation ofEelam. 42 When cadres die, whether 
they be Black Tigers or not, they impel the liberation struggle onwards, enabling 
the LTTE to take yet another step towards the actualisation of its goal- Eelam.43 
37 LTTE, Towards Liberation, 18. 
38 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "Tamil National Leader Hon . V. Prabhakaran 's Interview," 
http: //www.eelamweb.com/leader/interview/in 199404/ (accessed May 16, 2008). 
39 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translatio;; ofMartyrs' Day Speech 1999," 
http:/ /www.ltteps.org/?view=415&folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
40LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 263 . 
41 Ibid ., 268 . 
42LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 261 . 
43Eelam is thus shaped by the dead: "For the liberation of the motherland, many thousands of 
tiger heroes have battled and fell. We have buried these heroes by opening the breast of our 
heroic earth. They have not disappeared as lifeless corpses inside land. We have buried them as 
seeds of liberation in the lap of our mother. Mother history has embraced them. Many thousands 
of individual lives have entered the womb ofhistory. Those lives have become the foetus, and 
have assumed a shape in course of time. They assume the form of independence of the nation. As 
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The deaths of cadres bring Eelam closer in another way also . They 
replenish the struggle. We can best see this in the LTTE's commemorations of 
the dead. When the dead are commemorated through ritual ceremonies, the 
people's passion for the struggle is renewed. During the ceremonies, attendees 
experience a range of emotions which end in them recommitting themselves to 
the struggle. First, they are reminded that the dead died for them: "Our martyrs 
have died for the liberation of his land so that our people could live in our land 
with freedom, dignity and security."44 Those attending the ceremonies feel 
sorrow and guilt for this: "As dogs with contempt I We existed oh Tiger I Only 
yesterday ... I We forgot to guard I The soil that was mother. .. I Full I of empty 
talk I We were mouth ... I As deed you came. "45 Consequently the people express 
grief, wailing and sobbing: "Crying crying every day I The eyes have dried up. I 
Each waking day I Breaks with the hero's death." 46 
The LTTE, however, also reminds the public that these occasions are not 
solely about mourning: "Today is not a day of mourning to weep for the dead nor 
a sad day to plunge into sorrow."47 Once again, experiences of suffering and 
grief(this time, over the loss of a cadre) are transformed: "Hearts exploding in 
sobbing, a sorrow I unbent. I Impossible to stop crying, such a I sorrow indeed 
and yet. .. I Relatives who beat their breast I trembling . .. I And yet. .. therein the 
germ ofbravery I sprouting."48 The deaths of cadres incite the living to renew 
their commitment to Eelam: "On this sacred day when we remember our martyrs 
who have sacrificed their lives for national freedom and attained historical 
immortality, let us pledge to commit ourselves to the cause for which thousands 
of our freedom fighters laid down their lives. "49 The living thus strengthen their 
the child of history, that independent nation called Tamililam will be born soon." LTTE, 
Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed May 12, 
2008), 294. 
44 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation of Martyrs Day Speech 1995" 
http: //www.ltteps.org/?view=419&folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
45 Kaci Anantan, "You Were Mouth, You Came As Deed," trans. by Hellmann Rajanayagam, 
"And Heroes Die," 134. 
46 Putuvai Irattinaturai, "Supporters of the Soil ," trans. by Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And Heroes 
Die," 145. The burial of cadres is referred to as a 'planting' and the dead cadres are referred to as 
seeds. 
47 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation of Martyrs Day Speech 1996," 
http://www.ltteps.org/?view=418&folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
48 Jeya, "He Guards the ' We ', Having Destroyed the 'I ' (Having Destroyed Himself, He Will 
Guard Us)," trans. by Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And Heroes Die," 135. 
49 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation of Martyrs Day Speech 1995" 
http://www.ltteps.org/?view=419&folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
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resolve to pursue Eelam, not wanting the efforts of the dead to be in vain. 50 In 
this way, cadres' deaths bring the liberation of the nation closer. 
The L TTE has developed a range of metaphors to capture how dying 
contributes toward the liberation ofEelam. Once again, the cadres are said to 
defeat death - as seeds that replenish the struggle51 and as historical architects 
that live on in history. 52 They also defeat death because they live on in those who 
take up the struggle: "He exhaled national fire in slow breaths I and passed 
vigour and fierce velocity to Tamil cubs, I once timid and shy as mice, I And now 
lives as the sinew and blood I of armies of pouncing Tigers I pursuing national 
pride and peace and a national paradise."53 
Violence and death are thus construed as liberating acts. In particular, 
dying is considered the ultimate articulation ofliberation. When cadres die in 
battle, they demonstrate that their self is not shackled to worldly desires and 
objects. Furthermore, dying is the ultimate way in which a cadre can contribute 
to the nation's liberation. When cadres die they first, make strategic advances 
that could not be won otherwise, and second, they replenish their comrades' 
commitment to Eelam. We thus see how the L TTE mobilises a group identity 
through notions of liberation. Once again, the theme of becoming emerges - the 
Tamil nation is in a process ofbecoming. This involves not only attaining the 
mechanisms of a state, but also liberating and transforming individuals. Being 
Tamil is thus tied up with this process oftransformation of liberation and 
transformation. 
As we have seen, the L TTE most potently communicates this 
'becoming' through a series of metaphors and images. When cadres die in this 
liberated way, they conquer death and become something else (history, seeds 
etc.). Several ofthe images suggest some sort of metaphorical immortality. 
In some L TTE poems the cadres seem to live on in a more literal sense 
too. The dead are referred to as "children of god" or even gods. 54 In one poem, 
50 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation of Martyrs' Day Speech 1992, 
http://www.ltteps.org/?view=422&folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
51 Trawick, "Reasons For Violence," 140. 
52 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation of Martyrs' Day Speech 1993," 
http://www.ltteps.org/?view=42l&folder=9 (accessed May 16, 2008). 
53 Professor Kopan Mahadeva, "Martyr Thi1eepan," 
http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/Thileepan 5 12 03.htm (May 16, 2008). 
54 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And Heroes Die," I39. -
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the dead watch the struggle from beyond the grave, showing no interest in the 
offerings laid before them: "For us there are no flowers ... I For us there are no 
lamps . .. I For us there is not even this song .. . I For us there is only freedom I For 
us there is only the liberation of the I country."55 In another poem, the dead 
influence the struggle from beyond the grave: "There in the flower world he 
creates I new works I A storm of rays spreading, the thunder I of a volcano." 56 
The dead heroes thus seem to live on in a literal as well as a metaphorical sense. 
Amongst other things, this notion of living on leads scholars to conclude 
that the Tamil public approach the tiyaki as deities. It is to this notion, the 
deification ofthe dead, that scholars impute the category of religion. I now turn 
to these scholarly claims and arguments. 
4.4 The Deification of the Dead: Evidence of Religion? 
Scholars draw on a wide range of evidence to suggest that Tamils 
attending L TTE rituals approach the dead as deities. Several argue that the L TTE 
has formatted its rituals in such a way that it subtly encourages the people to 
worship and propitiate the dead. In their analyses, scholars implicate the category 
of religion and draw conclusions which impact upon how they assess not only 
L TTE rituals and culture, but also the organisation itself In these analyses, the 
meaning of religion is generally taken for granted. In the following discussion, I 
will investigate each scholar' s position on the deification of the dead. Finally, I 
will suggest an alternative reading of the practice, focussing on the nadukal 
tradition. 
Schalk, the first of our scholars, sees the deification of the dead as a 
religious act. But for Schalk, the people's deification of the dead does not 
compromise the LTTE's assertions of secularity, unless the LTTE officially 
endorses the practice. 57 Schalk is thus not interested in trying to determine 
whether the Tamil public regard the mavirar as deities. He only wants to 
55 Putuvai Irattinaturai, "Supporters of the Soil," trans. by Hellmann Rajanayagam, "And Heroes 
Die," 146. 
56 Pantitar Vi. Parantaman, "A King Born From Humanity, " trans . by Hellmann Rajanayagam, 
"And Heroes Die," 140. 
57 Schalk, "Beyond Hindu Festivals," 391. Schalk argues that the LITE's secularity places them 
beyond traditional religion and also beyond religion in principle. For Schalk, the cult of martyrs 
would no longer be rationalistic (or beyond religion in principle) if the LTTE explicitly 
encouraged people to approach the dead as deities. 
95 
establish how the LTTE officially refers to the dead: "What goes on in the mind 
ofthe individual is ... another matter. We focus here only on the official ideology 
ofthe members ofthe movement."58 Schalk maintains that the LTTE does not 
conflate the Great Heroes with deities: ''Nobody expects the Great Hero to react 
to prayers and offerings. He is and remains dead. Furthermore, there is no 
concept of intercession . . . The flowers laid on the grave are according to the 
official norm commemorative tokens, and not offerings forcing the other party to 
reciprocal action. "59 
When Schalk argues that the L TTE does not officially deify the dead, he 
discusses the nadukal (literally, planted stone), the headstones in L TTE 
cemeteries. The term is crucial to how scholars construct their arguments about 
the deification of the dead.60 I will briefly digress and discuss the nadukal before 
returning to Schalk's argument. 
The L TTE has revived the term nadukal from Sang am poetry. In the 
Sangam era, the nadukal referred to a stone that was erected to honour a dead 
hero. The hero was believed to reside within the stone and could be propitiated 
through offerings: "The spirit of the dead hero was identified with the stone and 
was worshipped and sacrificed to."61 The nadukal of the Sangam era were 
always erected on the outskirts ofthe village. 
Schalk argues that the L TTE does not represent its nadukal as auspicious 
stones that house deified heroes.62 Instead, he claims that the term nadukal has 
been appropriated for other reasons. Like the Sangam nadukal, the LTTE's 
nadukal potently marks a territorial claim.63 Furthermore, the LTTE's nadukal, 
like the ancient nadukal, is public property. By calling the headstones nadukal, 
the L TTE has been able to present its funerals and graveyards as public events 
and spaces and thus distinguish its own rituals from kinship rituals. 64 With this 
argument, Schalk affirms his position - the L TTE officially endorses only the 
commemoration, and not the deification ofthe dead. The LTTE does not 
58 Ibid., 398. 
59 Ibid., 398. 
60 Schalk, "The Revival OfMartyr Cults Among Ilavar," 183. The LTTE also refer to these 
stones by other names: camati and kallarai. 
6 1 Ibid ., 183. 
62 Ibid., 185. 
63 Ibid., 184. 
64 Ibid. 
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represent the nadukal as deified stones. Instead, the LTTE employs the term 
because it evokes a strong sense of territorial allegiance, and because it alludes to 
public ways of honouring the dead. 
Unlike Schalk, Roberts focuses on how people participate in L TTE 
ceremonies. He claims that the LTTE is not completely in control oftheir 
cultural compositions- partly because people are free to interpret them as they 
please, and partly because the LTTE leaders, like all Tamils, have been 
conditioned by deeply ingrained Tamil or Hindu traditions. 65 The LTTE 
leadership thus believes in its own productions, and is not completely aware of 
what makes its compositions so powerfully evocative. 66 
Because the L TTE is not completely autonomous in how it handles 
tradition, Roberts argues that we must not attend merely to what the LTTE say 
about their rituals. 67 Ifwe want to understand why these rituals resonate with the 
Tamil people and how they evoke the response they do, we must investigate the 
rituals themselves and their connections to Tamil tradition.68 When we do this, 
Roberts argues that we heed (what he calls) the "cosmological conditioning" of 
Tamils, "a grounding that goes back many centuries."69 
Roberts argues that LTTE rituals resemble entrenched Tamil practices. 
He suggests that these similarities (between LTTE rituals and Tamil traditions) 
predispose the Tamil public to approach the mavirar as deities. For Roberts, the 
deification ofthe dead is part of a greater argument about the regenerative 
quality ofLTTE rituals: "Some Tamils (including some Tigers) may renew their 
faith and derive sakti from their sincere acts of devotion to the dead - dead who 
may even be regarded as deities."70 Roberts does not definitively argue that the 
Tamil public approach the dead as deities. He offers it as a suggestion only. 71 In 
stronger terms, however, he argues that L TTE rituals possess a regenerative 
dynamic that also pervades traditional Tamil Hindu practices. 
65 Michael Roberts, "Saivite Symbols, Sacrifice, and Tamil Tiger Rites," Social Analysis 49: I 
(2005): 68-9. 
66 Michael Roberts, "Filial Devotion in Tamil Culture and the Tiger Cult of Martyrdom," 
Contributions to Indian Sociology 30:2 ( 1996): 258. 
67 Roberts, "Tamil Tiger 'Martyrs,"' 498 . 
68 Ibid., 505. In another article, Roberts argues that this cosmological conditioning applies to both 
Hindu and Christian Tamils. Roberts, "Saivite Symbols, Sacrifice, and Tamil Tiger Rites," 69. 
69 Michael Roberts, "Tamil Tiger 'Martyrs,"' 505. 
70 Ibid ., 503 . 
71 Ibid ., 505. 
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In order to advance his suggestion that the dead are being deified, Roberts 
offers three pieces ofevidence. 72 All three involve Tamil or Hindu traditions: 
votive rituals, the nadukal and the tradition of burying sannyasins (ascetics). 
Roberts focuses particularly on the votive rituals in which Tamils partake. He 
suggests that the similarities between L TTE rituals and votive rituals induce 
Tamils to approach the dead cadres as deities, asking for their succour and 
blessing. Just as Tamils perform votive rituals to seek favour from the deities, so 
too do the Tamil public propitiate the mavirar while they pay homage, seeking 
arul (grace or divine presence) or darsanam ("the act of seeing and being seen by 
a deity, an exchange of vision, an auspicious sight, or a blessing deriving from 
the gaze of a deity"). 73 
Roberts also refers to the nadukal to support his claims about the 
deification of the dead. Roberts argues that when the LTTE uses the term 
nadukal, it either deliberately or unintentionally suggests that its nadukal, like 
the Sangam nadukal, houses a deified hero.74 While Schalk refers to how the 
L TTE officially represents the nadukal tradition, Roberts thus discusses the 
evocative power of the term nadukal. 
The final piece of evidence that Roberts offers pertains to ascetics. 
Roberts connects the Hindu tradition ofburying ascetics to the LTTE's decision 
to bury its dead. As explained earlier, the L TTE has chosen to bury its mavirar, a 
practice that departs from the Hindu tradition of cremating the dead. While 
cremation was and is the norm in Hindu society, Roberts alerts us to how 
sannyasins (ascetics) were traditionally buried. "Sannyasins are a special 
category of persons: the path to the status of exemplary ascetic involves the 
burning away of one's former life, a form of death in other words. So sannyasins 
are buried and their shrines are regarded as a locus of divine power."75 
Traditionally, ascetics were buried and then revered as supernatural beings that 
could effect change from beyond the grave. Once again, Roberts demonstrates 
how a Tamil practice converges with the LTTE's practice. He argues that the 
LTTE induces the Tamil people to approach the dead as deities, when it refers to 
72 Roberts also uses all three pieces of evidence (alongside other evidence) to support his claim 
that L TIE rituals have a regenerative dynamic. 
73 Roberts, "Pragmatic Action and Enchanted Worlds," 91-2. 
74 Roberts, "Tamil Tiger 'Martyrs,"' 500. 
75 Ibid., 499. 
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its dead- dead that are buried- as ascetics. Roberts thus conducts a threefold 
analysis where he elicits similarities between L TIE rituals and Tamil traditions. 
Based on this he concludes that the mavirar are "perhaps deified dead like those 
reposing in nadukal in the Tamil past."76 
Roberts argues that the deification of the dead, like the regenerative 
dynamic, is evidence that the LITE's symbolism and rhetoric has non-rational, 
enchanted facets. The connection between religion and the 'enchanted' is not 
always clear in Roberts' writings. Sometimes Roberts connects the enchanted to 
votive rituals or Hindu practices, and other times to anything which holds some 
kind of symbolic or non-rational meaning. 77 While Roberts is ambiguous about 
what the enchanted is, he is clear that the enchanted can and does coexist 
alongside the rational facets ofLTTE practice. The deification ofthe dead is 
evidence of this. As mentioned in the Introduction, Roberts uses this analysis to 
claim that the LITE resembles AI Qaeda. Both organisations draw on a 
combination of enchanted sensibilities and rational considerations. 
Natali, the third scholar whom I discuss, has conducted fieldwork in the 
North-east and has interviewed LITE cadres and members ofthe Tamil public. 
She argues that the Tamil people regard the tuy ilum illam as temples and the 
mavirar as deities. "When I asked if Tuillum I !lam were cemeteries, all the 
people replied saying 'How can you say such a thing? Tuillam !!lam are temples, 
gods are seeded [buried] there. "'78 Natali assumes that this interpretation (that the 
dead are deities and the tuyilum illam are temples) is incongruous with the 
LITE's interpretation ofthe graveyards as secular places. Furthermore, she 
assumes that the LITE is aware, as she is, ofthis discrepancy. According to 
Nat ali, the L TIE leaders choose not to reject this religious interpretation 
"because it allows them to include the tuillum illam in the mainstream of Hindu 
tradition." 79 Elsewhere she says: "I would argue that the attitude oft he L TIE 
with regard to the identification of the Maaveerar with gods emerges as an 
ambiguous but necessary one .. . the idea that Tuillum !flam are temples where the 
76 Roberts, "Pragmatic Action and Enchanted Worlds," 92. 
77 Ibid ., 94, 87. At one point, Roberts di scusses how the L TIE uses jasmine flowers in their 
ceremonies. He claims that this is evidence of the enchanted. 
78 Natali , "Building Cemeteries, Constructing Identities. Funerary Practices and Nationalist 
Discourse Among the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka," 
http: //www.basas.ac.uklconference05/natali, %20cristiana.pdf (accessed April 26, 2008) 
79 Ibid. 
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Maaveerar/gods are worshipped allows the LTTE to avoid a break with the 
religious feelings of civilians, guaranteeing popular consent to the new project of 
nation-building. "80 
Of the three scholarly analyses, Natali's conclusions worry me the most. 
She claims that the LTTE does not dissuade the people from this 'religious' 
interpretation, because it enables the organisation to represent burial as an 
acceptable, Tamil practice. 81 Natali thus suggests that the leaders of the LTTE 
tum a blind eye to this religious interpretation, knowing that it contravenes the 
organisation's secular proclamations. One might pursue her line ofreasoning 
further and argue that the L TTE is not serious about its secularity. But is it 
necessary to derive such conclusions? If people are propitiating the dead, this 
certainly adds something to how the L TTE officially presents the rituals. But 
does it necessarily follow that the LTTE really see it as a divergence? 
When all three scholars analyse the deification of the dead, they apply the 
categories of religion and the secular as self-evident, descriptive categories. 
Schalk assumes that the deification ofthe dead is an inherently religious act that 
would compromise the LTTE's secularity ifthe organisation officially endorsed 
the practice. On the other hand, Roberts argues that the deification ofthe dead is 
an enchanted practice. Because L TTE rituals implicitly encourage the practice, 
the L TTE should not be understood (from an analytical perspective) as a secular 
organisation. Natali, like Schalk, also sees the deification of the dead as an 
inherently religious practice. Unlike Schalk, however, she argues that the 
people's deification of the dead compromises the LTTE's secularity because the 
L TTE ignores the practice. 
These arguments all assume that religion is a self-evident phenomenon 
when, in fact , it is defined and redefined in different contexts. When we expose 
how these arguments rely upon conventional understandings of religion and the 
secular we begin to realise the true limitations of these scholarly analyses. In 
sum, the three scholars inform us of only two things: that the Tamil public 
possibly approach the dead as deities; and that the LTTE does not officially or 
explicitly refer to the dead as deities. While these scholars assess the deification 




deification ofthe dead might be involved in the LTTE's representation of a 
secular, national identity. 
4.5 Deification of the Dead: An Alternative Reading 
Before I advance an alternative reading, I want to discuss three key issues 
pertaining to the deification ofthe dead which highlight where further research 
needs to be done. 
First, I am not completely convinced that the Tamil public defmitely 
approach the dead as deities. More research needs to be conducted into whether 
Tamils regard the mavirar as deities who can interact with and influence the 
living. Second, we need to better understand what the L TTE mean when they 
describe their cult of martyrs as a secular one. Unfortunately, I have no 
independent statements from the L TTE which explain how and why its cult of 
martyrs is secular. Consequently, I have had to rely on reported statements from 
scholars. Because scholars assume that the meaning ofthe secular is self-evident, 
they do not specifically focus on what the LTTE's declarations of secularity 
mean. Consequently, they confuse their own analysis ofthe LTTE's secular 
proclamations with the actual proclamations. Third, we require more information 
about how the LTTE regards the deification ofthe dead. Does the organisation 
perceive the practice as a threat to its secular proclamations? Does it therefore 
avert attention from the practice? The answers which emerge can be used to 
determine how the LTTE represents the secular. For example, we might discover 
that the L TTE is aware that the international community would not regard the 
practice as a secular one. We might thus find that the L TTE, influenced by the 
opinion of the international community, regards the practice as a threat to its 
secularity. Ifthis is the case, we can conclude that the LTTE's representations of 
the secular are influenced by how powerful, Western secular nations understand 
what it means to be secular. 
As I do not know what the LTTE's position is on the factors presented 
above, I will assume a possible position and then propose interpretations based 
on it. I assume that there are Tamils who approach the dead mavirar as deities. I 
also postulate that the LTTE's notion ofthe secular does not preclude the 
deification of the dead. Consequently, I assume that the deification of the dead 
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does not impinge on the LTTE's declarations of secularity. From these premises 
I offer three readings. In the first two, I suggest how the deification of the dead 
might be represented as a secular practice, and in the last, I demonstrate how the 
deification of the dead might be represented as a religious practice which enables 
the people to practise their religious freedom. 
These suggestions are obviously contradictory. But the point of the 
exercise is not to provide definitive conclusions, but rather to suggest alternative 
ways of approaching the deification ofthe dead. In doing so, I follow Asad ' s 
exhortation to repudiate the categories ofreligion and the secular as they are 
conventionally understood. I do not assume that the deification of the dead is an 
inherently religious practice. Instead, I analyse how the practice is involved in 
representing a secular, national identity. 82 
My first suggestion (that the deification of the dead may be represented 
and mediated as a secular practice) is connected to Schalk's observation that the 
L TTE is selective in how it uses the nadukal concept. Schalk shows how there 
are significant differences between how the LTTE's concept ofthe nadukal is 
employed by the LTTE and the nadukal ofthe Sangam era. But the LTTE has 
been selective not only in how it applies the term, but also in its choice ofthe 
concept. 
The L TTE has derived the term nadukal from Sangam literature. 83 
Historians as well as nationalists refer to this literature when they discuss Tamil 
culture and customs during the Sangam era. The Sangam era is depicted by the 
L TTE and others as a pre-caste, pre-religious era in Dravidian history84 where 
egalitarian, secular values flourished . "The argument that the Sangam society 
was secular and caste-free and the social and religious divisions among the 
present day Tamils are due to the 'Aryan' influence is a favourite one advanced 
by Tamil nationalist groups in Tamil Nadu and the Tigers." 85 Given that the 
nadukal is drawn from Sangam literature, it is possible that the LTTE represents 
82 My investigation is highly speculative. I cannot speak or read Tamil which makes it difficult 
for me to carry out any conclusive examination. I thus qualify all my conclusions as suggestions 
only! 
83 The Purananuru anthology (discussed in the previous chapter) is one anthology within this 
body ofliterature. 
84 Cheran, The Sixth Genre, 20. Cheran argues that Sangam society cannot be said to be caste free 
except perhaps for in a relative sense, "relative to early north Indian society as evidenced by 
literature and the later Tamil society." 
85 Ibid. 
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the worship of the dead at the nadukal as a non-religious act drawn from the pre-
religious Sangam era. The practice may be considered a cultural, rather than a 
religious practice. 
There is a second way in which the practice might be represented as a 
secular one. If we leave aside its connection to the Sangam era, we might argue 
that the deification of the dead is represented as a religious idiom transferred into 
a secular context. Just as Western nationalists reposition sacrificial, Christian 
vocabulary in a secular context, so too do the L TTE reformulate a Saivite idiom 
(the worship of the dead as deities) within a new context. Western secular 
nationalists do not see this vocabulary as compromising their secularity. 
Similarly the people's deification of the dead may be represented and mediated 
as a secular practice that has religious origins but no religious meaning. 
Because we as Westerners do not associate the deification of the dead 
with secular ideals, it does not mean that the L TTE cannot represent and mediate 
the practice as a secular one. Ifwe recall Asad's example of France, Britain and 
America, the secular can be represented in diverse ways. The deification of the 
dead certainly adds another dimension to the LTTE's commemorative rituals. 
But the L TTE need not necessarily tum a blind eye to the practice. Instead, the 
organisation may represent the deification ofthe dead as a secular practice which 
complements (rather than contradicts) its official commemorations. 
My third proposition is that the deification of the dead is represented and 
mediated as a religious practice through which the people express their religious 
freedom. I offer this suggestion based on a statement which Schalk makes: "It is 
not unusual to divinise a dead prominent person in South India, and in some 
cases a living person also. A dedication of one's person to a divinised person is 
natural. .. Many of them [Sri Lankan Tamils] are Uust normal) Caivas ... What else 
could they do than express their grief in a Caiva idiom?" 86 
Here, Schalk does discuss the deification of the dead as a Saivite practice. 
Perhaps, then, the deification ofthe dead is represented as a Saivite practice 
through which Saivites express their religious freedom. The L TTE has long 
proclaimed that the Tamil people are at liberty to practise their own religious 
traditions. For the LTTE, being religious (whether Hindu or Christian) is not 
86 Schalk, "Historisation of the Martial Ideology of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam," 66. 
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antithetical to being Tamil. In this case, the deification of the dead is not part of 
the LTTE 's official nadukal concept. But the LTTE does not repress or artfully 
ignore the practice, even though the practice may diverge from its focus on 
commemorating the dead. Instead the practice is represented and understood as 
an expression of the people's religious freedom - a representation which is 
entirely in keeping with the LTTE 's secularism. 
I have offered three readings ofhow the deification of the dead could be 
understood alongside the LTTE's secular proclamations. On the one hand, I have 
suggested how the deification of the dead might be regarded as a secular practice, 
and on the other, I have delineated how it might be represented and mediated as 
an expression of the people's religious freedom, guaranteed to them through the 
LTTE's policy ofsecularism. Either way, the practice has a strong egalitarian 
emphasis. The deities are fellow Tamils who have died fighting for the 
realisation of Eelam. This powerfully reinforces the horizontal comradeship 
which characterises all nationalist discourses. The deification of the dead also 
underlines the liberating quality of death which we identified earlier. Dying 
unleashes a powerful transformation where the dead liberate the self, bring 
Eelam closer, replenish the cause, and possibly influence the struggle from 
beyond the grave. The theme ofbecoming and transformation emerges once 
again. When scholars analyse the deification of the dead as a religious practice, 
they miss how the practice complements the LTTE's depiction of death and 
violence as creative, transformative, liberating acts. In other words, they miss 




Exploring Becoming and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study has been structured by two interrelated interests: the religious 
difference between Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms and the LTTE's 
representations of national identity. With regards to the first issue, I argued that 
the LTTE's nationalism does have content that we might anachronistically call 
religious. But this content differs in important ways from the Buddhist rhetoric 
and symbols of the Sri Lankan government. The religious difference thus does 
not pertain to the content itselfbut to how Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists 
represent the categories of religion and the secular through this content. In this 
study, I also discussed how scholars implicate the categories when they assess 
Sinhalese, and more particularly Tamil nationalism. When scholars apply the 
categories of religion and the secular in self-evident ways, they often ignore how 
Sinhalese and Tamil people perceive the government and the L TTE. How useful 
is it to argue that the LTTE's nationalism has religious facets , when LTTE cadres 
see their movement as a secular one? "When we die, we have no religion."' 
With regards to the second issue, I argued that the LTTE mobilises a 
group identity through a variety of claims, traditions and experiences. I explored 
these mobilisation tools when I discussed two L TTE discourses: history, and 
violence and death. I focussed on how the LTTE mobilises a group identity 
through claims, practices and arguments that are represented as being secular; 
reworked Tamil traditions and shared experiences of suffering and liberation. As 
I discussed these features, it became clear that these discourses emphasise 
experiences ofbecoming and transformation. The LTTE promises to radically 
transform individuals (who partake in the struggle), Tamil society (caste and 
dowry practices, and gender relations) and finally, Tamil culture (Vellalar values 
and Tamil martial traditions). The LTTE thus acknowledges that Tamil identity 
is in a state of change. This sense of becoming is an important facet of how the 
LTTE mobilises a group identity; being part of this current process of 
transformation is an important part of what it means to be a Tamil. 
1 Trawick, "Reasons for Violence," 155. 
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As I have discussed, this focus on transformation is quite extraordinary. It 
enables the LTTE to both draw on and explicitly diverge from Tamil traditions. 
Furthermore, it enables the LTTE to celebrate this divergence. We expect 
nationalists to choose and modify tradition. We do not, however, expect 
nationalists to explicitly celebrate this process of selection and revision. 
Nationalists usually appeal to the essence of a tradition or culture, claiming that 
they are stripping tradition of all accretions, of all that is not truly culture. The 
L TTE sometimes advances this claim. For the most part, however, it explicitly 
celebrates its revision of and divergence from tradition. 
The LTTE's emphasis on becoming and transformation manifests in other 
equally unexpected ways. For example, the L TTE promises to transform the 
people ' s suffering in the post-colonial past; it thus emphasises a strikingly recent 
history. In doing so, the L TTE implies that Tamil identity is grounded in the 
recent past. Once again, this is quite extraordinary. We do not expect nationalists 
to locate national identity in recent events. Instead we expect nationalists to 
argue that the nation, and therefore national identity, extend back to the furthest 
reaches oftime. The LTTE's emphasis on becoming is thus an unusual, but 
important part ofhow the LTTE mobilises a group identity. Scholars miss this 
insight, in part, because they depend on conventional understandings of religion 
and the secular. 
Here, in the conclusion, I will elaborate on the L TTE 's process of 
'becoming. ' Finally, I will suggest how future studies on the L TTE or Sri Lanka 
might draw on the conclusions arrived at in this study. Here, I return to Asad ' s 
theory. 
5.1 Tamil Identity: A Secular State of Becoming 
Given that the L TTE does not seem to posit a cultural essence, we might ask how 
the LTTE justifies the transformation that it promises. The following extract 
from an L TTE text gives us some insights into this question: 
The monumental growth in knowledge and the resulting global outlook is 
taking humanity into a new era. Ideas, views and philosophies are 
changing in tandem with this growth in knowledge and this is resulting in 
changes in society. Yet within the Sinhala nation, there is little change in 
its ideas and philosophies ... The Sinhala nation remains mislead by the 
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mythical ideology of the Mahavamsa and remains trapped in the 
chauvinistic sentiments thus created? 
The LTTE suggests that its transformation of society (and all that it entails) is 
based on enlightened choices. This is how the LTTE explains its selection and 
revision ofTamil tradition; it retains and even betters all that is enlightened, and 
discards all that is backward. 
In the quote above, we see the L TTE imply that the Sinhalese are blinded 
by a fanatical , religious ideology, an ideology which prevents them from making 
enlightened choices. The LTTE thus connects its transformation, its process of 
becoming, to enlightened, secular decisions and arguments. We have seen these 
connections elsewhere in this study. For example, in Chapter Four, we saw how 
the LTTE asserts its secularity when it presents its violence (and the 
transformation it entails) as just, rational and necessary. In this way, the LTTE 
connects its violence (and the transformation which its violence brings) to 
secular, enlightened choices. 
The LTTE also presents its transformation ofTarnil society as being 
predicated on enlightened choices. As I mentioned in Chapter Two, the LTTE 
wants to liberate the nation not only from government oppression, but also from 
oppressive cultural traditions and practices: "Only by making fundamental 
changes in social relations, we [sic] can get rid of oppressive forms prevalent in 
society and establish frrmly equality and social justice. "3 As discussed in Chapter 
Two, the LTTE has challenged the hegemony of the Vellalars. It has banned 
caste and dowry practices, which Vellalars have long employed to assert their 
elite status. The LTTE severely punishes those who defy such interdictions.4 
Like liberation from government oppression, this social liberation thus emanates 
"from the barrel of a gun."5 
The eradication of gender discrimination is another part ofthe societal 
transformation that the L TTE promises. Once again, this transformation is 
presented as an enlightened choice: "Oppression ofwomen is a complicated 
social problem; social cruelty has deep entrenched roots in our cultural life from 
2 Velupillai Prabhakaran, "English Translation of Martyrs' Day Speech 2006," 
http://www.ltteps.org/?view= 1776&fo1der=9 (accessed May 16, 2008) 
3 L TIE, Reflections of the Leader, http ://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 290. 
4 Schalk, "Women Fighters of the Liberation Tigers in Tamil Ilam," 169. 
5 Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The Jaffua Social System," 277. 
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antiquity. Our movement is determined to throw out this social injustice root and 
branch. "6 Some scholarly work suggests that the L TTE has been inconsistent in 
how it has represented the role ofwomen. 7 Previously, the traditional roles 
ascribed to women have been represented as an integral part ofTarnil tradition 
which should be retained. More recently, however, the L TTE has repudiated 
many traditional practices towards women, asserting that these practices are 
oppressive. 
We have thus seen how the LTTE emphasises a secular state ofbecoming 
- not only through experiences of suffering and liberation, and reworked Tamil 
tradition, but also through the societal transformation that it promises. In this 
process of transformation, the Tamil people are refined along with Tamil society, 
culture and tradition: "Our people have been (like gold) purified in the smithy of 
Sinhala communal suppression; they have faced the extreme heat of state 
terrorism; they are used always [sic] to carry the cross of suffering; they live, 
lying down and sleeping under the shadow of death."8 
In this study, I have argued that scholars neglect this sense ofbecoming 
that pervades L TTE discourses. 9 This oversight occurs at least partly because 
they are fixated on the categories on religion and the secular. Hellmann 
Rajanayagam, Roberts and Nat ali apply self evident definitions of religion to the 
LTTE's nationalism. In particular, they miss how the LTTE represents itself as 
selecting and shaping Tamil tradition. 
Schalk does assert that the L TTE is autonomous in how it employs 
tradition. Unfortunately, he words this as an analytical statement. He argues that 
the L TTE picks and chooses aspects of tradition, consequently it is not 
influenced by the traditions on which it draws: "These producers of martial 
6 LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 290. 
7 Hellmann Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers, 69-70. According to Hellmann Rajanayagam, the 
LTTE's position on the role of women in the struggle has changed considerably: "While in 
former years, their criticism consisted mainly in deriding the dowry system for the burden it puts 
on brothers and in denouncing the rape of Tamil girls by the Sinhalese army because this renders 
them unfit for marriage to respectable Tamil men, remarks have become somewhat more ... 
' heroic ' now ... in stark contrast to a release of the Voice of Tigers some years ago, where the 
contribution of the women fighters seemed to consist not least in dancing Bharatnatyam in battle 
dress!" 
8 LTTE, Reflections of the Leader, http://publications.uu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=8404 (accessed 
May 12, 2008), 279. 
9 Roberts does identify this sense of becoming when he discusses the regenerative dynamic that 
pervades LITE discourse. 
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concepts in the Office of Great Heroes seem to be sovereign and not predisposed 
and predetermined in their approach to the cultural heritage. They are not 
'outpourings' ofit." 10 Hellmann Rajanayagam and Roberts argue against Schalk, 
claiming that the LTTE is influenced by Tamil traditions in ways that its leaders 
are not aware of 
Of course, Hellmann Rajanayagam and Roberts are right. The LTTE is 
influenced by Tamil traditions which shape Tamil people's ontologies and 
epistemologies. And the organisation may not always be aware of these 
influences. What Hellmann Rajanayagam and Roberts miss, however, is the way 
in which the L TTE claims to handle tradition. While the L TTE might not be 
entirely autonomous in how it employs tradition (as Schalk claims it is), it 
nonetheless represents itself as handling Tamil tradition in an autonomous, 
explicitly selective way. 
5.2 Suggestions for Future Research: Returning to Asad 
From the foregoing discussion, we can see that Asad's notion of 
representation is useful for discussing not only the categories of religion and the 
secular, but also the notion of tradition. Future studies must thus distinguish how 
the L TTE represents tradition from how it is influenced by tradition. This is one 
way in which future research on the LTTE would benefit from an Asad-based 
approach. 
Asad's analytical approach can be applied to the Sri Lankan situation in 
many other ways that I have been unable to cover in this thesis. As I suggested in 
the previous chapter, I believe that further research needs to be done to determine 
how the LTTE understands its declarations of secularity. This is an important 
part of how the LTTE represents the secular. I also believe that a more 
comprehensive comparative study between Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms is 
required. Perhaps future studies might be done which focus on the explicitly 
secular character ofTamil nationalism and the implicitly religious character of 
Sinhalese nationalism. 
In addition to this, I think a comparative study must examine the key 
sensibilities which underpin Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms. Here I return to 
10 Schalk, "Historisation of the Martial Ideology of the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Ealam 
(LTTE)," 63. 
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Asad's reconstructed secular. For Asad, the reconstructed secular is characterised 
by particular modem sensibilities which emphasise a sense of this-worldliness 
and an apprehension of the real. 
Asad makes a valuable point through his reconstructed secular: while 
modem discourses, institutions and organisations claim to depict the world as it 
truly is, they actually present another conception of the world. In other words, 
modem discourses do not really apprehend the world as it is, although the claim 
that they do is an important part of how they are structured. We can yield 
interesting insights when we approach the modem depiction of the world as just 
that- one possible conception of the world. I think there are two possible 
applications of this for future research on Sri Lanka. First, we can specifically 
examine how modem sensibilities structure L TTE discourses. And second, we 
can more generally compare how Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms draw on 
these modem sensibilities. 
I would like to provide one example ofhow we might analyse LTTE 
practices in such a way. This suggestion provides a counterpoint to an argument 
advanced by Michael Roberts. After I have given an overview of Roberts' 
argument, I will provide this alternative analysis that attends to modem 
sensibilities, rather than Tamil tradition. 
Roberts claims that LTTE rituals, like Tamil traditions, have a 
regenerative quality. As part ofhis argument, he identifies how the people' s 
suffering is transformed during L TTE rituals: "Grief and suffering are not the 
only motifs that run through these ceremonies and their contexts ... the homage to 
the dead on 27 November every year since 1989 is a gathering of strength and an 
act ofrenewal. It mobilises, remembers, respects, legitimizes, transcends, and 
inspires." 11 Roberts argues that this regenerative dynamic arises out of 
similarities between Tamil traditions and L TTE ceremonies; the Tamils who 
participate in L TTE ceremonies are renewed in much the same way as those who 
partake in traditional rituals. 
Roberts classifies this regenerative dynamic as an enchanted facet which 
coexists alongside the rational facets ofLTTE practice (strategic thinking etc). 12 
While the enchanted facets concern symbolic meanings and intangible 
11 Roberts, "Saivite Symbols, Sacrifice, and Tamil Tiger Rites," 82-3. 
12 Roberts, "Tamil Tiger 'Martyrs,"' 494. 
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possibilities, Roberts seems to assume that the rational facets ofLTTE practice 
apprehend the world as it is. He does not, however, consider whether the modem, 
so-called rational facets ofLTTE practice also reflect a particular conception of 
the world. 
I would argue that the regenerative dynamic (which Roberts attributes to 
Hindu concepts and rituals) could easily be attributed to modem sensibilities 
which Asad describes as secular (in the reconstructed sense). I will present some 
of the modem, secular sensibilities that Asad identifies pertaining to pain and 
suffering, agency and resistance, and history and empowerment. I will show how 
we can explain the regenerative dynamic that Roberts identifies through these 
modem, secular sensibilities. 
In the modem era, new sensibilities (which Asad identifies as secular) 
arose around pain: "Pain was increasingly regarded as having an origin entirely 
internal to a mechanistic world, and therefore susceptible only to the action of 
elements in that world." 13 This has retrospectively been referred to as the 
secularisation of pain. But Asad argues that those who classify this new 
conception of pain as 'disenchanted' or 'secular' fail to attend to the presence of 
new patterns of sensibility and different ways of objectifying pain. 14 In the 
secular ontological world, pain is perceived as an external force that represses 
and subjugates the individual. 15 In the form of suffering, it is also a human 
condition that secular agency seeks to eliminate universally. 16 In secular 
discourse, pain is thus intimately connected to agency. 
Asad argues that the secular formulation of agency is not a natural 
category (a way of cognising the real), although academic and medical 
discourses treat it as such. 17 The secular formulation of agency is only one 
depiction of what it means to be an agent; and, like other depictions, it too makes 
possible different ways of acting and being. In the secular formulation, 
13 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 46. 
14 Ibid. , 46-8. 
15 Ibid. , 71. 
16 Ibid., 67 . 
17 Ibid., 73, 68. "Even in the growing field of medical anthropology, where innovative work has 
given us a cultural understanding of health and disease, the standard meaning of agency is taken 
too much for granted. The sick body is often represented no differently from the healthy body in 
that for both resistance to power is the form that agency typically takes. I find such views 
troubling because they attribute individual agency to the sick body translating all its states and 
movements directly into ' dissent.'" 
Ill 
individuals are considered either victims or agents.18 While external forces like 
power and pain oppress the individual, the individual, as an agent, has a 
responsibility to resist subjugation, become powerful and overcome suffering. 
Agents must strive to empower themselves and replace pain with pleasure. As a 
form of agency, resistance to pain or power is a response to an implied 
metaphysical question: "What should human beings do to realise their freedom, 
empower themselves and choose pleasure (given that they are essentially free, 
naturally sovereign and given to their own desires and interests)?" 19 
The LTTE's discourse on violence and death seems to conform strikingly 
to these formulations of suffering and pain, and agency and resistance. The 
LTTE constitutes and explains its cadres ' agency in relation to the people' s 
historical and continued suffering. L TTE cadres are the agents and the people are 
the victims whose suffering they are fighting to eradicate. This is why the deaths 
ofLTTE cadres are meaningful in a way that civilians' deaths are not. Even 
though both LTTE cadres and Tamil civilians die at the hands ofthe government, 
the LTTE's deaths are empowered, agentive acts, whereas the deaths ofthe 
Tamil people are in vain. Through their acts ofviolence and death also , cadres 
empower themselves and thus transform suffering. Because they die in an 
empowered, agentive way, death cannot conquer L TTE cadres. 
Asad connects agency to history (or what I called Enlightenment History 
in Chapter Three). In this regard too, we can see how LTTE discourses might be 
shaped by modem, secular sensibilities. Secular, modem ideas about agency are 
tied to a progressivist history; individuals and nations journey towards truth and 
freedom when they act as agents, realising their freedom, empowering 
themselves and choosing pleasure. In the context of the nation state, men and 
women of each national society make and own their history.20 We can thus see 
that the cadres' deaths are considered agentive not only because they are 
evidence of resistance or empowerment, but also because they are connected to 
history making. This explains why the LTTE discuss the cadres' contribution as 
a historical one. 
18 Ibid ., 79. 
19 Ibid ., 71. 
20 Ibid., 192-3. 
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The regenerative dynamic which Roberts attributes to Tamil, Hindu 
traditions and practices can thus be explained by these modern sensibilities. 
When living cadres (and members ofthe public) attend LTTE ceremonies, they 
overcome their experiences of suffering (the loss of comrades), becoming agents 
who are inspired to go forth and make their own contribution to Eelam, a 
contribution which is depicted as a historical achievement. This explanation does 
not necessarily disprove Roberts ' argument. LTTE rituals may very well imply 
notions of regeneration. What I want to suggest, however, is that we must 
recognise that modernity presents yet another conception of the world and is thus 
characterised by its own ontological and epistemological assumptions. When we 
recognise this we can assess how modern sensibilities might be involved in 
L TTE practices. 
When we attend to the sensibilities which underpin discourses as well as 
the representations of religion and the secular which these discourses 
promulgate, we obtain important insights into the evocative power of the 
discourses. This point brings me to my second suggestion for how Asad 's 
reconstructed secular might be useful for future research. 
We can compare Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms not only in terms of 
how they represent the secular, but also in terms of the sensibilities and concepts 
which underlie them. When we attend to how Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists 
represent the categories of religion and the secular, we identify key differences 
between them. But when we pinpoint how Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists draw 
on modern sensibilities, we elicit some key similarities between them. 
When Asad characterises nationalism as secular, he points to an 
interesting insight about nationalism which stands regardless of whether we 
agree with his proposition that nationalism is inherently secular. Nationalism 
requires both a universal discourse as well as other particularising discourses. On 
the one hand, nationalisms appeal to both the universal discourse of nations 
(which Asad would say is an implicitly secular one), which contains an overlap 
between what we (anachronistically) call religion and the secular. For example, 
the nation arouses sentiments often associated with religious sensibilities, and 
yet, it is grounded in this world. But alongside this universal discourse, 
nationalisms must also cultivate particularising discourses which guarantee the 
uniqueness ofthe nation. It is these particularising discourses that can be 
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represented as either secular or religious. Both the Sri Lankan government and 
the L TTE must use history and shared experiences to mobilise a national 
identity. They differ, however, in how they choose to represent the categories of 
religion and the secular within their particularising discourses. In this way, we 
can say that Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms rhyme. 21 They comprise both 
sameness and difference- and this difference concerns how the categories of 
religion and the secular are articulated in relation to national identity. 
This Asad based approach, which I have outlined above, is useful not 
only for studying Sri Lanka, but any situation where representations of religion 
and the secular are involved. Using Asad's ideas, we can redirect our inquiry. 
Rather than determine whether an object is inherently religious or secular, we 
can focus on a number of other inquiries: how do particular representations of 
religion and the secular shape people's identities and their discourses? What are 
the genealogies of particular terms? Has the grammar of particular concepts 
changed? And if so, what does this tell us about representations of religion and 
the secular? What sorts of sensibilities and concepts characterise the discourses 
being examined? 
This analytical framework opens up new, exciting possibilities for 
research on nationalism, and more particularly on nationalism in Sri Lanka. It 
enables us to take the LTTE's declarations of secularity seriously, assessing the 
implications they have for Tamil identity in Sri Lanka. When we focus on how 
religion and the secular are represented, we elicit rich insights, otherwise only 
partially uncovered or entirely overlooked. Such an analysis enables us to 
appreciate how and why the LTTE's depiction of Tamil identity resonates deeply 
amongst the Tamil public. Such a framework thus enables us to understand how 
the L TTE, only one of many militant groups, has risen to power against all odds 
and won the support of many Tamils belonging to different castes, regions and 
socio-economic groups across the island of Sri Lanka. 
21 Ismail, Abiding by Sri Lanka, xv, 85-6. Ismail uses the term ' rhyme ' to describe two 
approaches, positions or objects which hold both sameness and difference. "rhyme in the OED: 
'Agreement in the terminal sounds of two or more words or metrical lines, such that. .. the last 
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